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According to the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST), the normal aging process is 
associated with a greater emphasis on self-regulation of emotional states, and this fosters a 
bias in cognitive processing for information that is positively valenced (e.g., pleasant images 
and autobiographical events, happy faces), such that older adults have better memory for, and 
pay greater attention to, positive relative to negative valenced information (a “positivity 
effect”). Two hypotheses have recently emerged which differ in the cognitive mechanism 
proposed to account for the emergence of aging-related positivity effects. The first, termed 
the “cognitive control” hypothesis, suggests that positivity effects arise from older adults' 
directed application of cognitive efforts to preferentially process positive information, 
essentially a top-down explanation. The second is a bottom-up hypothesis, suggesting that 
positive information is relatively easier (more fluent) for older adults to detect and process, 
compared to negative information, due to changes in amygdala reactivity to negative stimuli, 
and is termed the "processing fluency" hypothesis. To evaluate these hypotheses, I conducted 
a suite of memory and attention experiments and compared performance of younger and 
older adults. I used five different tasks (three different memory tasks, and two different 
attention tasks) which varied with respect to the degree to which each allowed for the use of 
cognitive control, and was reflective in nature, or emphasized fluency (i.e., speed of 
processing and output). In Experiments 1 and 2, I examined the effect of age on two different 
types of memory task that differed with respect to the degree to which participants must rely 
on cognitive control/reflective processing or processing fluency to successfully complete the 
task. Clear positivity effects were found on the task that was reflective in nature 
(autobiographical memory task) but not on the task that relied more heavily on fluency 
(phonemic fluency task). In Experiment 3, I examined whether older adults strategically 
select positive information to later remember (i.e., use cognitive control to regulate encoding 
of positive material), by asking participants to judge the likelihood of remembering positive, 
negative, and neutral pictures for a later memory test. In line with a strategic bias, older, but 
not younger, adults showed a positivity effect in terms of the number of pictures selected as 
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particularly memorable, though both age groups showed a positivity effect in picture recall. 
Within the domain of attention-based tasks, in Experiments 4a and 4b I used a Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm to examine whether older adults were more likely to 
detect (or have attention captured by) rapidly presented positive, than negative or neutral, 
pictures compared to younger adults. Given the rapid rate of presentation in this paradigm, it 
is unlikely that participants would be able to use cognitive control to strategically direct 
attention to positive stimuli, thus performance was taken to measure fluency-mediated biases 
for the pictures of different valence. Results showed little evidence for a positivity effect. In 
Experiments 5a and 5b, again within the domain of attention, I examined whether older 
adults preferentially oriented attention toward positive, and/or away from negative, relative 
to neutral stimuli, on a dot probe task in which trial timings were long enough to allow for 
strategic control. Experiment 5a used faces whereas Experiment 5b used pictures as stimuli, 
in an effort to determine whether findings could generalize across different types of stimuli. 
Some evidence of positivity effects were found, as older adults were less biased to attend to 
negative (angry) faces compared to younger adults. Results across this series of experiments 
are consistent with the hypothesis that positivity effects in older adults' memory and attention 
stem from the strategic application of effortful, reflective, cognitive processing, rather than a 
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Many cognitive abilities change during the course of the life span, and it is well-
established that a general pattern of decline characterizes cognitive functioning during aging. 
However, researchers have begun to illuminate those aspects of cognitive functioning that are 
preserved or actually improve during aging. More specifically, a growing literature delineates 
the intrinsic characteristics of items which can boost cognitive processing in older adults. 
One such characteristic is emotional tone. Cognitive processing of items which evoke 
emotional reactions, such as pictures depicting pleasant or unpleasant events, is typically 
enhanced in younger adults, and recent research indicates that items which evoke positive 
emotions in particular often provide a comparatively larger enhancement to older adults’ 
cognitive processing of those items. The purpose of my thesis is to examine the specific 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie older adults’ superior cognitive processing of positive 
information, in order to determine the circumstances under which positive information is 
most likely to boost cognitive functioning. 
The introduction to this thesis is organized into several sections. I begin with a 
discussion of the relevance of the study of cognitive aging and describe some of the common 
changes in cognitive abilities that occur during the aging process. Next, I introduce the 
socioemotional selectivity theory, a new major theory of aging which provides the theoretical 
basis for my thesis studies. I then outline aging-related changes in emotional experience and 
provide a background on the study of emotion and how it influences cognitive functions. In 
the next section, I proceed to describe the impact of emotions on aging-related changes seen 
in cognitive functions of attention and memory. This is followed by a discussion of the 
currently unresolved debate in the literature on aging-related cognition-emotion interactions, 




1.1 The Importance of Research on Cognitive Aging 
The “silver tsunami” is already upon us. Currently, adults aged 65 or older account 
for 14.1% of the Canadian population, and that value is expected to rise to about 25% by 
2036 (Milan, 2011; Statistics Canada, 2010), with centenarians experiencing the fastest rate 
of growth of any age group (Milan, 2011). By comparison, “older adults” accounted for just 
8% of the Canadian population in 1971, and the rate of population aging will accelerate 
during the coming decades as the large cohort of “baby boomers” born between 1946 and 
1965 turn 65 years of age (Milan, 2011).The upshot of this demographic trend is that the 
number of older adults is projected to surpass the number of children aged 14 years or under 
in the population by 2021 (Milan, 2011). These changes in the age-stratification of society 
are being seen in developed and developing countries around the world (UNPF, 2011). 
In the wake of these demographic changes, unprecedented in human history (UNPF, 
2011), the percent of the general population living with the negative effects of normal aging-
related decline in cognitive functioning will sharply rise. Moreover, in North America, older 
adults are taking a more active approach to managing cognitive decline and are taking 
advantage of cognitive training programs which hold the promise of staving off aging-related 
declines in cognitive abilities, such as video games which claim to improve cognitive 
performance, and memory clinics (e.g., Arnst, 2006; Mossman, 2009). Clearly, older adults 
are very concerned about the negative impact that aging has on many cognitive abilities, and 
they are not alone. Given the high average life expectancy at birth in developed nations 
(UNPF, 2011), most people can expect to grapple with normal aging-related declines in 
cognitive functioning at some point in their lives. As well, almost everyone will be faced, at 
some point, with a family relation or friend of this older generation before they become old 
themselves. As such, the identification of those factors which may boost cognitive 
performance in older adults is key to increasing quality of life and preserving dignity for 
those facing aging-related declines in cognitive abilities. 
 
 3 
1.2 Aging-Related Changes in Cognitive Functioning 
1.2.1 Declines in Cognitive Functioning 
Older adults are right to be concerned about the changes in cognitive abilities that 
they are to expect as they age. It is well-established that a host of cognitive abilities decline 
during the aging process. There are declines in aspects of memory such as episodic memory 
(in recall more so than in recognition) (Craik & McDowd, 1987; Nyberg, Maitland, 
Rönnlund, Bäckman, Dixon, Wahlin, et al., 2003; Rönnlund, Nyberg, Bäckman, & Nilsson, 
2005; Zelinski & Burnight, 1997), which may leave older adults more susceptible to 
developing false memories (e.g., Jacoby, 1999; Watson, McDermott, & Balota, 2004), 
prospective memory (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004), and source memory 
(memory for the source characteristics of information; Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995; 
Glisky, Rubin, & Davidson, 2001). Also, there are aging-related declines in selective 
attention (e.g., Farkas & Hoyer, 1980), change detection, which can affect the ability to drive 
safely (e.g., Caird, Edwards, Creaser, & Horrey, 2005) and the ability to switch between 
performing two different tasks (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). Furthermore, aging is 
accompanied by declines in executive functions/cognitive control processes such as working 
memory (Daigneault & Braun, 1993; Park, Lautenschlager, Hedden, Davidson, Smith, & 
Smith, 2002), allocation of attention to multiple tasks simultaneously (e.g., Holtzer, Stern, & 
Rakitin, 2004), inhibition of irrelevant information (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), verbal fluency 
(Axelrod & Henry, 1992; Daigneault, Braun, & Whitaker, 1992), mental flexibility (Axelrod 
& Henry, 1992; Daigneault, Braun, & Whitaker, 1992),  problem solving (Healey & Hasher, 
2009; Yoon, Cole, & Lee, 2009), error monitoring (West, 2004), and self-initiated retrieval 
from memory (Craik, 1986). Moreover, decrements in the perceptual processing of 
information occur due to declines in visual acuity, ability of the eye to accommodate to low-
light conditions, reduced ability to detect blue hues (Blanks & Dorey, 2009), decreased 
hearing acuity (Pichora-Fuller & MacDonald, 2009), especially for high pitched sounds 
crucial for speech perception (Schneider & Pichora-Fuller, 2000), ability to detect auditory 
signals in noisy backgrounds (Tun, 1998), and considerable increases in speed of 
 
 4 
processing/reaction times (e.g., Park et al., 2002;  Salthouse, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996). These 
declines in sensory functioning also affect older adults’ ability to cognitively process 
information, and can at least partly account for decrements in cognitive performance that 
occur during aging (McDaniel, Einstein, & Jacoby, 2008; Schneider & Pichora-Fuller, 2000).  
For instance, when older adults’ cognitive resources are taxed by attempts to compensate for 
deficits in sensory processing, performance on cognitive tasks can suffer (e.g., McCoy, Tun, 
Cox, Colangelo, Stewart, & Wingfield, 2005; Wingfield, Tun, & McCoy, 2005). 
In addition, a number of changes in brain physiology and functioning occur during 
aging which may negatively impact cognitive functioning. For example, brain volume 
gradually shrinks beginning in young adulthood, and this shrinkage accelerates in middle-age 
(Raz, 2005). This shrinkage is most apparent in the frontal (which subsumes 
executive/cognitive control functions and the ability to flexibly guide behaviour in the face of 
unpredictability in the environment) and parietal regions of the brain, whereas the primary 
perceptual processing areas such as the occipital lobe experience little to no change 
(Pfefferbaum, Sullivan, Rosenbloom, Mathalon, & Lim, 1998; Raz, Lindenberger, Rodrigue, 
Kennedy, Head, Williamson, et al., 2005; Resnick, Pham, Kraut, Zonderman, & Davatzikos, 
2003). Moreover, some areas of the temporal lobes which support memory and emotional 
functioning, such as the hippocampus and amygdala, respectively, show moderate levels of 
atrophy (Malykhin, Bouchard, Camicioli, & Coupland, 2008; Raz et al., 2005; Raz, 
Rodrigue, Head, Kennedy, & Acker, 2004). In addition, the fluid-filled ventricles of the brain 
expand to fill the space left by atrophied tissue, with a corresponding reduction in 
surrounding brain tissue (Raz, 2005), neurons lose myelination (Dennis & Cabeza, 2008) 
which may account for cognitive slowing, and there is a decrease in the synthesis of 
neurotransmitters such as dopamine, which is associated with decrements in cognition 
performance (Bäckman, Ginovart, Dixon, Wahlin, Wahlin, Halldin, et al., 2000; Volkow, 
Wang, Fowler, Ding, Gur, Gatley, et al., 1998). Together with the findings from the literature 
on aging-related changes in cognitive functioning, these changes in brain structure paint a 
very negative picture of cognitive ability in older age. However, a number of cognitive 
abilities are relatively spared. 
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1.2.2 Cognitive Functions that Remain Stable or Improve 
In fact, a number of cognitive abilities can actually improve or remain relatively 
stable throughout midlife and into old age (although these abilities do tend to decline again 
after age 70, e.g., Schaie 1996a,  1996b, 2005), such as semantic memory (Rönnlund et al.,  
2005), general knowledge (Ackerman, 2008), and verbal abilities (Schaie 1996a,  1996b, 
2005), procedural memory (e.g., Smith, Walton, Loveland, Umberger, Kryscio, & Gash, 
2005), implicit memory (Monti, Gabrieli, Reminger, Rinaldi, Wilson, & Fleischman,1996), 
repetition priming (McCarley, Kramer, Colcombe, & Scialfa, 2004), and visual search 
efficiency for static displays (Whiting, Madden, Pierce, & Allen, 2005; Madden, Whiting, 
Cabeza, & Huttel, 2004). Indeed, when older adults can rely on accumulated experience and 
automatic influences to perform a task, age differences can be greatly reduced or eliminated 
(Castel, 2005; Clancy & Hoyer, 1994; Dollinger & Hoyer, 1996; Hoyer & Ingolfsdottir, 
2003; Masson, Carroll, & Micco, 1995; Salthouse, 2012). Moreover, recent research suggests 
a number of cognitive tasks in which older adults either meet or outperform their younger 
adult (this age group is usually composed of 18-30 year olds) counterparts (e.g., Castel, 
2005).  
A growing body of evidence suggests that older adults can accurately remember 
whether an information source is truthful or trustworthy (Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002), are 
superior at making decisions which must take into account the way in which past choices can 
affect future rewards (e.g., Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011), are better 
able to make effective decisions when loss aversion is salient, and as such are less susceptible 
to the sunk cost fallacy (e.g., Strough, Mehta, McFall, & Schuller, 2008). Researchers have 
also become interested in identifying the specific factors which lead to improvements in 
older adults’ cognitive abilities. For instance, it has been found that the subjective value of 
information affects how well the information is later remembered, with age differences in 
memory being attenuated when information is deemed to be high-value (e.g., Castel, 
Humphreys, Lee, Galvan, Balota, & McCabe, 2011; Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007). As 
discussed below, emotional information, specifically positive information, appears to be 
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particularly high-value to older adults as they place a greater emphasis on regulating their 
affective state. 
1.2.3 Improvements in Emotion Regulation: Cognitive Influences on Emotional 
Functioning 
Research has further focused on older adults’ superior emotion regulation relative to 
younger adults. Emotion regulation is defined as “how we try to influence which emotions 
we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express these emotions” (Gross, 
1998b, p. 275). There are a number of strategies that can be used to regulate emotions, which 
vary with respect to their likelihood of successfully reducing the intensity of experienced or 
expressed emotion, as well as the physiological reactions involved in emotional experience 
(Gross, 1998a, 2008; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). For instance, attempting to 
suppress outward displays of negative emotional state (called expressive suppression), is a 
poor strategy as it is not effective in reducing negative emotions, and in fact has been shown 
to increase negative emotions and physiological response to negative stimuli (e.g., Goldin, 
McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Gross, 1998a; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). However, strategies 
such as reappraisal (cognitively reinterpreting a negative situation such that it is viewed as 
less negative; Gross, 2008) are more effective (Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 1998a; McRae et 
al., 2012). Moreover, the neural response differs between these two strategies; although the 
prefrontal cortex is more active when participants engage in both types of strategies, the 
amygdala becomes less active during reappraisal (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005), but more active during expressive suppression (Goldin et al., 2008), 
in line with the decreases in subjective emotional response that follow use of the reappraisal, 
but not expression suppression, strategy. 
Recent research confirms older adults’ superior emotion regulation ability and 
knowledge of successful strategies. For example, older adults report that reappraisal 
strategies are more effective than expressive suppression (Shiota & Levenson, 2009), and 
older are more effective at using positive reappraisal (reinterpreting a negative event in a 
more positive light), as well as equally effective at using expressive suppression as compared 
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with younger adults (Shiota & Levenson, 2009; Urry & Gross, 2010). That older adults 
prefer the use of reappraisal to expressive suppression is good news for those concerned with 
aging-related declines in cognitive functioning, as use of expressive suppression has been 
shown to decrease memory for emotional stimuli (Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000). Hence, 
older adults appear to prefer emotion regulation strategies that may preserve, rather than 
hinder, their cognitive abilities. Furthermore, one study has shown that the act of attempting 
to down-regulate negative emotional states while concurrently performing a cognitive task 
improves older adults’ working memory performance, whereas it decreases working memory 
performance in younger adults, suggesting that emotion regulation is less cognitively taxing 
for older adults than for young (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). This is especially 
relevant as it implies cognitive control, and inhibition, believed to decline in aging, can in 
fact operate, depending on the task materials and motivation of the person. 
Indeed, a major new theory has emerged which accounts for aging-related changes in 
social, emotional, and cognitive functioning, called the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory. It 
paints a much more positive view of the changes that accompany the aging process, and 
challenges previous conceptions of the adaptiveness of socioemotional functioning in aging. 
In my thesis experiments, I test predictions from the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory and 
as such it serves as a major theoretical framework for my thesis.  
1.3 The Socioemotional Selectivity Theory: A New Perspective on Aging 
The socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) is rooted in the field of social 
gerontology, rather than cognitive psychology and, as originally conceived, presents an 
explanation for the pattern of social interactions in aging. In her seminal paper introducing 
the socioemotional selectivity theory, Carstensen (1995) accounts for the well-established 
finding that frequency of social contact is much less in older adults than in younger adults. 
According to Carstensen (1995), other theories maintain that reductions in frequency of 
social contact in older adults are the result of either: 1) fewer opportunities to engage in 
social interactions due to societally imposed life events such as retirement (activity theory; 
Maddox, 1963), or 2) a process in which older adults psychologically prepare for death by 
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focusing more on self-reflection and less on emotional state and social contact 
(disengagement theory; Cumming & Henry, 1961). 
The socioemotional selectivity theory differs in keys ways from these theories in the 
way it accounts for aging-related changes in social activity. First, it assumes that different 
social motives drive social behaviour and that the salience of these motives changes over the 
course of the life span (see Figure 1). As such, Carstensen (1995) characterizes the theory as 
a life-span developmental theory. I will focus on two of the three motives most pertinent to 
my thesis: emotion regulation (referred to here as maintenance of a positive affective state), 
and information seeking (learning new information). SST maintains that the salience of 
emotion regulation is highest during infancy and old age, whereas the salience of information 
seeking peaks in adolescence and young adulthood and declines during middle and old age. 
Carstensen (1995) purports that these changes in motive salience are moderated by the 
factors of experience and perception of time. In terms of the role of experience, information 
seeking is more relevant to young adults as they must gain new skills and information to 
become independent and in doing so must seek information from new social partners. On the 
other hand, older adults, who have accumulated much information, should be less likely to 




Figure 1. Salience of social motives across the lifespan (adapted from Carstensen, 1995). 
According to Carstensen (1995), however, it is time perception that exerts the 
strongest influence on the salience of these social motives (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). When time is perceived to be expansive (such as in young 
adulthood), information seeking goals are predicted to be more salient, and negative affective 
states can be tolerated if they advance the goal of acquiring new information to satisfy long-
term goals. In contrast, when time is perceived to be limited (as in old age), emotion 
regulation goals are predicted to be more salient as it becomes more pressing to satisfy short-
term goals of maintaining a positive affective state.  
Given this logic, older adults are predicted to decrease contact with acquaintances and 
novel social partners relative to young adults, but increase frequency of social contact with 
emotionally meaningful partners such as family. Carstensen (1995) finds confirmation of this 
idea in a reanalysis of data from a longitudinal study (Carstensen, 1992), as well as in 
laboratory (Frederickson & Carstensen, 1990; Fung & Carstensen, 2004) and naturalistic 
(Fung & Carstensen, 2006; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999) studies of social partner 
preferences. In this way, SST accounts for aging-related reductions in frequency of social 
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contact by stating that it is not chronological age, or the biological changes that accompany 
aging, per se that drive this change, but time perception. Thus, circumstances which alter the 
perception of the expansiveness of time should also produce similar patterns of frequency of 
social behaviour. Indeed, a number of studies have shown this to be the case and also provide 
evidence consistent with the idea that selection of social partners according to the social 
motives of emotion regulation and information seeking is an active process (Lang & 
Carstensen, 2002). For instance, terminally ill younger adults (Carstensen & Fredrickson, 
1998), as well as older adults, and younger adults under a perceived time constraint, 
(Frederickson & Carstensen, 1990; Fung & Carstensen, 2004, 2006; Fung, Carstensen, & 
Lutz, 1999) indicate preference for social partners who are familiar and who can contribute 
to a positive affective state. 
In summary, SST postulates that the perception of the expansiveness of time 
determines the salience of motivational goals throughout the life span to either regulate 
emotion or acquire information, and the salience of these goals in turn drives socio-
emotional, and cognitive, behaviour.  
As intimated above, previous research had focused on documenting aging-related 
declines in cognitive and perceptual abilities, working on the implicit assumption that old age 
is a time of loss and misery (Carstensen & Charles, 1998). Of particular importance is that 
SST is the first socio-psychological theory of aging to emphasize growth and development of 
some of the positive aspects of growing older, namely, improvements in emotional 
functioning (Carstensen & Charles, 1998; Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003). 
1.3.1 Aging-Related Changes in Emotional Experience 
A substantial literature documents aging-related improvements in emotional 
experience; both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have shown that older adults 
experience less negative affect (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles, 
Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Griffin, Mroczek, & Spiro III, 2006; Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, 
Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997; Kunzmann, Little, & Smith, 2000; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998; 
Pethtel & Chen, 2010), or more positive affect (Carstensen et al., 2011; Mroczek & Kolarz, 
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1998,  but see Griffin et al., 2006), relative to younger adults, at least until very old age (e.g., 
Griffin et al., 2006). As well, older adults report experiencing mixed emotional states more 
often than young (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2000; Carstensen et al., 2011), and better control 
over their emotional states relative to young (Carstensen et al., 2011; Gross et al., 1997; 
Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992; Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2006; Riediger, 
Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2009; Rocke, Li, & Smith, 2009), and older adults 
have greater stability of their positive than negative affective states (Carstensen et al., 2000). 
Some evidence also suggests that older adults may reappraise memories of negative life 
events in a more positive light (Comblain, D’Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005). 
The cause of this improved affect with age is unclear, and certainly stands in contrast 
to the realities of physical and cognitive decline that occur with the aging process. It is 
possible that older adults are more focused on regulating their emotions and so either use 
emotion regulation strategies more frequently (e.g., Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2006) 
or select more effective strategies to maintain a more positive affective state. For example, 
older adults use emotion regulation strategies to reduce feelings of anger more frequently 
than do younger adults (Phillips et al., 2006).  
Importantly for the current thesis, older adults appear to be more skilled at applying 
those emotion regulation strategies, such as positive reappraisal, that are more effective 
(Gross, 2008; John & Gross, 2004) at decreasing emotional reactions to negative stimuli 
(Shiota & Levenson, 2009). It is also possible that older adults, many of whom are retired, 
free of child care duties, and do not have to care for an ailing partner, are less exposed to the 
acute stresses and uncertainties of young adulthood and middle age, and so it is easier to 
maintain a positive affective state (Almeida & Horn, 2004; Carstensen et al., 2011; Rocke, 
Li, & Smith, 2009). For example, older adults have been shown to prefer predictable daily 
routines (Bouisson & Swendsen, 2003), and many have the freedom to structure their days in 
a predictable fashion.  
Moreover, it is possible that older adults are less physiologically reactive to emotional 
situations and stimuli, either due to increased psychological threshold for reactivity to 
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negative situations that accompanies a lifetime of coping with repeated exposure to negative 
events (Lawton, 1996; Schulz, 1982), or due to lower physiological reactivity to emotional 
situations and events (e.g., Mroczek & Almeida, 2004). Findings from a number of studies 
support the idea of decreased physiological, but not psychological, reactivity to negative 
stimuli. Older adults have been shown to be less physiologically reactive to emotional stimuli 
used in laboratory tasks (for a review regarding aging-related differences in cardiovascular 
reactivity to emotional stimuli, see Uchino, Birmingham, & Berg, 2010), unless the stimuli 
are particularly age-relevant, such as film clips portraying loss of a spouse (Kunzmann & 
Grühn, 2005; Kunzmann & Richter, 2009). For instance, older adults have been shown to 
have lower cardiac reactivity in response to emotional autobiographical memories (Labouvie-
Vief, Lumley, Jain, & Heinze, 2003), pictures (Smith, Hillman, & Duley, 2005), and film 
clips (Tsai, Carstensen, & Levenson, 2000). Regarding subjective psychological reactions to 
emotional stimuli, however, age differences are less often found (Charles & Carstensen, 
2008; Tsai et al., 2000;  but see Smith et al., 2005), but when they are present, older adults 
report less intense subjective emotional reactions to stimuli that induce anger (Charles & 
Carstensen, 2008; Labouvie-Vief et al., 2003) compared with younger adults.  
However, studies also show that when exposed to stimuli or situations high in 
emotional arousal or stress, older adults are less able to regulate their emotional state. As 
such, older adults may be more effective at regulating normal day-to-day stresses relative to 
younger adults (Diehl, Coyle, & Labouvie-Vief, 1996), but less effective at dealing with 
highly stressful situations (Mroczek & Almeida, 2004, but see Rocke, Li, & Smith, 2009).  
Finally, cohort effects could account for these changes in emotional experience; the cohort of 
people who are now in the older adult demographic group may indeed experience less 
negative affect relative to younger cohorts (Carstensen, 2011). In sum, normal aging is 
accompanied by improvements in affect, which appear to be driven by an enhanced ability to 




1.4 Background on the Study of Emotion 
1.4.1 Definition of Emotion 
Despite being a ubiquitous and highly intuitive phenomenon that is a fundamental 
part of the human experience, emotion is a complex topic of study and the literature on 
emotion is riddled with controversies. For the purpose of my thesis, I discuss aspects of 
emotion research that are generally agreed upon in the psychological literature, the first being 
the definition of the concept of emotion. “Emotion” (often, but not always, used 
interchangeably with the term “affect”) is defined as a subjective psychological state of 
relatively brief duration, which results from combinations of physiological activations and 
cognitive appraisals (e.g., Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003; Fox, 2008; Schachter & 
Singer, 1962). Physiological activations refer to changes in the peripheral nervous system 
(nerves outside of the brain and spinal cord) such as changes in heart rate, breathing rate, and 
perspiration rate (e.g., Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 
1990), whereas cognitive appraisals (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966; Scherer, 1984, 2001) 
refer to assessments of the “valence” of an emotion-eliciting event, i.e., whether the event is 
deemed “good” or “bad” (e.g., Davidson et al., 2003; Fox, 2008; Öhman, 2000; Rolls, 2005). 
For example, if a person on a walk through the woods encountered a large bear, that person 
would likely experience changes to his or her peripheral nervous system such as an increased 
heart rate, breathing rate, and rate of perspiration, while appraising the situation as 
dangerous, resulting in the subjective experience of the emotion fear. A change in facial 
expression would also occur, with the facial muscles being moved (unconsciously) so that the 
whites of the eyes are more exposed, eyebrows are raised, and the mouth is open with lips 
retracted, producing a fearful facial expression (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). 
Emotions differ from moods in that moods are usually defined as having a less specific cause 
and persist for much longer periods of time than emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992a; Fox, 2008; 
Frijda, 1994; Morris, 1989; Rolls, 2005). 
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1.4.2 Characterizing Emotional Experience 
Emotional experiences have been characterized and classified in a number of 
different ways. A good deal of work in the emotion literature has sought to classify emotional 
experiences into discrete categories of universally recognizable emotions, referred to as the 
“basic emotions” of happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and surprise (e.g., Ekman, 
1992a, 1992b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Tomkins & 
McCarter, 1964). These studies focused on recognition of emotional states in the context of 
human facial expressions. (Note that “neutral” facial expressions are defined as faces which 
lack any particular emotional expression.) Regarding whether older adults are as adept at 
identifying emotional states in others as younger adults, both age groups can identify with 
quite high accuracy (80-90% correct recognition) faces expressing the basic emotions of 
happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, and anger, but are less accurate at recognizing faces  
portraying fear (e.g., Isaacowitz, Löckenhoff, Lane, Wright, Sechrest, Riedel, & Costa, 
2007). However, a number of studies have found evidence of an aging-related decline in 
recognition accuracy of expressions of anger (e.g., Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Malatesta, Izard, 
Culver, & Nicolich, 1987; McDowell, Harrison, & Demaree, 1994; Phillips, MacLean, & 
Allen, 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a, 2004b), sadness (MacPherson, Phillips, & Della 
Sala, 2002; Malatesta et al., 1987; McDowell et al., 1994; Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz, & 
Alpert, 1993; Phillips et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a), and fear (e.g., Calder, 
Keane, Manley, Sprengelmeyer, Scott, Nimmo-Smith, & Young, 2003; Isaacowitz et al.,  
2007; Malatesta et al., 1987; McDowell et al., 1994) whereas accuracy for expressions of 
happiness is spared (e.g., Borod, Yecker, Brickman, Moreno, Sliwinski, Foldi, et al., 1993; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a). 
Other work, however, has sought to refine the characterization of emotional 
experience and expression by mapping degree of emotional experience on to continuous, 
Likert-type, scales (e.g., Feldman Barrett, 1998, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Russell & Feldman 
Barrett, 1999). When using continuous scales to quantify emotional experience, two aspects 
of emotion are typically considered: emotional valence and psychological arousal (e.g., Fox, 
2008; Russell, 1980, 1983). Valence is conceptualized as the direction of the emotional 
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experience (pleasant/positive or unpleasant/negative), whereas arousal is conceptualized as 
the intensity of the emotional experience (high or low) (e.g., Fox, 2008). Valence can be 
represented either on a bipolar scale (ranging from highly negative to highly positive; 
Russell, 1980), or two unipolar scales (negative and positive) (Diener & Emmons, 1985; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The absence of positive or 
negative emotion is defined as the neutral state, and lies in the centre of a bipolar scale.  
In my thesis studies, I conceptualize the valence of emotional experience as 
consistent with a bipolar scale as I am less interested in examining ambivalent or mixed 
emotional states and more interested in understanding responses to the dominant emotion 
experienced by participants in response to experimental stimuli. The dominant emotional 
response to stimuli is even computed for purposes of comparison in studies which have 
participants rate items on separate unipolar scales for valence (e.g., Berntson, Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Cacioppo, 2007). Moreover, in terms of practical considerations, the 
widely-used databases of affective word (e.g., Affective Norms for English Words; ANEW; 
Bradley & Lang, 1999) and picture (International Affective Picture System; IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) stimuli developed for use in psychological experiments use 
bipolar scales to evaluate peoples’ emotional reactions to the stimuli, and by using these 
databases I am able to directly compare the emotional reactions of participants in my thesis 
studies to established normative ratings of valence and arousal.  
1.4.3 The Brain Basis of Emotional Experience 
A number of brain regions in the limbic system are heavily involved in the processing 
of emotional information. These include structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex (in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex of the frontal lobes; Bechara, 2004; Rolls, 2004; Wallis, 
2007), cingulate cortex (e.g., Giuliani, Drabant, & Gross, 2011), insula, and subcortical 
structures such as the amygdalae (in the temporal lobes) (e.g., Berntson, Norman, Bechara, 
Bruss, Tranel, & Cacioppo, 2011; Kringelbach, 2005). In addition, recent neuroimaging 
studies suggest that a number of other regions in the prefrontal cortex are involved in 
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emotion regulation processes and are thought to provide top-down control of emotions 
generated by the amygdalae (e.g., Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
It is well established in the scientific literature that the amygdalae are involved in the 
processing of emotional stimuli and the production of emotional states and reactions, and this 
brain region has received the lion’s share of empirical attention relative to other brain 
structures involved in emotion processing. Specifically, the amygdalae are highly involved in 
the processing of fear-related stimuli as animal models and work with humans show the role 
of the amygdala in fear-conditioning (e.g., Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & 
Damasio, 1995; Funayama, Grillon, Davis, & Phelps, 2001; LeDoux & Phelps, 2004), and 
amygdala-damaged patients show specific deficits in being able to correctly identify faces 
with fearful expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Calder, Young, Rowland, Perrett, Hodges, & Etcoff, 1996), and 
in their ability to experience fear (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Feinstein, Adolphs, 
Damasio, & Tranel, 2011; Weiskrantz, 1956). However, other work suggests that the 
amygdalae are also involved in the processing of other negative emotions such as disgust and 
sadness (e.g., Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003), and there is even some evidence 
that the amygdalae are responsive to positive emotion (e.g., Canli, Sivers, Whitfield, Gotlib, 
& Gabrieli, 2002), although with less consistency compared with responsiveness to negative 
emotions (Zald, 2003). 
Of particular importance to this thesis is that some studies have shown the amygdalae 
to be less active in response to negative information in older adults, compared with young 
adults. For example, Mather, Canli, English, Whitfield, Wais, Ochsner, Gabrieli, and 
Carstensen (2004) showed younger and older participants a series of positive, negative, and 
neutral pictures from the IAPS database mentioned above, while in a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. They found that older adults’ amygdalae were less active 
when viewing negative pictures relative to positive pictures, whereas younger adults’ 
amygdalae were equally active when viewing negative and positive pictures. 
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1.4.4 The Aging-Brain Model, an Alternative to SST 
These findings have led to the development of an alternative account to the SST for 
the mechanisms that underlie the improved affective experience with aging, called the aging-
brain model (Cacioppo, Berntson, Bechara, Tranel, & Hawkley, 2011). Rather than 
postulating the effect of different motivational forces on emotional states and the processing 
of emotional information, the aging-brain model takes a more biology-based approach. The 
aging-brain model posits that the amygdalae become less reactive to negative stimuli during 
aging, but maintain reactivity to positive stimuli, and so less psychological arousal is 
experienced by older adults when processing negative stimuli, compared with younger adults 
(Cacioppo et al., 2011). This reduction in psychological arousal is also expected to affect 
cognitive processing of negative material, such as a reduction in the memorial advantage for 
negative-arousing stimuli (Cacioppo et al., 2011) sometimes seen in young adults (for 
reviews see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Vohs, & Finkenauer, 2001, and Rozin & Royzman, 
2001).  
As such, if the amygdalae deteriorate during the aging process, this model predicts a 
selective decrease in the processing of negative information in older adults. Furthermore, 
Cacioppo et al. (2011) cite findings from studies of neuropsychological patients with damage 
to the amygdalae to support their theory. They reason that if decrements in the functioning of 
the amygdalae are crucial to reductions in the processing of negative material, then patients 
with lesions to the amygdalae, regardless of age, should show this deficit. This idea was 
confirmed in a study (Berntson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Cacioppo, 2007) in which 
patients with damage to the amygdalae/anterior temporal lobe viewed and then rated 
negative, positive, and neutral IAPS pictures on the dimensions of valence and arousal. It 
was found that patients with amygdala damage rated negative, but not positive, pictures as 
less arousing compared with both the normative picture ratings and ratings of patients with 
damage to other brain areas not involved in emotion processing, despite the preserved ability 
to correctly categorize the pictures according to valence (Berntson et al., 2007). In this way, 
the aging-brain model views reduced amygdala activity to negative material as the cause of 
aging-related changes in processing of emotional stimuli (a bottom-up effect), whereas the 
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SST views the reduced amygdala activity as the consequence of older adults’ prioritization of 
goals to regulate emotional state (a top-down effect).  
1.5 The Effect of Emotion on Cognitive Processing of Information 
A large literature exists documenting the memory boosting and attention capturing 
properties of emotionally valenced stimuli. It is important to first clarify what is meant by the 
term “emotionally valenced stimuli”, as this may not be immediately apparent to those not 
engaged in the study of emotion. Emotionally valenced stimuli refer to items such as words, 
narratives/sentences, faces, pictures, and events that call up positive or negative feelings. 
Examples of positive stimuli include: words with a pleasant connotation (e.g., “love”, “joy”, 
“sunshine”, “beautiful”), narratives about pleasant circumstances (e.g., a birthday party), 
faces expressing happiness, pictures of pleasant scenes (e.g., cute puppies, a wedding, 
beautiful garden, loving families, delicious food, people engaged in sporting activities, 
depiction of consensual erotic activities), and pleasant autobiographical and non-
autobiographical events (e.g., graduating from university, a royal marriage). Examples of 
negative stimuli include: words with unpleasant connotations (e.g., “hate”, “shame”, 
“disease”, “injury”), narratives about unpleasant circumstances (e.g., death of a spouse), 
faces expressing anger, pictures of unpleasant scenes (e.g., dead animals, war, dirty toilets, 
people in emotional distress, plane crashes, guns), and unpleasant autobiographical and non-
autobiographical events (e.g., being laid off from a job, a train crash). In contrast, neutral 
stimuli are by definition devoid, or nearly devoid, of emotional content. Examples of neutral 
stimuli include: the words “box”, “tool”, “bush”, “person”, a narrative about a daily 
commute, a face with a neutral expression, pictures of chairs, light bulbs, people working at a 
computer or driving a car, and autobiographical and non-autobiographical events such as 
going grocery shopping or watching people waiting for a bus. 
The effect of emotionality on cognitive processes has been well established, 
especially in the domains of memory and attention. Emotionally valenced items (such as 
words, pictures, film clips, and narratives), and events, are often more likely to be recalled 
and correctly recognized (e.g., Blake, Varnhagen, & Parent, 2001; Buchanan, Etzel, 
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Adolphs,& Tranel, 2006; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Guy & Cahill, 1999; Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003; Kulas, Conger, & Smolin, 2003; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Talmi & 
Moscovitch, 2004) relative to items with a neutral valence. Attention is also more likely to be 
directed to, and captured by, emotionally valenced items (Huang, Baddeley, & Young, 2008; 
Ihssen & Keil, 2009) relative to neutral items. Emotional items are also more likely to 
distract attention from surrounding non-emotional items (e.g., Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; 
MacKay, Shafto, Taylor, Marian, Abrams, & Dyer, 2004). A prominent finding in the 
emotion-cognition literature is that negatively valenced items or events are sometimes (e.g., 
Kern, Libkuman, Otani, & Holmes, 2005; Ochsner, 2000; Ogawa & Suzuki, 2004), but not 
always (e.g., Breslin & Safer, 2011; Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008; Libkuman, 
Stabler, & Otani, 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Stein, Peelen, Funk, & Seidl, 2010; Yates, 
Ashwin, & Fox, 2010), better remembered and attended to than positive and neutral items or 
events. For example, studies which use visual search (“face-in-the-crowd”) paradigms in 
which participants must identify a target face that has an emotional facial expression that is 
discrepant with the other faces in the surrounding matrix, often find that angry faces are 
detected more quickly than happy or neutral faces, indicating greater attention capture (e.g., 
Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Pinkham, Griffin, Baron, 
Sasson, & Gur, 2010). It is of particular interest to the current thesis, however, that older 
adults often do not show an enhancement in the cognitive processing of negative information 
as do younger adults. Rather, recent research indicates that older adults are often biased to 
preferentially cognitively process positive information, and this is referred to as the aging-




The Aging-Related Positivity Effect in Cognitive Performance 
The SST highlighted the role of emotion in older adults’ social behaviour. Within a 
few years, the assumptions of the SST were applied to cognitive psychology. Researchers, 
including Carstensen herself, began to ask the question of whether motivational goals could 
affect the way in which information is cognitively processed. It was reasoned that if emotion 
regulation goals are salient in older adults, then they may be more likely to preferentially 
cognitive process positive information, when compared with younger adults, to maintain a 
positive affective state. An earlier study of Carstensen’s suggested the importance of emotion 
to older adults’ memory performance: When asked to remember narratives composed of 
emotional- and neutral-toned sentences, older adults recalled a greater proportion of the 
emotional than neutral content, relative to younger adults (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 
1994).  
Research on the effect of emotion on the cognitive performance of older adults in the 
context of SST began in earnest with the publication in the same year of two papers 
addressing the effect of emotion on memory (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003) and 
attention (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). Charles et al. (2003) compared recall and recognition 
of positive, negative, and neutral pictures in young, middle-aged, and older adults and found 
greater recall of positive, relative to negative, pictures in older and middle-aged adults, 
whereas younger adults recalled equal numbers of positive and negative pictures. Both age 
groups recalled greater numbers of emotional pictures relative to neutral pictures. To 
examine the effect of emotion on sustained attention, Mather and Carstensen (2003) showed 
younger and older adults pairs of faces, in which one face had a neutral expression and the 
other a happy, sad, or angry expression, and measured how quickly participants could detect 
a dot that replaced either the neutral or emotional face. Faster response times to detect a dot 
when it replaced an emotional face, compared with the neutral face with which it was paired, 
indicate that a participant’s attention was directed at the emotional face. Mather and 
Carstensen (2003) found that older adults were slower to detect the dot when it replaced an 
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angry or sad face compared to when it replaced the neutral face in the pair, suggesting that 
older adults are biased to orient attention away from negative stimuli. Younger adults did not 
show a bias in attention for emotional faces. 
These two studies were the first to report what is now referred to as the aging-related 
“positivity effect”. The positivity effect is most often defined with respect to performance in 
memory and attention tasks, but is found in other cognitive domains as well. Generally, 
positivity effects in memory are defined as follows: The ratio of positive to negative items 
remembered is higher in older adults relative to younger adults. Positivity effects in attention 
can be defined in a similar way: Older adults pay proportionally more attention to positive 
relative to negative items, in comparison with younger adults. That is, studies cite evidence 
of aging-related positivity effects when older adults are shown to have better memory for, 
and pay greater attention to, positive information relative to negative information, and 
younger adults do not show this same pattern. 
2.1.1 Definition of Aging-Related Positivity Effects 
One issue with the definition of positivity effects is that it can be conceptualized as 
resulting from comparisons of performance between younger and older adult age groups, or 
within each age group separately (consistent with the definition presented above). For 
instance, sometimes studies will claim that a positivity effect has been found if older adults 
remember more positive, or fewer negative, items relative to younger adults, and may 
disregard the ratio of positive to negative items within each age group. Other studies may 
eschew direct comparisons between age groups, and claim that a positivity effect has been 
found when older adults remember greater numbers of positive items relative to negative 
items, and younger adults show a different effect of valence on memory. It is also common 
for studies to report comparisons both between age groups and within age groups when 
referring to positivity effects. Because no consensus has been reached in the literature 
regarding the way in which positivity effects should be reported, in my thesis I report both 




2.1.2 Positivity Effects in Various Cognitive Domains 
Despite some inconsistency in the way positivity effects are conceptualized, a 
growing literature shows evidence of aging-related positivity effects in a number of different 
cognitive domains (see Table 1). Positivity effects have been found in decision making 
studies (Kim, Healey, Goldstein, Hasher, & Wiprzycka, 2008; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 
2007; Mather & Johnston, 2000) in which older adults report greater satisfaction with chosen 
options as well as better memory for positive features of options, in tasks that rely on 
executive functions such as working memory (Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & Carstensen, 
2005), in which older adults show enhanced performance for positive items, in tasks in which 
information is inhibited (Thomas & Hasher, 2006),  and prospective memory, in which older 
adults show better prospective memory for positive events/cues under some conditions 
(Schnitzpahn, Horn, Bayden, & Kliegel, in press; Rendell, Phillips, Henry, Brumby-Rendell, 
de la Piedad Garcia, Altgassen, & Kliegel, 2011).  
Positivity effects have been studied to a much greater extent in the domains of 
memory and attention. Older adults have shown positivity effects on various types of 
episodic memory tasks (e.g., Charles et al., 2003, Experiment 1; Kennedy, Mather, & 
Carstensen, 2004; Tomaszczyk, Fernandes, & MacLeod, 2008), and on attention tasks which 
have used eye tracking to assess gaze preferences for faces expressing different emotions 
(e.g., Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a). 
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Table 1 Selected Studies Which Have Found Positivity Effects, by Cognitive Domain, 
Paradigm, and Stimulus Type 
Study Cognitive 
Domain(s) 
Paradigm(s) Stimulus Type(s) 
Mather & Johnson (2000) Decision making Recall Written 
information 
Charles, Mather, & Carstensen  
(2003) 
Episodic Memory Recall; 
recognition 
IAPS Pictures 










Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky 
(2004) 
Episodic memory Recall, 
recognition 
Words, faces 
Comblain, D’Argembeau, & 




Mather & Knight (2005) Episodic memory Recall IAPS pictures 
Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, 
& Carstensen (2005) 
Executive function Working 
memory 
IAPS pictures 
Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, 
& Wilson (2006a) 
Attention Eye-tracking Faces 
Thomas & Hasher (2006) Episodic memory Recognition Words 
Grady, Hongwanishkul, 
Keightley, Lee, & Hasher 
(2007) 
Episodic memory Recognition Faces 
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Grühn, Scheibe, & Baltes 
(2007) 
Episodic memory Recognition IAPS pictures 
Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, 
Nesmith, & Mather (2007) 
Attention Eye-tracking Faces and IAPS 
pictures 
Löckenhoff & Carstensen 
(2007) 
Decision making Recall Written 
information 





Allard & Isaacowitz (2008) Attention Eye-tracking Faces 





Recall IAPS pictures, 
words 
Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & 
Wilson (2008) 
Attention Eye-tracking Faces 
Kensinger (2008) Episodic memory Recall, 
recognition 
words 
Kim, Healey, Goldstein, Hasher, 
& Wiprzycka (2008) 
Decision making Choice selection Common objects 
Petrican, Moscovitch, & 
Schimmack (2008) 
Episodic memory Recall n/a 
Tomaszczyk, Fernandes, & 
MacLeod (2008) 
Episodic memory Recall IAPS pictures 
Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & 
Schlangel (2009) 
Attention Eye-tracking Faces 
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Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert 
(2009) 
Attention Eye-tracking Faces 
Kwon, Scheibe, Samanez-
Larkin, Tsai, & Carstensen 
(2009) 
Episodic memory Recall, 
recognition 
IAPS pictures 
Langeslag & van Strien (2009) Episodic memory Recall IAPS pictures 






Lee & Knight (2010) Attention Dot probe Faces 





Shamaskin, Mikels, & Reed 
(2010) 
Episodic memory Recognition Written 
information 
Werheid, Gruno, Kathmann, 
Fischer, Almkvist, & Wingblad 
(2010) 
Episodic memory recognition Faces 
Rendell, Phillips, Henry, 
Brumby-Rendell, de la Piedad 
















2.1.3 What Are the Cognitive Mechanisms of Aging-Related Positivity Effects? 
Although a number of studies have found evidence of aging-related positivity effects, 
the effect is actually inconsistent in the literature, and sometimes these inconsistencies occur 
within the same set of experiments. This occurs in the domains of both memory (e.g., Charles 
et al., 2003, Experiment 2; Emery & Hess, 2008; Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 
2003; Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005; Kensinger, 2008; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 
2007; Kensinger, Growdon, Brierley, Medford, & Corkin, 2002; Schnitzpahn, Horn, Bayden, 
& Kliegel, 2011) and attention (e.g., Hahn, Carlson, Singer, Gronlund, 2006; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a; Langley, Rokke, Stark, Saville, Allen, & Bagne, 2008; 
Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008, 2010; Lee & Knight, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2003, 
Experiment 2; Mather & Knight, 2006; Orgeta, 2011; Mickley Steinmetz, Muscatell, & 
Kensinger, 2010 ). It is currently unclear which methodological factors (e.g., type of task, or 
study material) most strongly influence the manifestation of these effects (for a review and 
meta-analysis, see Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). Knowing the circumstances or conditions 
that do and do not give rise to a positivity effect in aging can shed light on how the effect 
manifests. Most notably, a number of studies have demonstrated that experimenter-activated 
goals to regulate emotions, manipulated by asking participants to focus on their accuracy or 
on their emotions, make it more likely that a positivity effect will be observed (e.g., Holland, 
Tamir, & Kensinger, 2010; Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). Emotion-focus 
instructions also increase the likelihood of observing positivity biases in decision making 
(e.g., Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007). Furthermore, factors such as the personal relevance 
of study stimuli have been shown to modulate whether positivity effects are seen in episodic 
memory (Tomaszczyk et al., 2008). 
More recently, two accounts have emerged regarding the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying positivity effects which seek to explain the variable emergence of positivity 
effects in the literature. These two accounts attempt to discern whether positivity effects are 
observable only on tasks which require older adults to engage in deliberate, strategic or 
reflective processes, or whether they are the result of greater processing fluency of positive 
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material in older adults. The first, referred to as the ‘cognitive control’ account, suggests that 
positivity effects arise due to older adults’ “top-down” application of cognitive control 
processes/executive functions mentioned above to achieve the goal of maintaining a positive 
affective state. In this literature, cognitive control is conceptualized as those processes 
involved in directing behaviour and use of attention resources, such as those required for goal 
maintenance (active/working memory) and representation, inhibition of goal-irrelevant 
responses, self-initiated retrieval, and selective attention (e.g., Miller, 2000).  
Support for this account comes from two sets of behavioural studies. First, studies on 
the effect of individual differences in executive functions as measured by neuropsychological 
tasks, on performance in episodic memory or sustained attention tasks, have shown that older 
adults who perform better on the executive function tasks are also more likely to show 
positivity effects in the memory and attention tasks (e.g., Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert, 
2009; Mather & Knight, 2005; Petrican, Moscovitch, & Schimmack, 2008). Second, 
positivity effects found when tasks are performed under full attention conditions are nullified 
or even reversed when performed under divided attention (Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, 
Nesmith, & Mather, 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005), suggesting that control processes, or 
attentional resources, disrupted under divided attention are required for the effect to emerge 
in older adults. 
There is also evidence from neuroimaging studies that the brain basis for the 
positivity effect lies in control processes mediated by the prefrontal cortex. A number of 
studies have shown that when participants engage in emotion regulation strategies, such as 
reappraisal of emotion-eliciting events, activation increases in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas activation in limbic 
structures such as the amygdalae decreases (for reviews see Green & Malhi, 2006, and 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). In the context of the positivity effect literature, it is assumed that 
older adults’ chronically activated goal to regulate their affective state motivates them to use 
cognitive control processes to engage in emotion regulation. Indeed, there is mounting 
evidence of the role of the prefrontal cortex in the involvement of positivity effects in a 
variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., Addis, Leclerc, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger & 
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Schacter, 2008; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2010; St. Jacques, Dolcos, 
& Cabeza, 2010). 
The second account, in contrast, is a “bottom-up” view, and essentially suggests 
differences in relative processing fluency for positive, negative, and neutral information. 
Processing fluency is typically conceptualized as the subjective experience of being able to 
cognitively process something quickly and without great need for conscious elaboration. It is 
usually operationalized as the speed with which information can be cognitively processed 
(for a review, see Oppenheimer, 2008). The processing fluency account suggests that positive 
information may be more accessible to, or have a processing fluency advantage for, older 
adults, and/or that negative information may be less accessible to older than younger adults 
(e.g., Yang & Hasher, 2011). To the best of my knowledge, the first study which directly 
examined the processing fluency account of positivity effects in the memory domain, 
compared performance on a semantic retrieval task (speeded word fragment completion) for 
positive, negative, and neutral words, in younger and older adults (Yang & Hasher, 2011). In 
that study accessibility of words was operationally defined as the proportion of word 
fragments that participants could spontaneously solve, for words of different valence. They 
found that older adults completed a larger proportion of word fragments with neutral relative 
to negative and positive words, whereas younger adults completed a greater proportion of 
word fragments with negative than neutral words, providing some evidence for an aging-
related negativity reduction in semantic memory (though no evidence of a positivity effect or 
enhancement). Yang and Hasher concluded that neutral words may be more accessible to 
older adults in the context of more automatic or implicit memory tasks. 
2.1.4 Purpose of Thesis 
In my thesis, I examine the extent to which processing fluency and cognitive control 
could account for the appearance of aging-related positivity effects in memory and attention 
performance. I hypothesize that positivity effects may emerge more reliably on tasks that 
allow for cognitive control processes to be used in service of goals to regulate emotion, in 
older adults, such as in tasks which lend themselves to a more reflective style of processing 
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(e.g., Charles & Carstensen, 2009). It is important to note that by “reflective style of 
processing” I am referring to cognitive processing directed at personal assessment or 
evaluation, in the context of a cognitive task. As such, I argue that differences in task 
demands can explain the inconsistencies in past studies. I present evidence that the key factor 
that influences the manifestation of the effect is whether the cognitive task allows for the 
motivational goal to maintain a positive affective state to be displayed in cognitive 
processing. I argue that this is more likely to occur on tasks that are reflective in nature, and 
allow participants to use cognitive and strategic control processes to preferentially process 
positive information in accordance with this motivational goal. 
I note that the cognitive control and processing fluency accounts are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and it is likely that many of the cognitive tasks that have been used in the 
literature to assess aging-related positivity effects can be carried out through reliance on 
processing fluency of study materials and/or through use of strategic processes. Moreover, it 
is entirely possible that there may be individual differences in the extent to which these 
cognitive processes are used to carry out a given task. I argue, however, that some tasks more 
clearly lend themselves to the use of cognitive control processes (e.g., retrieval of 
autobiographical memories) or reliance on fluent processing (e.g., fluency tests) of stimuli. 
As outlined above, the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the positivity effect are 
under debate. Few studies in the memory literature have entertained an alternate explanation 
to the cognitive control account: that positivity effects may result from an aging-related 
enhancement in processing fluency for positive items. This thesis evaluates these two 
accounts by comparing performance on a suite of memory and attention tasks that vary with 
respect to the degree to which they allow the use of cognitive control and are reflective in 
nature. This thesis seeks to identify the cognitive mechanism underlying observations of a 
positivity effect in cognitive processing associated with normal aging, and thus contributes to 
the determination of boundary conditions under which aging-related enhancements in the 
cognitive processing of emotional information will most likely be observed. To this end, I 
will first present a series of experiments on memory, followed by a series of experiments on 
attention orientation, which search for evidence of positivity effects, and create conditions 
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that can be used to address whether the effect is based more in cognitive control or more in 




Experiments on Memory 
3.1 Introduction to Memory Experiments 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, positivity effects have primarily been studied in the 
context of memory paradigms. Older adults have shown positivity effects in recall and 
recognition of pictures and words (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003, Experiment 1; 
Grühn, Scheibe, & Baltes, 2007; Kensinger, 2008; Kwon, Scheibe, Samanez-Larkin, Tsai, & 
Carstensen, 2009; Langeslag & van Strien, 2009; Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 2004; 
Mather & Knight, 2005; Thomas & Hasher, 2006; Tomaszczyk et al., 2008), recognition of 
faces (Grady, Hongwanishkul, Keightley, Lee, & Hasher, 2007; Leigland, Schulz, & 
Janowsky, 2004; Werheid, Gruno, Kathmann, Fischer, Almkvist, & Wingblad, 2010), 
recognition of valenced written information (Shamaskin, Mikels, & Reed, 2010), recall of 
emotional events as well as autobiographical memories (Comblain, D’Argembeau, & Van 
der Linden, 2005; Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, & Schryer, 2008; Gallo, Korthauer, 
McDonough, Teshale, & Johnson, 2011; Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004; Petrican, 
Moscovitch, & Schimmack, 2008; Ros & Latorre, 2010; Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & 
Kvavilashvili, 2009; Serrano, Latorre, & Gatz, 2007), and in implicit semantic memory for 
words (Yang & Hasher, 2011). To evaluate the cognitive control and processing fluency 
hypotheses in the context of memory tasks, the following three experiments examine 
evidence for aging-related positivity effects in memory tasks that either encourage reflection 
and the use of cognitive control, or are more dependent on processing fluency. 
3.2 Experiments 1 and 2: A Positivity Effect in Autobiographical Memory, But 
Not Phonemic Fluency, in Older Adults (Tomaszczyk & Fernandes, in press) 
Introduction 
   In the following two experiments, I examine whether a task which arguably primes 
emotional goals, and reflective thinking—through use of emotional cue words and 
requirement to produce and classify autobiographical memories by valence—would lead to a 
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positivity effect whereas a task which primes accuracy goals—output on the FAS task— 
would not. As mentioned in the General Introduction, a recent study which directly examined 
the processing fluency account of positivity effects in the memory domain compared 
performance on a semantic retrieval task (speeded word fragment completion) for positive, 
negative, and neutral words, in younger and older adults (Yang & Hasher, 2011). In that 
study, accessibility of words was operationally defined as the proportion of word fragments 
that participants could spontaneously solve, for words of different valence. They found that 
older adults completed a larger proportion of word fragments with neutral relative to negative 
and positive words, whereas younger adults completed a greater proportion of word 
fragments with negative than neutral words, providing some evidence for an aging-related 
negativity reduction in semantic memory (though no evidence of a positivity effect or 
enhancement). Yang and Hasher (2011) concluded that neutral words may be more 
accessible to older adults in the context of more automatic or implicit memory tasks. 
Experiment 1 (FAS test) of the current thesis allowed me to examine the generalizability of 
Yang and Hasher’s (2011) findings, using a different measure of fluency.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, I examined the extent to which processing fluency and 
cognitive control could account for the appearance of aging-related positivity effects in 
memory. I hypothesized that positivity effects may emerge more reliably on tasks that allow 
a more reflective style of processing (e.g., Charles & Carstensen, 2009). It is important to 
note that by “reflective style of processing” I am referring to cognitive processing directed at 
personal assessment or evaluation, in the context of a cognitive task. To this end, I compared 
performance within a sample of younger and older adults on a fluency task, as in Yang and 
Hasher (2011), albeit a different one, the FAS test. A different verbal fluency task was used 
to determine the generalizability of Yang and Hasher’s (2011) results. Here participants are 
given letters one at a time and asked to say aloud as many words that begin with each of the 
target letters as they can in a short period of time. I predicted that, as in Yang and Hasher 
(2011), older adults would output more neutral words than emotional words. This prediction 
is also based on the assumption that because in the FAS test participants are instructed to 
focus on task accuracy (i.e., generating words that meet certain restrictions), goals to enhance 
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emotional state would not be salient and thus no positivity effect would emerge.  
I also compared performance on an autobiographical memory task, using a standard 
“cue-word” method (e.g., Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Jansari & Parkin, 1996; Rubin & 
Schulkind, 1997; Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009), in which participants 
were first given positive, negative, and neutral cue words and were asked to generate 
memories that related to each cue word. I predicted that older adults would generate more 
autobiographical memories classified as positive, than negative or neutral, and that younger 
adults would generate more autobiographical memories classified as negative, consistent 
with previous studies of autobiographical memory (e.g., Gallo, Korthauer, McDonough, 
Teshale, & Johnson, 2011; Kennedy, Mather, Carstensen, 2004; Serrano, Latorre, & Gatz, 
2007). This prediction is also based on the assumption that retrieval of autobiographical 
memories, in response to cue words, encourages a reflective processing style in which 
participants’ emotional state is more salient as they write out their personal memories. This 
salience of emotional state may prompt older adults to regulate their emotions by 
strategically retrieving positive memories.  
Additionally I asked participants to rate how they currently felt about the memories 
they generated. I included ratings of participants’ current feeling about autobiographical 
memories as well as memory classifications by valence to address the idea that, particularly 
for older adults, there may exist discrepancies between how one would classify an 
autobiographical memory with respect to valence, and how one currently feels about that 
memory given that older adults may reappraise their autobiographical memories (e.g., 
Comblain, D’Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005; Levine & Bluck, 1997) in service of 
emotion regulation goals. Consistent with the logic presented above for classifications of 
memories, I predicted that older adults would generate more memories about which they 
currently felt positive than negative or neutral, particularly those generated in response to 
negative cue words. Based on these assumptions, instructing participants to think about how 
negative or positive they currently felt about their memories should in fact be more likely to 
prompt older adults to regulate their emotional state and rate memories as positive.  
 
 34 
As outlined above, the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the positivity effect are 
under debate. Few studies in the memory literature have entertained an alternate explanation 
to the cognitive control account: that positivity effects may result from an aging-related 
enhancement in processing fluency for positive items. Experiments 1 and 2 of the current 
thesis evaluated this alternate hypothesis by comparing performance on two tasks in which 
participants must output information in response to verbal cues (phonemic fluency and cue 
word method autobiographical memory test), so as to allow for a more direct comparison of 
results than would be possible with retrieval protocols employed in previous studies of 
autobiographical memory in aging in which participants retrieved memories in response to 
open-ended questions (e.g., Kennedy et al., 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-five healthy community-dwelling older adults were recruited through the 
University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool (WRAP). The WRAP pool 
distributes recruitment flyers in the Kitchener-Waterloo area and potential participants must 
complete a phone interview about their demographic characteristics, medical status and 
history to determine their eligibility to participate in studies. Eligible participants are then 
entered into the pool and are contacted for individual studies for which they meet study-
specific criteria. Fifty-five younger adults were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes into the University of Waterloo’s Research Experience Group. Potential participants 
had to complete a mass testing and pre-screening questionnaire on an online study 
management system. Students who met the eligibility criteria for specific studies according 
to their responses on the pre-screen questionnaire could decide to sign up for a study of their 
choosing. Table 2 displays participant characteristics. Participants came into the lab for a 
study on attention to pictures and completed all of the tasks listed below. Older adults 
received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups, inclusion criteria were: fluency in English, normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, and no previous 
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head injury.  This information was obtained through self-report. For older adults, an 
additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 (out of 30) on the Mini-Mental State 
Exam (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). During the course of the study, 
participants of both age groups completed a battery of neuropsychological tasks (Trail 
Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and backward). Scores on the Trail Making 
Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm that older adult participants were within 
normal range for cognitive functioning according to published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 
1998; Wechsler, 1997). See Table 2 for neuropsychological test scores.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., Verhaeghen, 2003), the older adult 
group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), t (108) = 8.06, p < .0005, as estimated by the National Adult Reading 
Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 1992) than the younger adult group. (In the NART-R, participants are asked 
to read irregularly spelled words out loud.) Older adults also had a greater number of years of education, t (63) 
= 2.08, p < .05 (note that years of education data were missing for 4 older adults). 
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Table 2 Experiments 1 and 2 Participant Characteristics. Mean Values with Standard 
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Materials and Procedure 
 FAS test. To examine the contribution of processing fluency to positivity effects, I 
used the FAS test (Spreen & Strauss, 1998), a standard neuropsychological test of phonemic 
fluency (executive functioning). On this test, participants are given the letters F, A, and S one 
at a time and are asked to say aloud as many words that begin with each of the target letters 
as they can. Participants were given 1 minute for generation, per letter, and were instructed 
not to generate words that are proper names, place names, trademarked names, or the same 
word with a different ending (e.g., eat and eating). Participant responses were recorded both 
on paper and with an audio recording device. If a spoken word had multiple meanings (e.g., 
son and sun, or were homonyms) the experimenter inquired about the intended meaning after 
the minute had elapsed for the given letter and recorded it on the paper. Words output by 
participants were later coded as positive, negative, or neutral in one of two ways: 1) words 
that appeared in the ANEW database  (Bradley & Lang, 1999; a database with normative 
ratings of English words by valence and arousal rated on a 1-9 scale) were coded based on 
their normative valence ratings (ranges were  1 - 3.66 for negative, 3.67 - 6.33 for neutral, 
and 6.34 - 9 for positive, words), and 2) words not in the ANEW (including different 
conjugations/pluralizations of words that appeared in the ANEW) were classified into one of 
three emotional valence categories (positive, negative, neutral) by two coders working 
independently. Coding discrepancies were resolved by a third coder. Coding discrepancies 
occurred for 27.6% and 20.1% of younger and older adults’ word output for words not in the 
ANEW, respectively. Words that violated test instructions (including non-words and non-
English words) were not coded and these comprised 0.49% and 2.2% of younger and older 
adults’ word output, respectively. Repetitions of words were not included in the analyses. 
The mean number of errors produced on the FAS test was 0.22 (SD = .50) for younger adults, 
and 0.85 (SD = 1.14) for older adults. 
Autobiographical memory task. Participants were given nine “cue words” selected 
from the ANEW database. There were 3 each of negative (Alone, Mistake, Discomfort; M = 
2.49, SD = 0.34), neutral (Teacher, News, Market; M = 5.55, SD = 0.21), and positive 
(Home, Bunny, Cake; M = 7.47, SD = 0.38), words. Cue words were matched as closely as 
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possible on arousal (Mnegative = 4.73, SD = 0.51, Mneutral = 4.45, SD = 0.63, Mpositive = 4.42, SD 
= 0.51) and were selected based on presumed ease with which they could be associated with 
autobiographical memories. Cue words were presented in a random order for each participant 
on sheets of paper, with 10-13 lines under each cue word for the participant to write out their 
memory (one memory per cue word). Participants were instructed as follows:  “Provide 
memories of specific events from your life that are related to each of the keywords below. 
You’ll have 1 minute (or 2 if you really need it) to write down a brief description of the 
event. These memories can be from any time in your life (i.e., from childhood or from the 
recent past). We are interested in your memories of specific events that have occurred at a 
specific point in time and place”. Although instructions indicated that participants had 1-2 
min. to retrieve and write down their memories, in practice participants were allowed extra 
time to record their memories if necessary; this instruction was included to encourage 
participants to complete the task in a timely manner. 
After participants wrote down their memories, the experimenter checked to make sure 
that they were specific (contained detail), and asked participants to provide additional 
information for productions that were general in nature. For example, if a participant wrote “I 
like bunnies” or “I used to have a bunny” in response to the cue word “Bunny” the 
experimenter would ask “Could you write about a time when you had a specific experience 
with a bunny or that involved bunnies?” If after probing a participant still could not generate 
a specific memory to the cue word, the memory was still included in the analyses, as I 
reasoned that such general or semantic memories are based upon the aggregate of a series of 
episodic memories of the participant’s past. 
Next, participants were asked to “Please classify each of the events you described 
above as positive, negative, or neutral”; they did so by placing a “+”, “-“, or “0” in the box 
on the left of each cue word. Finally, participants rated their memories on a Likert-type scale 
regarding how they currently felt about each memory. The instructions were: “For each of 
the events that you described, please rate how positive or negative you feel each event was, 
using the scale below (-3 being very negative, 0 being neutral and +3 being very positive).  
Please make these ratings based on how you feel right now about each event. Indicate this 
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score in the box to the right of each description”. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Participants completed the NART-R as well as 
the Trail Making Tests A and B (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), and Digit Span forward and 
backward tasks (Wechsler, 1997), which measure executive functioning. Scores on the Trail 
Making Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm that older adult participants 
were within normal range for cognitive functioning (see Table 2), according to published 
norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Wechsler, 1997). Older adult participants completed the 
MMSE after the other neuropsychological tasks. To assess mood at time of test, participants 
also completed the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule – Expanded (PANAS-X, 
Watson & Clark, 1994). Participants then completed the FAS test and autobiographical 
memory task.  
Results 
Mood Measure 
Raw PANAS-X scores were converted to percentages (see Table 2 for means). Each 
age group reported greater positive than negative affect tyounger (54) = 9.71, p < .0005; tolder 
(54) = 14.45, p < .0005 at time of test. Older adults reported greater positive affect t (108) = 
3.43, p < .005 and less negative affect t (108) = 2.53, p < .05 than did younger adults. 
 Three mixed ANOVAs were performed. The first was to analyze the number of 
positive, negative, and neutral words output in the FAS test. The second was to analyze the 
number of autobiographical memories that participants classified as positive, negative, and 
neutral. The third was to analyze the number of autobiographical memories that participants 
rated as “currently feel positive/negative/neutral about”, as there could be a difference in how 
participants currently felt about their autobiographical memories, and how they would 






Number of words output in the FAS test was analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with 
the between-subjects factor of age group (younger, older) and the within-subjects factor of 
word valence (negative, neutral, positive). This tested whether older adults would output 
more positive than negative or neutral words (positivity effect), compared to younger adults. 
Total number of words output did not differ between younger (M = 41.53, SD = 9.91) 
and older (M = 40.47, SD = 11.47) adults, F (1, 108) = 0.27, p > .1, np
2
 = 0.002. There was a 
main effect of valence of words output, F (2, 216) = 343.90, p < .0005, ηp
2
 = .76. Participants 
output greater numbers of neutral (M = 25.51, SD = 9.14) than positive (M = 9.40, SD = 
5.18), t (109) = 14.80, p < .0005, or negative (M = 6.09, SD = 3.50), t (109) = 21.10, p < 
.0005 words, and greater numbers of positive than negative words, t (109) = 6.34, p < .0005. 
This main effect was qualified by a Word Valence x Age Group interaction, F (2, 216) = 
25.37, p < .0005, ηp
2
 = .19 (see Table 3) in which younger adults output a greater number of 
negative, t (108) = 1.99, p < .05, and positive words, t (86) = 6.48, p < .0005, than did older 




                                                 
2
 Comparisons within each age group indicated the same pattern of word output as in the main effect of Valence 
(ps < .05).  
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Table 3 Experiment 1, Mean Number of Words Output in the FAS Test by Word Valence and 










































Effects of mood and years of education on FAS test performance. To examine the 
effect of negative mood, positive mood, and years of education on the number of words 
output in the FAS test, the above analyses were conducted using these variables included as 
covariates; when included, the main effect of word valence became marginal (p = .07) and 
there was a significant main effect of positive mood F(1, 101) = 7.02, p < .01, np
2
 = .06: 
participants who reported more positive affect output greater numbers of words overall, r = 
.23, p < .05. The Word Valence x Age Group interaction remained significant, F (2, 202) = 
16.71, p < .0005, ηp
2
 = .14. No other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
Relation between NART-R reading test scores (FSIQ) and FAS test 
performance. As aging-related differences in vocabulary may have affected word output, 
correlations between raw scores on the NART-R reading test (number of pronunciation 
errors), and number of words output, were examined for each age group and word valence 
type.  For younger adults, fewer NART-R errors was related to greater output of negative 
words, r = -.30, p < .05, and greater total word output, r = -.31, p < .05. For older adults, 
fewer NART-R errors was related to greater negative, r = -.32, p < .05, and neutral, r = -.38, 
p < .005, word output, and greater total word output, r = -.41, p < .005.
3
 
Autobiographical Memory Task 
 Autobiographical memories classified according to valence. Number of memories 
classified by the participant according to valence in the Autobiographical Memory Task was 
analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with the between–subjects factor of age group (younger, 
older) and the within-subjects factors of memory valence (negative, neutral, positive) and cue 
word valence (negative, neutral, positive). This tested whether older adults would classify 
                                                 
3
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to retrieval of words, scores on these tests were correlated with number 
of words retrieved for each valence type and age group. These analyses  revealed that for younger adults better 
performance on Digit Span backward (larger span) was related to  retrieval of more negative words, r = .27, p < 
.05. For older adults, better performance on Digit Span backward was related to retrieval of more negative, r = 
.29, p < .05, neutral, r = .29, p < .05, and total, r = .37, p < .01, words, and better (faster) performance on Trails 
B was related to retrieval of more neutral words, r = -.31, p < .05. 
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more of their memories as positive, and fewer memories as negative (positivity effect), 
compared to younger adults.  
Because all participants generated nine memories (one for each cue word) as 
instructed, there was no main effect of cue word valence, age group, or an Age Group x Cue 
Word Valence interaction in the analyses reported below. All p-values are reported with the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
There was a main effect of memory valence F (2, 216) = 94.13, p < .0005, np
2
 = 0.47: 
Participants generated greater numbers of memories classified as positive (M = 4.24, SD = 
1.62), than negative (M = 3.44, SD = 1.41), t (109) = 3.02, p < .005, or neutral (M = 1.31, SD 
= 1.22),  t (109) = 12.33, p < .0005, and greater numbers of memories classified as negative 
than neutral, t (109) = 10.67, p < .0005. This main effect was qualified by two 2-way 
interactions. First, there was a Memory Valence x Age Group interaction, F (2, 216) = 16.32, 
p < .0005, np
2
 = .13 (see Figure 2). Older adults generated greater numbers of memories 
classified as both negative, t (54) = 8.07, p < .0005, and positive, t (54) = 15.36, p < .0005, 
than neutral, and generated greater numbers of memories classified as positive, than negative, 
t (54) = 5.05, p < .0005. Younger adults also generated greater numbers of memories 
classified as both negative, t (54) = 7.00, p < .0005,  and positive, t (54) = 5.41, p < .0005, 
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 Comparisons between age groups indicated that older adults classified greater numbers of their memories as 
positive, relative to young, t (108) = 5.25, p < .0005, whereas younger adults classified greater numbers of their 





Figure 2.  Experiment 2, mean number of autobiographical memories classified by 
participants as negative, neutral, or positive, by age group. Error bars are standard errors of 
their respective means. 
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Second, there was a Memory Valence x Cue Word Valence interaction, F (4, 432) = 
120.91, p < .0005, np
2
 = 0.53. Note that this interaction serves as a manipulation check that 
the cue words generally encouraged the generation of memories for which classified valence 
was congruent with cue word valence. For negative cues, participants generated greater 
numbers of memories classified as negative than positive, t (109) = 13.14, p < .0005, and 
neutral, t (109) = 16.81, p < .0005, but numbers of positive and neutral memories did not 
differ (p > .05). For neutral cues, participants generated greater numbers of memories 
classified as positive than negative, t (109) = 6.26, p < .0005, and neutral, t (109) = 8.54, p < 
.0005, but numbers of negative and neutral memories did not differ (p > .05). For positive 
cues, participants generated greater numbers of memories classified as positive than negative, 
t (109) = 11.16, p < .0005, and neutral t (109) = 13.90, p < .0005, but the difference between 
number of negative and neutral memories was not significant (p > .1). 
Relation between mood and years of education and classification of 
autobiographical memories. To examine whether my reported effects were influenced by 
Mood at time of test, or by Education variables, the above analyses were run with negative 
mood, positive mood, and number of years of education as covariates. When these variables 
were included, the main effect of memory valence became non-significant (p > .1) and there 
were significant Memory Valence x Positive Mood, F (2, 202) = 5.46, p < .01, np
2
 = .05, and 
Memory Valence x Years of Education, F (2, 202) = 4.34, p < .05, np
2
 = .04, interactions. 
Importantly, the Memory Valence x Age Group interaction remained significant, F (2, 202) = 
8.44, p < .0005, np
2
 = .08, as did the Memory Valence x Cue Word Valence interaction, F (4, 
404) = 3.19, p < .05, np
2
 = .03. (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values reported.) No other 
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 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to retrieval of autobiographical memories, scores on these tests were 
correlated with number of memories retrieved for each valence type and age group. These analyses revealed 
only that for older adults, better performance on Digit Span backward (larger span) was related to retrieval of 
fewer neutral memories, r = -.31, p < .05. 
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Ratings of current feelings about autobiographical memories (“feel now” 
ratings). To examine how participants currently felt about their autobiographical memories, I 
tabulated a count of memories that were given a negative, positive, or neutral “feel now” 
rating. Memories rated as -1, -2, or -3 were binned into a “negative-feeling” category and 
memories rated as +1, +2, or +3 were binned into a “positive-feeling” category. Memories 
rated as 0 comprised the “neutral-feeling” category. The number of memories in each of 
these three categories was analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with age group as a between–
subjects factor and  valence of “feel now” rating (negative, neutral, positive) and cue word 
valence (negative, neutral, positive) as within-subjects factors. This analysis tested whether 
older adults would currently feel more positive than younger adults about memories (i.e., 
show a positivity effect).  
There was a main effect of valence of “feel now” rating, F (2, 216) = 78.31, p < 
.0005, np
2
 = .42. Participants generated greater numbers of memories about which they 
currently felt positive (M = 4.61, SD = 1.70), t (109) = 11.16, p < .0005, and negative (M = 
2.65, SD = 1.52), t (109) = 4.01, p < .0005, than neutral (M = 1.71, SD = 1.44), and generated 
greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt positive than negative, t (109) = 
7.14, p < .0005. 
This main effect was qualified by two 2-way interactions. First, there was a 
significant Valence of “feel now” Rating x Age Group interaction, F (2, 216) = 20.28, p < 
.0005, np
2
 = .16. Younger adults generated greater numbers of memories about which they 
currently felt negative (M = 3.07, SD = 1.48), t (54) = 2.58, p < .05, and positive (M = 3.73, 
SD = 1.56), t (54) = 4.23, p < .0005, than neutral (M = 2.13, SD = 1.64). Older adults also 
generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt positive (M = 5.49, 
SD = 1.34), t (54) = 16.23, p < .0005, and negative (M = 2.22, SD = 1.46), t (54) = 3.18, p < 
.005, than neutral (M = 1.29, SD = 1.05), but importantly, they generated greater numbers of 
memories about which they currently felt positive, than negative, t (54) = 9.31, p < .0005. 
Second, there was a significant Valence of “feel now” Rating x Cue Valence 
interaction, F (4, 432) = 89.20, p < .0005, np
2
 = .45. This interaction serves as a manipulation 
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check that the cue words generally encouraged the generation of memories for which “feel 
now” valence was congruent with cue word valence. For negative cues, participants 
generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt negative than 
positive, t (109) = 7.38, p < .0005, or neutral, t (109) = 7.72, p < .0005. For neutral cues, 
participants generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt positive 
than negative, t (109) = 9.88, p < .0005, and neutral, t (109) = 7.85, p < .0005. For positive 
cues, participants generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt 
positive than negative, t (109) = 14.09, p < .0005, and neutral t (109) = 12.72, p < .0005.  
These 2-way interactions were qualified by the significant 3-way Valence of “feel 
now” Rating x Age Group x Cue Word Valence interaction, F (4, 432) = 6.71, p < .0005, np
2
 
= .06 (see Figure 3). For negative cues, younger adults generated greater numbers of 
memories about which they currently felt negative, compared to older adults, t (108) = 4.43, 
p < .0005, whereas older adults generated greater numbers of memories about which they 
currently felt positive, compared to young, t (108) = 4.69, p < .0005. Generation of memories 
about which participants currently felt neutral did not differ between age groups (p > .1).  
For neutral cue words, older adults generated greater numbers of memories about 
which they currently felt positive, compared to young, t (108) = 4.55, p < .0005, whereas 
younger adults generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt 
neutral, compared to older adults, t (108) = 4.54, p < .0005. Generation of memories about 
which participants currently felt negative did not differ between age groups (p > .1).  
Similarly, for positive cues, older adults also generated greater numbers of memories 
about which they currently felt positive, compared to young, t (108) = 3.00, p < .005, 
whereas younger adults generated greater numbers of memories about which they currently 
felt neutral, compared to older adults, t (108) = 2.80, p < .01. Generation of memories about 
which participants currently felt negative did not differ between age groups (p > .1).
6
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 Comparisons within each age group for “feel now” memories indicated that, for negative cues, number of 
memories generated followed the same pattern of results as in the Valence of “feel now” Rating x Cue Valence 






                                                                                                                                                       
neutral, t (54) = 2.23, p < .05, memories, and more neutral than negative, t (54) = 2.07, p < .05, memories. The 
pattern for older adults was the same as that for young, except that older generated more negative than neutral 
memories, t (54) = 2.08, p < .05. For positive cues, younger adults generated more positive, than negative, t (54) 
= 8.07, p < .0005, or neutral, t (54) = 6.45, p < .0005, memories, but numbers of neutral and negative memories 








Figure 3. Experiment 2, mean number of autobiographical memories about which 
participants currently felt negative, neutral, or positive, by age group and for each cue word 
valence. Panel A: memories generated for negative cue words. Panel B: memories generated 
for neutral cue words. Panel C: memories generated for positive cue words. Error bars are 
standard errors of their respective means. 
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Relation between mood and years of education and “feel now” ratings of 
autobiographical memories. To examine whether my reported effects were influenced by 
Mood or Education variables, the above analyses were run with negative mood, positive 
mood, and number of years of education as covariates. With these variables included as 
covariates, the main effect of valence of “feel now” rating became non-significant (p > .1), 
and there were marginal interactions of valence of “feel now” rating with negative mood 
scores, F (2, 202) = 2.79, p = .06, np
2
 = .03, and with positive mood scores, F (2, 202) = 2.81, 
p = .06, np
2
 = .03. Importantly, the Valence of “feel now” Rating x Age Group interaction 
remained significant, F (2, 202) = 11.15, p < .0005, np
2
 = .1, and the Valence of “feel now” 
Rating x Cue Valence interaction was also significant, F (4, 404) = 2.38, p = .05, np
2
 = .02. 
Furthermore, the Valence of “feel now” Rating x Age Group x Cue Word Valence 
interaction remained significant, F (4, 404) = 3.82, p < .01, np
2
 = .04. No other main effects 




In the current study, I compared retrieval of words on a phonemic fluency task, and of 
events on an autobiographical task, in younger and older adults. When asked to generate 
words that began with the letters F, A, and S, no positivity effect in output was found, though 
older adults output more neutral words. For my autobiographical task, older adults output 
more autobiographical memories classified as positive, and rated their memories more 
positively than did younger adults. I suggest that the positivity effect in older adults is 
primarily observed when the cognitive task allows for personal evaluation and/or engages a 
reflective style of processing, as on an autobiographical but not a fluency task.  
 
                                                 
7
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which asses executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to retrieval of “feel now” autobiographical memories, scores on these 
tests were correlated with number of memories retrieved, for each valence type and age group. These analyses 
revealed only that for older adults, better (faster) performance on Trails B was related to retrieval of fewer 
neutral memories, r = .27, p < .05. 
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Phonemic Fluency Test (FAS) 
To the best of my knowledge, only one study to date has examined the processing 
fluency account of aging-related differences in memory for emotional and neutral 
information. Although the study (Yang & Hasher, 2011) used an implicit and semantic 
memory task (speeded word fragment completion), my results are similar to theirs even 
though I used an explicit and phonemic-based fluency task, and performance on the FAS test 
likely relied on self-initiated retrieval of words to a greater extent.  Both in Yang and 
Hasher’s (2011) study and in mine, older adults generated more neutral than negative, or 
positive, information. These convergent findings provide support for Yang and Hasher’s 
(2011) assertion that neutral information may be more accessible to older adults relative to 
information with emotional content (possibly for the reasons discussed above). Also similar 
to the current study, Yang and Hasher (2011) found that younger adults generated more 
neutral than positive words. Thus, information of a neutral valence appears to be more 
accessible for both older and younger adults relative to emotional information, but this 
pattern of results may simply reflect the numbers of neutral and emotional words in the 
English lexicon.  
One might argue that older adults in this sample scored higher on the NART-R 
(reading test), and that this difference in vocabulary may have affected number, or valence 
type, of words output in the FAS test. However, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Bolla, 
Lindgren, Bonaccorsy, & Bleecker, 1990; Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997), number of 
words output did not differ between age groups; also, both age groups output greater 
numbers of neutral compared to negative, or positive, words. Furthermore, as fewer errors on 
the NART-R was related to greater output of negative words and greater total word output in 
both age groups, it is unclear how vocabulary size per se might have affected the Age x 
Valence interaction.  
Autobiographical Memory Task 
I turn next to the results for the autobiographical memory task. Older adults classified 
greater numbers of their autobiographical memories as positive, than negative or neutral, and 
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classified greater numbers of memories as negative, than neutral. Younger adults, on the 
other hand, classified greater numbers of their autobiographical memories as positive or 
negative compared to neutral, with no significant differences between numbers of positive 
and negative memories generated. Thus, when older adults are asked to retrieve 
autobiographical memories, they preferentially recall events that they classify as positive, 
whereas younger adults retrieve memories that they classify as being positively and 
negatively valenced, relative to neutral.  
 Participant ratings of how they currently felt about their autobiographical memories 
replicated the pattern found for classifications of memories. Again, older adults showed a 
positivity effect; they generated greater numbers of autobiographical memories about which 
they currently felt positive, than negative or neutral. Younger adults generated greater 
numbers of autobiographical memories about which they currently felt positive and negative, 
than neutral. Thus, older adults appear to preferentially recall events that they not only 
evaluate as being positive in nature, but also which they currently feel positively about, 
whereas younger adults recall events about which they currently feel positive and negative. 
 What is especially interesting is the Valence of “feel now” Rating x Age Group x Cue 
Word Valence interaction. Here I find evidence of both a positivity enhancement and a 
negativity reduction for older adults. Given negative cue words, older adults generated 
greater numbers of autobiographical memories about which they currently felt positive, and 
fewer autobiographical memories about which they currently felt negative, relative to 
younger adults. Also, given either neutral or positive cues, older adults again generated 
greater numbers of memories about which they currently felt positive, relative to younger 
adults. These findings suggest that older adults not only may preferentially recall life events 
about which they currently feel positive, but may also be inclined to avoid recalling life 
events about which they currently feel negative, even when prompted with negative cues. 
It is important to note that the cue word valence interactions, with memory valence 
and with valence of “feel now” rating, indicate that participants did indeed generate 
memories with valence concordant with that of the cue word. That is, participants generated 
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greater numbers of positive and negative memories to positive and negative cue words, 
respectively. The only exception was for neutral cue words, for which participants generated 
greater numbers of positive, compared to negative and neutral memories. This is in line with 
experience sampling studies that show that both younger and older adults report a higher 
frequency of positive, than negative, affect in their day-to-day lives (e.g., Carstensen, 
Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000). 
My autobiographical memory results are also largely in line with previous literature. 
A number of studies have investigated aging-related changes in autobiographical memory for 
emotional and neutral events. For instance, Kennedy et al. (2004) asked a sample of middle-
aged and older nuns to recall aspects of their past physical and emotional health on which 
they had previously given reports fourteen years earlier. They found that older nuns recalled 
their past in a more positive light than was originally reported, compared with middle-aged 
nuns. In line with this, Comblain, D’Argembeau, and Van der Linden (2005) asked younger 
and older adults to generate negative, neutral, and positive autobiographical memories from 
the past two years and found that older adults rated their negative memories as having been 
more positive, compared to younger adults. These results suggest that older adults may have 
reappraised their negative memories to be more positive, as reported in my study. Fernandes, 
Ross, Wiegand, and Schryer (2008) also found a positivity effect in number of reports of 
positive autobiographical events. Interestingly, later recall of those initially retrieved events 
did not show a positivity effect, perhaps because the task instructions focused on accuracy of 
recall of events reported in the previous session. Notably, they did find a positivity effect in 
older adults’ false memories about recent events, in line with my report of a biased output of 
positive events on autobiographical tests. Moreover, one recent study that also used the cue-
word method to probe autobiographical memory found that older adults, especially older 
men, retrieved fewer negative memories in response to negative cue words compared with 
younger adults (Ros & Latorre, 2010). 
Despite using a very similar methodology to the current study, however, Schlagman, 
Kliegel, Schulz, and Kvavilashvili (2009) did not find a positivity effect in older adults’ 
voluntary autobiographical memories. Schlagman et al. (2009), examined ‘involuntary’ 
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(spontaneous) and ‘voluntary’ (generated in response to word or phrase cues) 
autobiographical memories of younger and older adults. While they did not find a positivity 
effect in older adults’ voluntary memories, they did find that older adults rated their 
involuntary memories more positively compared to younger adults. One difference between 
Schlagman et al.’s (2009) procedure and mine is that they used phrases which described 
specific situations, as well as single words, as retrieval cues for voluntary autobiographical 
memories, whereas I exclusively used single words as cues. To illustrate, Schlagman et al.’s 
(2009) phrase cues “having a row” (negative phrase), “first date” (positive phrase), and 
“giving directions” (neutral phrase) might be perceived as stronger cues to generate 
autobiographical memories with a negative, positive, and neutral valence, respectively, 
compared to my word cues, which afforded more scope for emotional regulation goals to 
become evident. Moreover, Schlagman et al. did not analyze the number of memories that 
participants rated as being negative, neutral, and positive in valence, for each word cue 
valence as I did. Rather, mean valence ratings were analyzed by word cue type (negative, 
neutral, positive). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that both younger and older adults rated 
the memories that they generated in response to negative, neutral, and positive phrase cues as 
negative, neutral, and positive, respectively. This pattern is very similar to the pattern found 
in my Memory Valence x Cue Word Valence interaction for classifications of 
autobiographical memories, which suggests that participants generated memories for which 
valence was concordant with cue word valence. 
In line with the cognitive control account, and with the predictions of SST more 
generally, I suggest that it is primarily when tasks engage participants in a reflective 
processing style, or when the cognitive task in question allows emotional goals to be more 
salient, that positivity effects are most likely to be found. I propose that tasks which engage 
participants in strategic and reflective processing allow greater focus on one’s emotional 
state, and may be more likely to show a positivity effect in aging.  
I note that the cognitive control and processing fluency accounts are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and it is likely that many of the cognitive tasks that have been used in the 
literature to assess aging-related positivity effects can be carried out through reliance on 
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processing fluency of study materials and/or through use of strategic processes. Moreover, it 
is entirely possible that there may be individual differences in the extent to which these 
cognitive processes are used to carry out a given task. In light of these considerations, I 
acknowledge that both my fluency and “reflective” tasks likely tap into processing fluency 
and cognitive control mechanisms. I argue, however, that the autobiographical memory task 
lends itself much more readily to a reflective processing style as participants must 
contemplate events from their lives and in doing so may become focused on their emotional 
state, which would allow for cognitive control to be used in service of emotion regulation 
goals. This view is in accordance with recent research which shows that retrieval of specific 
autobiographical memories (as in my task) depends, in part, upon executive control processes 
(e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007; Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008; Piolino et al., 2010). 
This is in contrast to my fluency task, which discourages a reflective processing style by 
requiring participants to output as many words as possible in a short time period, with an 
emphasis on task accuracy (first letter of output, and generating words within specific test 
restrictions).  
As mentioned in the Introduction, recent studies have shown that positivity effects in 
cognitive tasks can be influenced by instructions to focus on task accuracy or emotional state; 
when both younger and older participants focus on their emotional state, positivity effects 
tend to emerge, whereas positivity effects disappear when participants focus on task accuracy 
(e.g., Kennedy et al., 2004; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007). This effect may even occur 
more strongly on intentional memory tasks that require controlled processing (Yang & 
Ornstein, 2011), as on my autobiographical task.  
There is also evidence from neuroimaging studies that the brain basis for the 
positivity effect lies in control processes mediated by the prefrontal cortex. A number of 
studies have shown that when participants engage in emotion regulation strategies, such as 
reappraisal of emotion-eliciting events, activation increases in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas activation in limbic 
structures such as the amygdalae decreases (for reviews see Green & Malhi, 2006, and 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). In the context of the positivity effect literature, it is assumed that 
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older adults’ chronically activated goal to regulate their affective state motivates them to use 
cognitive control processes to engage in emotion regulation. Indeed, there is mounting 
evidence of the role of the prefrontal cortex in the involvement of positivity effects in a 
variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., Addis, Leclerc, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2008; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2010; St. Jacques, Dolcos, 
& Cabeza, 2010). My results and interpretation fall in line with this literature. 
Finally, my results are in line with neuroimaging studies which show that when 
processing positive stimuli during tasks which induce a deep level of processing, older adults 
recruit the prefrontal cortex to a greater extent than younger adults, perhaps as a result of 
attempting to regulate emotional response to those stimuli (for a review see Nashiro, Sakaki, 
& Mather, 2011). Specifically, this effect appears in tasks in which participants make 
semantic (Ritchey, Bessette-Symons, Hayes, & Cabeza, 2011) and self-referential (Gutchess, 
Kensinger, & Schacter, 2007) judgments. Because my autobiographical memory task 
required participants to reflect upon how cue words could be related to events from their own 
lives, this task likely tapped into memories that were more deeply processed relative to the 
phonemic fluency task, and so may have been more likely to make emotion regulation goals 
more salient to older adults. 
Limitations 
 It is possible that differences between my phonemic fluency and autobiographical 
tasks other than the extent to which participants engaged in a reflective processing style and 
use of cognitive control mechanisms could have contributed to the observed differences. 
First, words generated in the FAS test were coded for valence by independent coders and 
through use of the ANEW, whereas valence of memories in the autobiographical task was 
rated by participants themselves. If participants had coded valence of words generated in the 
FAS test themselves, it is possible that they would have classified words differently. It seems 
unlikely, however, that the majority of participants’ classifications would differ greatly from 
those of independent coders. Furthermore, the emotional tone of a participant’s 
autobiographical memory may not be as obvious to an objective observer as it would be to 
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the participant, and so I felt that participants’ classifications of the valence of their 
autobiographical memories would be more valid than those of objective coders. Moreover, 
Fernandes et al. (2008) had both younger and older adult external coders rate the 
autobiographical memories generated by younger and older adult participants, and found the 
same results regardless of coder age. 
 Nevertheless, to address the limitation that my tasks may have differed on variables 
other than a reflective processing style, future work can manipulate instructions given for the 
FAS test to focus either on accuracy (adherence to test restrictions) or emotional state, and to 
examine valence of words output. These two instruction conditions could also be used to 
compare the valence of memories generated in the autobiographical memory task. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed an aging-related positivity effect and a negativity 
reduction on an autobiographical memory task, but no evidence of such effects on a 
phonemic fluency task in the same sample of younger and older participants. In keeping with 
Mather and Carstensen’s (2005) idea that aging-related positivity effects may be most likely 
to arise on memory tasks in which the to-be-remembered material is personally relevant, the 
most obvious difference between my fluency and autobiographical tasks is the degree to 
which the tasks engage participants in a self-reflective processing style. This likely includes 
aspects of cognitive control (e.g., Mather & Knight, 2005). Although the FAS test is 
traditionally used to measure verbal fluency (executive function), this task by its nature does 
not clearly lend itself to a reflective processing style—participants may not have sufficient 
motivation to preferentially retrieve positive information when the goal is to quickly generate 
words that begin with a certain letter, and is unlikely to activate goals to maintain positive 
well-being. Such a result is in line with Kennedy et al.’s (2004) claim that motivation to 
maintain positive well-being influences whether a positivity effect is obtained.  
My results also speak to the current debate regarding another theoretical account of 
aging-related positivity effects, which postulates that these effects arise from age-related 
decline in the amygdala’s ability to process negative information (Cacioppo, Berntson, 
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Bechara, & Tranel, 2011). It is argued that if positivity effects stem from biological decline 
of the amygdala in particular, then they should be more consistent across tasks and less 
susceptible to experimental manipulations of motivational state (e.g., Charles & Carstensen, 
2009; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). The fact that my study did not find consistent positivity 
effects across two tasks, in the same sample of participants, and that my phonemic fluency 
task did not provide evidence of a selective decrement in the processing of negative 
information in older adults, relative to positive information, goes against this theoretical 
account.  
To conclude, I found no evidence of a positivity effect or negativity reduction in the 
valence of words output on a phonemic retrieval fluency task. I did, however, find evidence 
of a negativity reduction and a positivity effect on my episodic autobiographical memory 
task, and in appraisal of those memories, in older relative to younger adults.  The results of 
my study are not readily accommodated by a processing fluency account. By this account, 
the fluency task should have revealed a bias in output, but it did not. Whether a positivity 
effect in older adults is observed seems to depend, at least in part, on whether the task is one 





3.3 Experiment 3: A Positivity Effect in Older Adults’ Memorability Judgments 
of Pictures  
Introduction 
Experiment 3 examined whether there is evidence of positivity effects in strategic 
selection of items that older adults consider memorable. To this end, I developed a novel 
method of presentation of information in which older adults were asked to deliberately 
choose a subset of information, of different emotional valence, which they considered to be 
memorable among a set of possible items. Selection biases and later memory performance 
were then compared in younger and older adults.  
Specifically, in Experiment 3 I sought to determine whether older adults actually 
deemed positive items to be more memorable than negative or neutral ones. The purpose of 
the current experiment was thus two-fold. The first was to employ a novel methodology to 
examine whether older and younger adults preferentially select information that they thought 
would be memorable, based on emotional valence. The second was to determine whether this 
leads to biases in their subsequent memory. In my study, younger and older adults were 
shown a 5 x 6 array of negative, neutral, and positive pictures and were asked to select a 
subset of the pictures that they feel they would be most likely to remember, after which they 
were asked to recall all of the pictures in the array. Unlike the methods employed in previous 
studies of metamemory, in which participants judge the memorability of individual items 
presented sequentially, this novel methodology encourages participants to make cross-item 
comparisons of characteristics, and to make preferential selections of relative memorability. I 
assume that my methodology, in which a subset of pictures is to be selected from an array, 
would require participants to employ a strategy to guide selection; participants must compare 
the characteristics of multiple items with the goal of selecting only those pictures that they 
deem most memorable. Importantly for the current thesis, this task also encourages 
participants to engage in reflective processing to make their picture selections, as they must 
consider which pictures that they will be most likely to remember later. This may allow older 
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adults to select pictures in accordance with goals to regulate emotional state both during 
picture selection and at retrieval. 
Based both on previous studies that implicated strategic control processes in 
mediating aging-related positivity effects, and the predictions of SST that older adults are 
more motivated to regulate their emotions, I expected that older adults would select more 
positive pictures as being memorable than negative or neutral ones, and would also be more 
likely to recall positive pictures. Moreover, as some (e.g., Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 
2003, Experiment 2; Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003), but not all (e.g., 
Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003, Experiment 1; Fernandes et al., 2008; Kensinger, 
Growdon, Brierley, Medford, & Corkin , 2002), studies have shown a negativity bias in 
younger adults’ memory for pictures, I expected younger adults to select more negative 
pictures as being memorable, and that they would show enhanced recall for these pictures.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty healthy community-dwelling older adults (63-88 years of age; 18 female) 
recruited through the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 30 
younger adults (18-25 years of age; 16 female) recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes completed the study. Table 4 displays participant characteristics. Older adults 
received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups, inclusion criteria were: fluency in English, normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, no previous head 
injury, and not currently being treated for depression or anxiety. For older adults, an 
additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 (out of 30) on the Mini-Mental State 
Exam, which may indicate cognitive impairment (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 
1975). Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., Verhaeghen, 
2003), the older adult group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), F(1, 58) = 35.58,  p  < .0005, 
as estimated by the National Adult Reading Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 1992) than 
the younger adult group, but the age groups did not differ on years of education (p > .1). 
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During the course of the study, participants of both age groups completed a battery of 
neuropsychological tasks (Trail Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and 
backward). Scores on the Trail Making Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm 
that older adult participants were within normal range for cognitive functioning according to 
published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Wechsler, 1997). See Table 4 for mean 
demographic values and scores on neuropsychological tests. One older adult was replaced 
due to scoring less than 26 on the MMSE and the first younger adult run was replaced as it 
was noticed that some pictures on the poster were oriented upside down. This was corrected 
for subsequent participants. 
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Mood measure. To compare mood at time of test, across age groups, raw scores on 
the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule – Expanded (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 
1994) were converted to percentages (see Table 4 for means) and were analyzed with a 
mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects variable of age group (younger, older) and within-
subjects variable of mood (positive, negative). There was a main effect of mood, F (1, 58) = 
217.24, p < .0005, ηp
2 
= .79: Both age groups reported more positive than negative mood. 
There was also a Mood x Age Group interaction, F (1, 58) = 11.99, p < .005, ηp
2
 = .17, in 
which older adults reported greater positive mood than young, t (58) = 3.39, p < .005, but 
there were no age differences in negative mood (p > .1). 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials. Pictures were taken from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001), a widely-used database of full-colour pictures with 
normative ratings on the dimensions of emotional valence and psychological arousal. Each 
dimension is rated on a scale of 1-9, with 1 being negative valence or low arousal, and 9 
being positive valence or high arousal. Two picture lists were created to ensure that any 
effects would not be due to a specific picture set, both containing 10 pictures each of 
negative, neutral, and positive valence, for a total of 30 pictures per list. Valence ratings of 
pictures for the two lists were as follows: negative (Mlist 1 = 3.00, SDlist 1 = 0.48; Mlist 2 = 2.75, 
SDlist 2 = 0.33), neutral (Mlist 1 = 4.82, SDlist 1 = 0.71; Mlist 2 = 5.16, SDlist 2 = 0.80), and positive 
(Mlist 1 = 7.50, SDlist 1 = 0.36; Mlist 2 = 7.40, SDlist 2 = 0.36). For each valence category, half of 
the pictures were low in arousal (Mlist 1 = 3.90, SDlist 1 = 0.29; Mlist 2 = 4.03, SDlist 2 = 0.25) 
and half were high in arousal (Mlist 1 = 6.38, SDlist 1 = 0.29; Mlist 2 = 6.52, SDlist 2 = 0.44). 
Within each arousal category, about half of the pictures contained people and the other half 
contained animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects. Picture content was matched as 
closely as possible across the two lists (e.g., pictures of attack dogs appeared in both lists). 
Average normative valence and arousal ratings did not differ between the two picture lists for 
any valence or arousal category (all ps > .1). Average normative valence differed between 
each valence category, and average normative arousal differed between low and high arousal 
pictures, for both picture lists (all ps < .0005). Moreover, normative arousal ratings did not 
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differ across valence categories for low (negative M = 4.10, SD = 0.28; neutral M = 3.88, SD 
= 0.24; positive M = 3.92, SD = 0.27), and high (negative M = 6.46, SD = 0.31; neutral M = 
6.29, SD = 0.29; positive M = 6.60, SD = 0.48), arousal pictures (ps > .05). 
Procedure. Participants were given an information letter telling them that they would 
be viewing pictures that they were to remember for a later memory task. Participants were 
tested individually, and mood was assessed with the PANAS-X either before or after the 
picture viewing and memory tasks to examine the effect of mood on task performance. 
Picture pre-exposure task. To equate as much as possible the encoding of study 
pictures, participants first viewed the 30 pictures from List 1 or 2 (counterbalanced across 
participants, for each age group) presented one at a time in a random order, and were asked 
to say out loud a word that described each picture in some way. Pictures were 312 pixels x 
416 pixels in size and were presented for 4 seconds each on a white background in the centre 
of the screen. Participants had unlimited time to give their response, and pressed the space 
bar to advance to the next picture. 
Picture selection task. Immediately after completing the pre-exposure task, 
participants were shown a white poster board with the 30 pictures displayed on it in a 5 x 6 
array. The poster was mounted on a white wall of the testing room, 119 cm from the floor, 
and pictures were 11 cm x 14.5 cm (the same size as those in the pre-exposure task). Three 
versions of posters were created for each picture list to randomize the position of specific 
pictures (counterbalanced across participants, and picture list, for each age group). 
Participants were told that these were the same pictures that had been presented on the 
computer screen, and were asked to “select 15 of the pictures that you feel you will best be 
able to remember such that you could tell someone about the pictures or recognize them 
afterward.” Participants were asked to indicate their selections by pointing, although some 
verbally described their selections, and were given an unlimited amount of time to make their 
selections. Afterward, the poster was removed. 
Picture free recall task. After a delay of about 5-10 min. during which participants 
completed the NART-R and forward and backward digit span tasks (Wechsler, 1997), 
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participants were given a sheet of paper with lines on it and were asked to “write down a 
short description of as many of the pictures that you saw as you can remember. This includes 
both the pictures that you selected as well as the pictures that you did not select”. 
 Participants’ written picture descriptions were later matched to study pictures from 
the poster by two independent coders. Matching discrepancies were resolved by a third coder 
and these final categorizations of pictures were linked with picture selection data to 
determine which of the selected pictures were later recalled. Coder discrepancies in matching 
written descriptions to study pictures occurred for 1.40 % and 5.10 % of younger and older 
adults’ picture descriptions, respectively. Descriptions that could not be matched to study 
pictures (intrusions), or were repeated, were not coded. Intrusions comprised 0 % and 0.76 % 
of younger and older adults’ picture descriptions, respectively. 
 Neuropsychological tasks. Next, participants completed the Trail Making Tests A 
and B (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) to compare psychomotor function across age groups, and 
older adults completed the MMSE. 
 Post experimental picture rating. Last, to verify that participant ratings of pictures 
were concordant with the IAPS normative ratings, participants rated all of the study pictures 
on the dimensions of valence, arousal, and personal relevance using the Self-Assessment 
Manikin Scales (SAM, from IAPS,  Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). These scales were the 
same as those used to gather normative ratings for IAPS, except that I adapted the scale used 
to measure perceived “dominance” of pictures to gather ratings of personal relevance. 
Pictures were shown one-at-a-time on a computer screen with SAM scales appearing below 
the pictures, and participants rated pictures by pressing number keys on the keyboard. 
Results 
Picture Selection  
 The number of pictures selected by participants was analyzed using a mixed ANOVA 
with the between-subjects factor of age group (younger, older), and the within-subjects factor 
of picture valence (negative, neutral, positive). There was a main effect of valence, F (2, 116) 
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= 6.61, p < .005, ηp
2
 = .10; This was qualified by a Valence x Age Group interaction, F (2, 
116) = 3.86, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .06: Older adults selected greater numbers of positive than 
negative, t (29) = 4.88, p < .0005, or neutral, t (29) = 3.25, p < .005, pictures, but numbers of 
negative and neutral pictures selected did not differ (p > .1), whereas younger adults’ picture 
selection did not differ at all by valence (all ps > .1; see Figure 4).
8
 There was no effect of 
Age Group as younger and older adults both followed instructions and selected 15 pictures.
9
 
                                                 
8
 Comparisons between age groups indicated that older adults selected more positive pictures than younger 
adults, t (58) = 2.59, p < .05, and marginally fewer negative pictures, t (58) = 1.93, p = .059. Number of neutral 
pictures selected did not differ between age groups, p > .1. 
9
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to picture selection, scores on these tests were correlated with number of 
pictures selected, for each valence type and age group. These analyses revealed only that for younger adults 





Figure 4. Experiment 3, mean number of pictures selected by participants, by valence and 
age group. Error bars are standard errors of their respective means. 
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To examine whether participants’ picture selection was modulated by arousal, 
number of pictures selected was analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects 
factor of age group (younger, older), and the within-subjects factor of picture arousal 
category (low, high). There was no main effect of arousal (p > .1) but a significant Age 
Group x Arousal interaction, F (1, 58) = 7.66, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .12: Older adults selected more 
low arousal pictures (M = 8.07, SD = 1.60) than did younger (M = 6.90, SD = 1.67), and 
fewer high arousal pictures (M = 6.93, SD = 1.60) than did younger (M = 8.10, SD = 1.67). 
There was no effect of Age Group as younger and older adults both followed instructions and 
selected 15 pictures. 
Picture Recall  
 Total number of pictures recalled (both selected and non-selected pictures) was 
analyzed in the same way as selected pictures above. There was a main effect of valence
10
, F  
(2, 116) = 6.88, p < .005, ηp
2
 = .11; participants recalled greater numbers of positive (M = 
6.63, SD = 1.65) than negative (M = 5.85, SD = 1.76), t (59) = 2.79, p < .01, or neutral (M = 
5.75, SD = 1.58), t (59) = 3.61, p < .005, pictures, but recall of negative and neutral pictures 
did not differ (p > .1).
11
 There was no effect of Age group (p = .08), and no Valence x Age 
Group interaction (p > .1).
12
 
To examine whether participants’ memory performance was modulated by arousal, 
number of pictures recalled was analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with the same factors as in 
                                                 
10
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to picture recall, scores on these tests were correlated with number of 
pictures recalled for each valence type and age group. No correlation reached significance (all ps > .1). 
11
 Correlation analyses conducted to address the concern that mood may explain my significant findings did not 
reveal any systematic relation between participant mood and picture selection or recall performance, for either 
age group. 
12
 Participants also completed a recognition task in which they were asked to make old/new judgments of study 
pictures. The ‘new’ pictures comprised the pictures from the other picture list.  Only the main effect of Age 
Group was significant, F (1, 58) = 15.90, p < .0005: younger adults (M = 0.97, SD = .027) were more accurate 
at recognizing the pictures than older adults (M = 0.92, SD = .063). 
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the arousal analysis above. There was a main effect of arousal, F (1, 58) = 6.95, p < .05, ηp
2
 = 
.11: participants recalled more high arousal, (M = 9.60, SD = 2.29) than low arousal (M = 
8.63, SD = 2.26), pictures. Neither the interaction with age group (p > .1) nor the effect of 
age (p > .05) reached significance. 
Accuracy of Memory for Selected Pictures 
 To examine the accuracy of participants’ memorability predictions of pictures, I 
divided the number of selected pictures that were later recalled by the total number of 
pictures that participants selected as being memorable, for each valence type, to obtain 
proportion scores of selected pictures that were later recalled. Proportion scores were 
analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of age group (younger, 
older), and a within-subjects factor of picture valence (negative, neutral, positive). Because 
proportion scores could not be computed for one younger and one older adult due to a lack of 
selection of pictures from at least one valence category, the analysis included 29 younger and 
29 older adults. 
 There was a main effect of Valence
13
, F (2, 112) = 4.97, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .08; greater 
proportions of the positive (M = 0.79, SD = 0.20) than neutral (M = 0.67, SD = 0.22) pictures 
were later recalled, t (57) = 2.90, p < .01, and greater proportions of negative (M = 0.77, SD 
= 0.23) than neutral pictures were recalled, t (58) = 2.51, p < .05. Proportion of positive and 
negative pictures did not differ (p > .1). There was no effect of Age (p > .1) and the Valence 
x Age Group interaction was not significant (p > .1).
14 
                                                 
13
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to judgment accuracy, scores on these tests were correlated with 
proportion of selected pictures recalled, for each valence type and age group. No correlation reached 
significance (all ps > .1). 
14
 Participant ratings of picture valence, arousal, and personal relevance were analyzed using mixed ANOVAs 
with the between-subjects factor of age group (younger, older), and the within-subjects factors of picture 
valence category (negative, neutral, positive) and picture arousal category (low, high). Analyses confirmed that 
participants rated pictures of each valence type, and arousal type, consistently with the normative IAPS ratings 
given above. In terms of personal relevance ratings, an Age Group x Valence x Arousal interaction, F (2, 116) = 
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To examine whether the accuracy of participants’ memorability predictions was 
modulated by arousal, proportion of selected pictures that were later recalled was analyzed 
with a mixed ANOVA with the same factors as in the arousal analysis above. There were no 
significant effects (all ps > .1).  
Accuracy of Memory for Non-Selected Pictures 
 I also investigated the effect of valence on recall of non-selected pictures to address 
the possibility that positivity effects might manifest in information deemed relatively less 
memorable.  To this end, proportion of non-selected pictures that were later recalled was 
analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of age group (younger, 
older), and a within-subjects factor of picture valence (negative, neutral, positive). The only 
significant effect was that of Age Group, F (1, 58) = 5.98, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .09, as younger 
adults (M = 0.52, SD = 0.15) recalled greater proportions of non-selected pictures than older 
adults (M = 0.42, SD = 0.15).  
Finally I examined the effect of arousal on recall of non-selected pictures by 
repeating the analysis above with the within-subjects factor of picture arousal category (low, 
high) instead of valence,  and found that for both age groups high arousal pictures (M = 0.51, 
SD = 0.23) were more likely to be recalled than low arousal pictures (M = 0.43, SD = 0.20), 
F (1, 58) = 4.67, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .07, and that again younger adults  recalled greater proportions 
of non-selected pictures than older adults, F (1, 58) = 7.22, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .11.  The interaction 
between age group and arousal was not significant (p > .1). 
Discussion 
When asked to select from an array a subset of items believed to be memorable, older 
adults showed a positivity effect in their selections, choosing greater numbers of positive, 
                                                                                                                                                       
4.10, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .07, indicated that older adults rated negative low arousal, neutral high arousal, neutral low 
arousal, and positive low arousal pictures as more personally relevant than younger adults (all ps < .05). 
However, correlations between rated personal relevance, number of pictures selected, and number of pictures 
recalled revealed only that, for younger adults, higher ratings of personal relevance of positive pictures was 
related to greater selection of positive pictures. 
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relative to negative and neutral pictures, whereas younger adults’ selections did not differ by 
valence. In terms of later memory performance, both age groups showed a positivity effect in 
recall of all study pictures (regardless of selection status), recalling greater numbers of 
positive than negative or neutral pictures. Thus, older adults accurately predicted the valence 
of pictures that they would later recall, whereas younger adults did not accurately predict a 
boost in their later memory for positive pictures.  
This experiment is the first to show that older adults preferentially select and encode 
positive material, and that this preferential selection leads to positivity effects in memory. 
This is in line with the postulated “situation selection” incorporated in Gross and colleagues’ 
process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; Urry & Gross, 2010): Older adults 
selectively place themselves in situations which will allow them to maintain a positive sense 
of well-being, such as selectively encoding positive over negative or neutral information. In 
agreement with this, older adults in Experiment 3 selected more positive material as being 
memorable. Given that participants in Experiment 3 were asked to evaluate pictures in terms 
of their memorability, in the context of the goal to select those which are more memorable, it 
seems reasonable to assume that participants employed cognitive control, defined here as 
deliberate, strategic or reflective (evaluative) processes, during picture selection. Thus, my 
results are consistent with those of others which demonstrate a role of cognitive control in the 
expression of positivity effects in tasks involving episodic memory (e.g., Mather & Knight, 
2005), and selective attention (e.g., Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert, 2009). It is interesting to 
note that older adults selected as memorable pictures lower in arousal compared to younger 
adults, whereas both age groups recalled more high arousal pictures, suggesting that younger 
adults may be more accurate in their predictions regarding the effect of arousal on memory. 
Moreover, both age groups recalled greater proportions of those high arousal pictures 
deemed less memorable (non-selected pictures), whereas picture valence did not influence 
accuracy of memorability predictions for non-selected pictures. 
What factors may underlie older adults’ superior accuracy of memorability 
predictions for emotional pictures in the current experiment? First, older adults may have 
more experience with processing neutral and emotional information and so may be more 
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aware that emotional, and more specifically, positive, material is memorable and thus use 
valence as a cue for processing fluency. It may also be that older adults are more attentive to 
factors that affect memory performance due to concerns about aging-related declines in 
memory. Finally, older adults may have deemed memorable information with the valence 
that they wished to remember, possibly in service of emotion regulation goals. This leads to 
the possibility that the mere act of selecting a picture as memorable might increase the degree 
to which the picture is encoded and the likelihood of its later being recalled, which could 
account for my recall results. However, as younger adults showed a positivity effect in their 
overall picture recall but not in their memorability predictions, this explanation seems 
unlikely. Regardless, the end result is that older, relative to younger, adults were wiser to the 
influence of emotion, specifically positive emotion, on subsequent memory.  
Previous studies of aging-related changes in metamemory which have employed 
verbal, non-emotional, stimuli report that older adults are just as accurate as their younger 
counterparts at predicting which items that they will later remember (Connor, Hertzog, & 
Dunlosky, 1997; Dunlosky, Baker, Rawson, & Hertzog, 2006; Hertzog, Sinclair, & 
Dunlosky, 2010; Serra, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 2008, but see Daniels, Toth, & Hertzog, 2009). 
In typical metamemory studies, participants are shown items sequentially and are asked to 
judge the likelihood of recalling each item. Although this method is appropriate for 
identifying the stimulus characteristics on which participants may base metamemory 
judgments of items in isolation, my method has several features that render it a more 
naturalistic exploration of metamemory predictions for pictorial information.  
Outside of the laboratory, participants would likely be presented with multiple items 
simultaneously, such as images or text in a magazine, advertisement flyer, or newspaper, and 
would need to determine which items they will process more extensively, and exert their 
limited cognitive resources.  During encoding of study pictures, on a poster board with all 
pictures available at once, participants can base their selections on direct comparisons of all 
items. This allows participants to assess the characteristics of each picture and decide 
whether these would make each item more or less memorable, relative to the other items 
available. Indeed, participants of both age groups indicated in follow-up questions that they 
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considered various picture characteristics when judging the relative memorability of items 
such as: perceptual (e.g., presence of a central object in a given scene), semantic (e.g., how 
easily they could put a word to a picture), personal relevance, emotional valence and arousal. 
These responses suggest that participants indeed were employing deliberate, strategic 
processes while evaluating pictures. However, responses also bring up the possibility that 
older adults may have based their picture selections on some characteristic that is more likely 
to be associated with positive stimuli than negative or neutral stimuli, but not positivity per 
se. Nevertheless, although participants vary in their beliefs about the characteristics that 
make pictorial information memorable, older adults as a group select positive pictures over 
negative and neutral ones.   
My results suggest that when presented with an array of neutral, positive and negative 
items, older adults are more accurate at predicting the influence of positive emotion on 
subsequent memory. On the other hand, younger adults are less accurate at predicting the 
effect of emotion on their later recall—they underestimate the enhancement of positive 
material on subsequent memory. Only one study to date has examined metamemory for 
emotional material (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). In their study, younger adults were asked 
to judge the likelihood of recalling negative, neutral, and positive nouns presented one-at-a-
time, and then completed a free recall test for the words. Unlike the current study, 
Zimmerman and Kelley (2010) found that participants were more likely to judge both 
positive and negative words as being more memorable than neutral words, and this was 
reflected in their free recall of the words. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that 
participant ratings in my study indicated that perceived arousal did not differ between 
pictures of different valences, whereas Zimmerman and Kelley’s (2010) neutral words were 
less arousing than the emotional words, and so their younger adults may have judged the 
emotional words as more memorable because they were more arousing (Zimmerman & 
Kelley, 2010). It is also possible that given rich pictorial stimuli, younger adults use another 
characteristic on which to base their memorability predictions, whereas emotion is a more 
obvious cue to memorability with word stimuli. Indeed, younger adults have been shown to 
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base metamemory judgments on such details as font size of studied words (Rhodes & Castel, 
2008). 
Moreover, my results are consistent with a recent study of aging-related changes in 
affective forecasting. Nielsen, Knutson, and Carstensen (2008) showed that older adults are 
better at predicting their affective reactions to wins and losses in the context of a computer 
game in which participants had to press a key quickly to either gain money or prevent loss of 
money. Although (perhaps unsurprisingly) both younger and older adults were relatively 
accurate at predicting the valence of their reactions in response to losses and gains, older 
adults were more accurate at predicting the intensity of arousal of those experiences, which is 
in line with my results showing that older adults are more accurate at predicting the effects of 
emotional stimuli on later memory. 
The finding that older adults preferentially select positive information has 
implications for selection of strategies to compensate for aging-relating declines in memory. 
For example, older adults can apply a “positive reappraisal” strategy (Shiota & Levenson, 
2009), to reinterpret information in a positive manner, thereby giving it a memorial 
advantage. There are also implications for everyday decision-making including selection of 
health care plans. For instance, Löckenhoff and Carstensen (2007) have shown that when 
considering different health care plans, older adults examine more positive than negative 
features of the plans, affecting their later decision of which to choose.  
In summary, my results suggest that older adults may have an enhanced awareness of 
the way in which positive emotion can enhance their memory performance compared with 
younger adults, as evidenced by the greater accuracy of older adults’ memorability 
predictions for positive stimuli. Future research should examine how this superior insight 
may be affected by the saliency of motivational goals to regulate emotions or to enhance 
accuracy (as in Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004), and whether older adults are also 
aware  of the circumstances under which emotional information may impair memory, as in 
the case of emotional distractors (e.g., Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
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Importantly for the current thesis, results of Experiment 3 are in line with the 
cognitive control hypothesis, as older adults selected as most memorable pictures of a 
positive valence in a task which emphasizes deliberate reflection on participants’ own 
memory processes. The selection of positive information is consistent with the idea that older 




Experiments on Attention 
4.1 Introduction to Attention Experiments 
Results of Experiments 1-3 suggest that within the domain of memory, aging-related 
positivity effects are most likely to emerge on tasks which emphasize self-reflection and 
allow for the application of cognitive control in the service of emotion regulation goals. 
Experiments 4-5 were conducted to examine whether tasks within other cognitive domains, 
such as attention, would also show evidence of positivity effects which differs depending on 
task demands.  
A number of studies have found positivity effects, or negativity reductions, on tasks 
that assess attention bias, such as gaze preferences using eye tracking (Allard & Isaacowitz, 
2008; Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 
2008; Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert, 2009; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a; 
Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007), and with a standard measure of 
selective attention, the dot probe paradigm (Lee & Knight, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 
2003; Orgeta, 2011). To evaluate the cognitive control and processing fluency hypotheses in 
the context of attention tasks, the following four experiments examined evidence for aging-
related positivity effects in two classic attention paradigms. The first is the Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm, for which performance is dependent on the ability to 
quickly process information. The second is the dot probe paradigm, which I have adapted in 
a manner that allows participants to use cognitive control to preferentially allocate their 






4.2 Experiments 4a and 4b: RSVP Paradigm  
Introduction to Experiments 4a and 4b 
In Experiments 4a and 4b, I use an RSVP paradigm to examine age differences in the 
ability of different valence stimuli to quickly capture attention. In this way, the task provides 
a measure of differences in processing fluency across age groups.  
In a typical RSVP paradigm, participants are shown a series of rapidly presented 
stimuli such as words, letters, or digits. Within the stream of stimuli are embedded either two 
targets (T1 and T2), or just the T2, amongst distractors. Following presentation of the stream, 
participants must state the identities of the targets detected in the stream. Usually, 
participants are less accurate at detecting the second target (T2) when it is preceded by a first 
target (T1) compared to when it is presented alone, particularly when T1 and T2 are 
presented in close temporal proximity (SOAs of 200-500msec). The RSVP paradigm is 
known to tax attentional resources (for a recent review, see Martens & Wyble, 2010), and so 
detection of targets is more likely if the target captures attention in a relatively “automatic” 
manner (bottom-up processing). Importantly for the current thesis, because attentional 
resources are taxed by the RSVP paradigm (due to the fast speed of processing required), it 
makes it unlikely that (older) participants would be able to use cognitive control to 
preferentially allocate attention to improve detection of (positive) items in service of emotion 
regulation goals. 
Past studies using RSVP 
A number of studies have examined the influence of emotion on ability to detect 
targets in the RSVP paradigm and have found that emotional T2s are more likely to be 
detected than neutral T2s, but that an emotional T1 impair subsequent detection of a neutral 
T2, indicating that emotional targets capture attention (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Keil & Ihssen, 
2004; Ogawa & Suzuki, 2004; Smith, Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006; Trippe, Hewig, 
Heydel, Hecht, & Miltner, 2007). These findings are consistent with findings from visual 
search tasks that emotional (negative in particular) stimuli are detected more quickly than 
neutral stimuli (e.g., Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). 
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Recently, researchers have begun to investigate aging-related changes in attention 
capture of emotional stimuli. In attention paradigms in which quick responding is 
emphasized, such as in visual search (Mather & Knight, 2006) and the RSVP paradigm 
(Langley, Rokke, Stark, Saville, Allen, & Bagne, 2008; Mickley Steinmetz, Muscatell, & 
Kensinger, 2010; Wieser, Muhlberger, Kenntner-Mabiala, & Pauli, 2006), the general pattern 
that emerges is that attention is captured by emotional stimuli similarly in older and younger 
adults. 
The novel contribution of Experiments 4a and 4b is that, unlike previous studies, the 
emotional valence of both the T1 and T2 targets is manipulated across experiments. This 
allows for an examination of both the degree to which attentional capture of emotional 
stimuli impairs the detection of subsequently presented non-emotional stimuli, and the degree 
to which those same emotional stimuli can delay the suppression of attention induced by 
attention capture of a preceding non-emotional target. Also, previous studies in the positivity 
effect literature have used words as stimuli, whereas Experiments 4a and 4b use IAPS 
pictures to examine whether previously reported effects generalize to stimuli that are more 
visually complex than words and may generate stronger emotional reactions in the viewer. 
 To investigate aging-related changes in attentional capture of emotional information, 
Experiment 4a used an RSVP paradigm in which T1 was always neutral, and emotional 
valence of T2 was manipulated (positive, negative, or neutral). In Experiment 4b, the 
identities of the targets were switched, such that T1 valence was manipulated, and T2s were 
always neutral. If positive information captures the attention of older adults, then I expected 
positive T2s to be detected more accurately than negative or neutral T2s in Experiment 4a. 
Using similar logic, in Experiment 4b, I expected neutral T2s to be detected with less 
accuracy when preceded by positive T1s relative to negative, or neutral, T1s, as the positive 









Thirty healthy community-dwelling older adults (60-78 years of age; 22 female) 
recruited through the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 30 
younger adults (18-23 years of age; 20 female) recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes, completed the study. Table 5 displays participant characteristics. Older adults 
received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups, inclusion criteria were self-reported: fluency in English, normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, no 
previous head injury, and not currently being treated for depression or anxiety. For older 
adults, an additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 on the Mini-Mental State 
Exam, which may indicate cognitive impairment (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 
1975). Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., Verhaeghen, 
2003), the older adult group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), t (58) = 5.88,  p  < .0005, as 
estimated by the National Adult Reading Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 1992) than the 
younger adult group, but age groups did not differ in years of education (p > .1). Years of 
education data were missing for one younger adult participant. During the course of the 
study, participants of both age groups completed a battery of neuropsychological tasks (Trail 
Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and backward). Scores on the Trail Making 
Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm that older adult participants were within 
normal range for cognitive functioning according to published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 





















































































































Materials and Procedure 
 Picture stimuli. Forty-five pictures were obtained from the IAPS database, a widely 
used database of full-colour photos with normative ratings of emotional valence and arousal 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). There were five each of negative (Valence M = 2.59, SD 
= 0.71; Arousal M = 4.57, SD = 0.61) and positive (Valence M = 7.36, SD = 0.72; Arousal M 
= 4.45, SD = 0.60) pictures, and 10 neutral (T1 Valence M = 5.07, SD = 0.79; Arousal M = 
4.45, SD = 0.87; T2 Valence M = 5.61, SD = 0.48; Arousal M = 4.42, SD = 0.63) pictures, 
used as targets in the RSVP paradigm. Twenty-five other neutral pictures were selected as 
distractor items (Valence M = 5.18, SD = 0.54; Arousal M = 4.48, SD = 1.27). IAPS 
normative ratings were used to categorize pictures according to valence, and all pictures were 
selected to be of medium arousal. For targets, three of the pictures of each valence featured 
animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects, and two featured people. For distractors, 15 of 
the pictures featured animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects, and 10 featured people. 
Pictures were resized to be 14cm in height and 11cm in width, when displayed on the 
computer monitor. Photo editing software was used to add a border 1cm in diameter to all 
pictures, with red borders for targets and white borders for distractors, so that participants 
could more easily distinguish targets from distractors in the RSVP trials.  
 RSVP task. Because pilot testing indicated that participants were close to floor and 
had trouble identifying individual pictures in the RSVP task, participants were first shown 
each of the target pictures presented one at a time on a computer screen, and were asked to 
provide a verbal label for each picture, which the experimenter wrote down; they were also 
told that they would use these labels to identify pictures during the RSVP task. 
 Participants were instructed that each trial would begin with presentation of a fixation 
cross, and afterward a stream of rapidly presented pictures would be shown, in which would 
appear either one or two target pictures with a red border (see Figure 5 for a graphical 
depiction of trial sequence), and  that after the picture stream ended they were to say out loud 
the identity of the targets, using the verbal labels used at the beginning of the experiment, and 
to guess if they were not sure of the target’s identity. 
 
 84 
For each trial, a white fixation cross appeared in the centre of the screen, on a black 
background, until participants pressed the space bar. Next a stream of pictures was presented, 
in which either one target (“T2”) or two targets (“T1” followed by a “T2”) appeared 
embedded amongst the distractors. These are referred to as “T1 absent trials” and “T1 present 
trials”, respectively. T1s were neutral in valence, and T2s were positive, negative, or neutral 
(different pictures than neutral T1s) in valence, manipulated between-subjects. For younger 
adults, pictures were presented for 100msec each with an ISI of 20msec, whereas for older 
adults pictures were presented for 200msec with the same ISI as younger adults. The 
stimulus duration for older adults was double that of younger adults as pilot testing indicated 
that older adults could not reliably detect target pictures at the 100mec duration and so 
performance was close to floor. Pictures were presented in the centre of the screen, on a 
black background. Additionally, the number of intervening items between the T1 and T2 on 
T1 present trials was varied such that 0, 2, 3, 5, or 8 pictures were presented between the 
targets. Furthermore, each category of T1 picture (people, animal/object/nature scene) was 
presented with each category of T2 picture, for a total of 250 experimental trials (125 T1 
absent trials and 125 T1 present trials). Trial presentation was randomized for each 
participant. At the end of each trial, the participant was prompted to state the identity of the 
target pictures, and the experimenter recorded the response on an audio tape. These responses 





Figure 5. Experiment 4a, sequence of events in an RSVP trial. Both the T1 (always a neutral 
picture) and T2 (a positive, negative, or neutral, picture, manipulated between-subjects) 
contain red borders, in a stream of neutral distractors with white borders. 
Participants also completed three blocks of ten practice RSVP trials which had the 
same trial characteristics as experimental trials, except that the picture presentation and ISI 
durations were initially longer than experimental trials and became progressively shorter over 
the blocks (block one, stimulus duration: 500msec, ISI: 200msec, block two, stimulus 
duration: 250, ISI: 100, block three, stimulus durationyoung 100msec, ISIyoung: 20msec, 
stimulus durationold: 200msec, ISIold: 20msec). 
 Participant picture rating. To examine whether participants rated pictures similarly 
to the IAPS normative ratings, participants rated each study picture on the dimensions of 
valence (very negative-very positive), arousal (not at all arousing-highly arousing), and 
personal relevance (using the dominance scale; very personally relevant-not at all personally 
relevant) with the IAPS Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales. During picture rating, 
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pictures were presented one at a time on the computer screen and participants were given a 
booklet with the SAM scales to make their ratings for each picture.    
 Procedure. Participants completed the RSVP task, followed by a battery of 
neuropsychological tasks (NART-R, Trail Making Tests A and B, digit span forward and 
backward and older adults completed the MMSE. Participant mood was assessed with the 
PANAS-X mood scale either before or after the RSVP task. Finally, participants rated the 
study pictures. 
Results 
Effect of T2 valence on accuracy to detect T2. The following analysis addressed 
two hypotheses: 1) whether older adults were overall more accurate at detecting a positively 
valenced T2 relative to negative or neutral ones, when compared with younger adults (in T1 
Absent trials), and 2) whether older adults’ accuracy to detect the T2 when the T1 was 
present was greater when the T2 was positive, relative to negative or neutral, when compared 
with younger adults (T1 Present trials; only trials on which the T1 was correctly identified 
were analyzed). Data were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factors 
of Age Group (younger/older) and T2 Valence (negative/neutral/positive), and the within-
subjects factor of T1 Status (present/absent).  
The main effects of T1 Status (p < .0005) and Age Group (p < .05) were qualified by 
a significant Age Group x T1 Status interaction, F (1, 54) = 17.58, p < .0005, np2 = .25. Post 
hoc tests indicated that although both age groups, tyounger (29) = 11.70, p < .0005, tolder (29) = 
10.45, p < .0005, were more accurate at detecting the T2 when the T1 was absent (Myounger = 
89.31, SDyounger = 8.42; Molder = 89.68, SDolder = 9.86), compared to when it was present 
(Myounger = 61.09, SDyounger = 15.10; Molder = 73.60, SDolder = 9.95), older adults were more 
accurate at detecting the T2 when T1 was present than younger adults, t (58) = 3.79, p < 
.0005, but there were no age differences when T1 was absent (p > .1). No other interactions 











Figure 6. Experiment 4a, Panel A: Mean T2 detection accuracy for T1 Absent trials, by T2 
valence condition and age group. Panel B: Mean T2 detection accuracy for T1 Present trials, 
by T2 valence condition and age group. Error bars represent standard errors of respective 
means. 
To more directly assess whether older adults’ attention is more likely to be captured 
by positive T2s relative to negative and neutral T2s, compared with younger adults, 
difference scores were calculated to assess the degree of impairment in detecting the T2 
when T1 was present compared to when T1 was absent. Difference scores were calculated as 
follows: percent accuracy to detect T2 when T1 absent minus percent accuracy to detect T2 
when T1 was present and correctly identified. Larger values on this measure indicate greater 
impairment in T2 detection. These difference scores also serve to control for baseline ability 
to detect T2 in T1 absent trials between the age groups and valence conditions. Difference 
scores were analyzed with a univariate ANOVA with the between-subjects factors of Age 
 
 89 
Group (younger/older) and T2 Valence (negative/neutral/positive). There was a main effect 
of Age Group, F (1, 54) = 17.58, p < .0005, np2 = .25: Detection of T2 was impaired to a 
greater degree, by the T1, in younger adults than in older adults. The effect of Valence and 
interaction of Valence and Age Group were not significant (ps >.1). See Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 4a, mean impairment in T2 detection accuracy when T1 was present, 
for each T2 valence condition, in younger and older adults. Error bars represent standard 
error of respective means. 
Mood measure. Raw scores for basic negative and basic positive affect from the 
PANAS-X were converted to percent of maximum possible score (see Table 5). Both 
younger and older adults reported greater positive, than negative, mood (tyounger (29) = 4.27, p 
< .0005; tolder (28) = 13.16, p < .0005). Older adults reported greater positive mood than 
young, t (58) = -2.55, p < .05, and less negative mood than young, t (58) = 4.10, p < .0005. 
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Effect of mood on performance in RSVP task. To examine whether mood was 
related to accuracy to detect T2 in each valence condition, partial correlations were 
conducted, controlling for age group. Neither positive nor negative mood scores were 
significantly associated with accuracy to detect T1 or T2 (T1 absent or present trials), or with 
the difference scores, for any of the T2 valence conditions (all ps > .05). 
Participant Ratings of Pictures. To verify whether participant ratings of T2 and T1 
pictures were comparable to the normative picture ratings, three multivariate ANOVAs were 
performed, with the between-subjects factors of Age Group (younger/older) and Valence 
Condition (negative/neutral/positive), to analyze the T1 and T2 SAM ratings for valence, 
arousal, and personal relevance, respectively. 
Valence. For T2 pictures, there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 54) = 
128.84, p < .0005, np2 = 0.83, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x 
Picture Valence interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated the 
valence of pictures consistently with the normative ratings. For T1 pictures, none of the main 
effects or interactions reached significance (all ps > .05), indicating that the neutral T1s were 
perceived similarly in valence across the three valence conditions. 
Arousal. For T2 pictures, there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 54) = 3.70, 
p < .05, np2 = 0.12, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x Picture Valence 
interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated positive T2s as more 
arousing than negative T2s, t (38) = 2.43, p < .05, but neither positive nor negative T2s 
differed in arousal from neutral T2s (ps > .1). For T1 pictures, none of the main effects or 
interactions reached significance (all ps > .1), indicating that the arousal of the neutral T1s 
was perceived similarly in valence across the three valence conditions.  As participant 
arousal ratings for T2s differed from the normative ratings (differences in arousal level 
across valence types) correlations between SAM Arousal ratings and accuracy to detect T2 in 
each valence condition were conducted. The only correlation that reached significant found 
that in the T2 Negative condition, higher SAM arousal ratings were associated with greater 
accuracy to detect negative T2 when T1 was present, r = .53, p < .05. No other correlations 
reached significance (all ps > .1). 
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Personal relevance. For T2 pictures, there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 
54) = 4.42, p < .05, np2 = 0.14, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x 
Picture Valence interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated positive 
pictures as more personally relevant than negative, t (38) = 2.95, p < .01, but neither positive 
nor negative T2s differed in personal relevance from neutral T2s (ps > .05). For T1 pictures, 
no effects were significant (ps > .1). To examine whether personal relevance was related to 
accuracy to detect T2 for each valence condition, correlations were conducted. The only 
significant correlation was that in the T2 Neutral condition, higher SAM personal relevance 
ratings were associated with greater accuracy impairment in detecting neutral T2 when T1 
was present, r = .45, p < .05. No other correlations reached significance (all ps > .05). 
In summary, both age groups were more accurate at detecting the T2 when presented 
alone, compared to when it was preceded by a first target (main effect of T1 status). 
However, an Age Group x T1 Status interaction indicated that older adults were less 
impaired at T2 detection relative to younger adults when T1 was present, but not when T2 
was presented alone. There were no significant effects of T2 Valence on detection 
performance. 
Experiment 4b 
 Experiment 4a examined whether positive stimuli capture older adults’ attention by 
examining the accuracy with which an emotional T2 is detected following an attention 
capturing T1. Conversely, the purpose of Experiment 4b was to examine the influence of an 
emotional T1 on subsequent detection of a neutral T2. Thus, in Experiment 4b, the 
emotionality of the T1 was manipulated between-subjects and the T2 was always neutral.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty healthy community-dwelling older adults (61-78 years of age; 22 female) 
recruited through the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 30 
younger adults (18-25 years of age; 21 female) recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes completed the study. Table 7 displays participant characteristics. Older adults 
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received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups, inclusion criteria were self-reported: fluency in English, normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, no 
previous head injury, and not currently being treated for depression or anxiety. For older 
adults, an additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 (out of 30) on the Mini-
Mental State Exam, which may indicate cognitive impairment (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1975). Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., 
Verhaeghen, 2003), the older adult group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), t (58) = 4.37,  p  
< .0005, as estimated by the National Adult Reading Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 
1992) than the younger adult group, but age groups did not differ on years of education (p > 
.1). During the course of the study, participants of both age groups completed a battery of 
neuropsychological tasks (Trail Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and 
backward). Scores on the Trail Making Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm 
that older adult participants were within normal range for cognitive functioning according to 
published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Wechsler, 1997). See Table 7 for mean 
demographic values and scores on neuropsychological tests. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Stimuli, tasks, and procedures in Experiment 4b were identical to those in Experiment 
4a except that in the Experiment 4b RSVP task, T1s were positive, negative, or neutral in 
valence, manipulated between-subjects, and T2s were always neutral (different pictures than 
neutral T1s). See Figure 8 for the sequence of events in the RSVP trials. 
 
 
Figure 8. Experiment 4b, sequence of events in an RSVP trial. Both T1 (a positive, negative, 
or neutral, picture, manipulated between-subjects) and T2 (always a neutral picture) contain 
red borders, in a stream of neutral distractors with white borders. 
  Also, for the participant picture rating, some participants used the paper-and-pencil 
version of the SAM scales described in Experiment 4a, and the rest of the participants 






Effect of T1 valence on accuracy to detect T2. I examined whether a positive 
(relative to neutral or negative) T1 differentially captured attention in older adults, impairing 
subsequent accuracy in detecting a neutral T2. Percent accuracy to detect a neutral T2, when 
preceded by T1, was analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factors of 
Age Group (younger/older) and T1 Valence (negative/neutral/positive), and the within-
subjects factor of T1 Status (present/absent; only trials on which the T1 was correctly 
identified were analyzed). 
The main effects of T1 Status, F (1, 54) = 265.78, p < .0005, np2 = .83, and Age 
Group, F (1, 54) = 37.02, p < .0005, np2 = .41, were qualified by a significant Age Group x 
T1 Status interaction, F (1, 54) = 11.70, p < .005, np2 = .18. Post hoc tests indicated that 
although both age groups were more accurate at detecting the T2 when the T1 was absent 
(Myounger = 88.77, SDyounger = 8.92; Molder = 94.48, SDolder = 5.42), compared to when it was 
present (Myounger = 59.27, SDyounger = 12.24; Molder = 75.21, SDolder = 8.53), tyounger (29) = 
11.69, p < .0005, tolder (29) = 12.35, p < .0005, older adults were more accurate at detecting 
the T2 when the T1 was present relative to younger adults, t (58) = -5.85, p < .0005, and 
when the T1 was absent, t (58) = -3.00, p < .005. No other interactions reached significance 
(ps > .1). There was a main effect of T1 Valence, F (2, 54) = 3.36, p < .05, np2 = .11. Post hoc 
tests indicated higher accuracy to detect the neutral T2 when T1 was neutral (M = 82.62, SD 
= 8.10) than negative (M = 76.48, SD = 9.22), t (38) = 2.24, p < .05. There was no difference 
in detection of T2 when T1 was neutral relative to positive (M = 79.64, SD = 8.87), p > .1, 










Figure 9. Experiment 4b, Panel A: Mean T2 detection accuracy for T1 Absent trials, by T1 
valence condition and age group. Panel B: Mean T2 detection accuracy for T1 Present trials, 
by T1 valence and age group. Error bars represent standard errors of respective means. 
To more directly assess whether older adults’ attention is more likely to be captured 
by positive T1s relative to negative and neutral T1s, compared with younger adults, 
difference scores were calculated to assess the degree of impairment in detecting the neutral 
T2 when T1 was present compared with when T1 was absent. Difference scores were 
calculated as follows: percent accuracy to detect the neutral T2 when T1 was absent minus 
percent accuracy to detect the neutral T2 when T1 was present and correctly identified. 
Larger values on this measure indicate greater impairment in T2 detection. These difference 
scores also serve to control for baseline ability to detect the neutral T2 in T1 absent trials 
between the age groups and valence conditions. Difference scores were analyzed with a 
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univariate ANOVA with the between-subjects factors of Age Group (younger/older) and T1 
Valence condition (negative/neutral/positive). There was a main effect of Age Group, F (1, 
54) = 11.70, p < .005, np2 = .18: Detection of T2 was more impaired in younger adults than 
older adults. The effect of Valence and interaction of Valence and Age Group were not 
significant (ps >.1). See Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Experiment 4b, mean impairment in T2 detection accuracy due to T1 presence, by 
T1 valence condition and age group. Error bars represent standard error of respective means. 
 Mood measure. Raw scores for basic negative and basic positive affect from the 
PANAS-X were converted to percent of maximum possible score (see Table 6). Both 
younger and older adults reported greater positive, than negative, mood (tyounger (29) = 5.74, p 
< .0005; tolder (29) = 8.54, p < .0005). Younger adults reported greater negative mood than 
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older adults, t (58) = 2.75, p < .01, but the age groups did not differ on positive mood (p = 
.09). 
Effect of mood on performance in RSVP task. To examine whether mood was 
related to accuracy to detect the T2 in each valence condition, partial correlations were 
conducted, controlling for age group. Neither positive nor negative mood scores were 
significantly associated with accuracy to detect T1 or T2 (T1 absent or present trials), or the 
difference scores, for any of the T2 valence conditions (all ps > .1). 
Participant picture ratings. To verify whether participant ratings of T2 and T1 
pictures were comparable to the normative picture ratings, three multivariate ANOVAs were 
performed, with the between-subjects factors of Age Group (younger/older) and Valence 
Condition (negative/neutral/positive), to analyze the T1 and T2 SAM ratings for valence, 
arousal, and personal relevance, respectively. 
Valence. For T1 pictures there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 54) = 
105.94, p < .0005, np2 = 0.8, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x Picture 
Valence interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated the valence of 
pictures consistently with the normative ratings. For T2 pictures, none of the main effects or 
interactions reached significance (all ps > .05), indicating that the neutral T2s were perceived 
similarly in valence across the three valence conditions. 
Arousal. For T1 pictures there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 54) = 3.11, 
p = .053, np2 = 0.10, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x Picture 
Valence interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated positive T1s as 
more arousing than neutral T1s, t (38) = 2.39, p < .05, but neither positive nor neutral T1s 
differed in arousal from negative T1s (ps > .1). For T2 pictures, none of the effects of 
interaction reached significance (all ps > .1), indicating that the arousal of the neutral T2s 
was perceived similarly in valence across the three valence conditions.  As participant 
arousal ratings for T1s differed from the normative ratings (differences in arousal level 
across valence types) correlations between SAM Arousal ratings and accuracy to detect T1 in 
each valence condition were conducted. The only correlation that reached significance found 
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that in the T1 Neutral condition, lower SAM arousal was associated with greater accuracy to 
detect T2, r = -.48, p < .05. No other correlations reached significance (all ps > .05). 
Personal relevance. For T1 pictures, there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 
54) = 3.18, p = .05, np2 = 0.10, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x 
Picture Valence interaction (p > .1). Post hoc tests indicated that participants rated positive 
pictures as more personally relevant than neutral, t (38) = 2.49, p < .05, but neither positive 
nor neutral T1s differed in personal relevance from negative T1s (ps > .1). For T2 pictures, 
no effects were significant (ps > .1). To examine whether personal relevance was related to 
accuracy to detect T1 for each valence condition, correlations were conducted. The only 
significant correlations were that in the T1 Neutral condition, lower personal relevance was 
associated with greater accuracy to detect the T2 in the T1 present and absent conditions (ps 
< .05), and lower personal relevance was related to greater impairment in detecting neutral 
T2 (difference scores), p < .05. No other correlations reached significance (all ps > .05). 
 
Discussion: Experiments 4a and 4b 
In Experiments 4a and 4b, I used an RSVP paradigm to examine age differences in 
processing fluency for images of different valence. Given the speed at which information 
must be processed in an RSVP task (Martens & Wyble, 2010), use of cognitive control to 
strategically direct attention toward pictures of a specific valence is limited. Although the 
Age x Valence interactions in these experiments did not reach significance, the pattern of 
results for difference scores (indicating degree to which T2 detection accuracy declines when 
T1 present) in Experiment 4a suggests that older, but not younger, adults are less impaired at 
detection of emotional (negative and positive) pictures relative to neutral pictures (although 
this greater attentional capture of emotional stimuli did not hold in Experiment 4b). Such a 
result indicates greater attentional capture by emotional stimuli for older adults, but not 
younger adults. In Experiment 4b, the pattern suggests greater attentional capture by negative 
pictures than positive pictures, in both age groups. Hence, there was no evidence for aging-
related positivity effects (or negativity reductions) in attentional capture of information. 
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A previous study which examined aging-related changes in attentional capture of 
emotional words in the RSVP paradigm also found evidence that older adults’ attention is 
captured by both positive and negative information (Langley, Rokke, Stark, Saville, Allen, & 
Bagne, 2008). This study, as well as one other (Mickley Steinmetz, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 
2010), also did not find consistent evidence of attentional capture by positive and negative 
words by younger adults. For instance, Langley et al. (2008) found that attentional capture 
was enhanced for positive words, but reduced for negative words.  These results, as well as 
results from Experiments 4a and 4b, stand in contrast to those obtained in other studies which 
have used the RSVP paradigm to examine attentional capture of emotional stimuli. More 
typically, studies of younger adults indicate enhanced attentional capture of emotional 
information (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Ogawa & Suzuki, 2004; Smith, 
Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006; Trippe, Hewig, Heydel, Hecht, & Miltner, 2007). However, 
these studies used stimuli which were often more emotionally arousing (e.g., words such as 
kill and “fall in love” (a word in German), and images of mutilated bodies, babies, and erotic 
couples) than stimuli used in the positivity effect literature (e.g., words such as misery and 
joy), and so the enhanced attentional capture of these target stimuli may be due to the 
increased emotional arousal.  
Moreover, the main effects of Age Group and Age Group x T1 Status interactions in 
Experiments 4a and 4b suggest superior ability of older adults to detect the second target in 
the RSVP stream, relative to young. This is in contrast to other studies which have 
demonstrated decrements in T2 detection for older adults (e.g., Georgiou-Karistianis, Tang, 
Vardy, Sheppard, Evans, Wilson, et al., 2007; Lahar, Isaak, & McArthur, 2001; Maciokas & 
Crognale, 2003). As the current experiments doubled the stimulus durations for older, 
compared to younger adults, this can likely account for the obtained age differences. Hence, 
extending the stimulus presentation duration appears to be an effective way to improve older 
adults’ performance in the RSVP paradigm, a finding which is consistent with the theory that 
aging-related decrements in performance on cognitive tasks are related to reduced speed of 




Limitations and future directions 
One possible limitation of Experiments 4a and 4b, which may have contributed to the 
null result with respect to interactions with Valence, is that highly complex pictures were 
used as stimuli, rather than words. As participants could only reliably identify target pictures 
after being given a great deal of exposure to the pictures prior to the main RSVP task, it is 
possible that attentional resources were allocated to discerning the contents of target pictures 
and so the influence of emotion was lessened. Also, as all study pictures were of medium 
high arousal (to more clearly determine effects of valence as opposed to arousal), and 
previous studies have indicated greater attentional capture of higher arousing stimuli (e.g., 
Anderson, 2005, Keil & Ihssen, 2004), this may also have attenuated effects of emotion. In 
future, it would be interesting to include highly emotionally arousing stimuli as targets (e.g., 
taboo words, erotic images, etc.) to examine interactions of valence and arousal in this 
paradigm, for older adults participants.  
In summary, the pattern of results in Experiments 4a and 4b does not provide 
evidence for positivity effects in attentional capture by positive valence images, but rather 
suggests that both positive and negative stimuli capture the attention of older adults in a 
bottom-up manner, when the task limits the use of cognitive control in service of emotion 
regulation goals. 
4.3 Experiments 5a and 5b: Dot Probe 
Introduction to Experiments 5a and 5b 
 Experiments 4a and 4b examined whether there were age differences on a task  that 
relied primarily on fluency of processing (and ease of attentional capture) of emotional 
stimuli, which would provide indirect support for a bottom-up account of aging-related 
positivity effects. No such support was found. The goal of Experiments 5a and 5b was to 
examine whether there were age differences, on a task which allowed for more top-down 
cognitive control in the allocation of attention to emotional stimuli.  
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Many previous studies that have examined selective attention to emotional and 
neutral stimuli have used a standard attentional paradigm called the dot probe paradigm 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In this paradigm, participants are shown pairs of stimuli 
(e.g., faces, words) and after stimuli offset a dot appears in the former location of one of the 
stimuli. Participants are typically instructed to press a button to indicate the location of the 
dot on the screen, and the dependent measure is response time to detect the dot. The logic 
behind this task is that participants should be faster to detect the dot when it appears in a 
location to which they had just been attending relative to when the dot appears in an 
unattended location. By varying the characteristics of each stimulus of the pair, biases in 
attention for a particular type of stimulus can be determined. For example, if participants are 
presented with a pair of faces, one of which has an angry, and the other a neutral, expression, 
it has been demonstrated that clinically anxious participants (sensitive to threatening 
information) are faster to detect the dot when it replaces the angry face relative to when it 
replaces the neutral face, indicating a bias to direct attention toward the location of the angry 
(threatening) face (for a meta-analysis, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Perfamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007).  
One factor identified in the aging literature as crucial to the manifestation of such 
attentional biases is stimulus presentation duration; it has been shown that aging-related 
positivity effects (particularly in the form of negativity reductions) in attentional bias are 
more likely to occur at longer presentation times (e.g., 1000 msec or longer; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003) than at short presentation times (e.g., 500 msec or less; Lee & Knight, 
2009; Orgeta, 2011). It has been postulated that these differences reflect active use of 
cognitive control to direct attention at the longer relative to shorter presentation durations, 
which are instead mediated by relatively automatic re-orienting of attention (e.g., Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Orgeta, 2011; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997). 
A few recent studies have used the dot probe paradigm to examine aging-related 
changes in attentional biases to positive, negative, and neutral information. The first such 
study (Mather & Carstensen, 2003) found evidence that older adults are biased to direct their 
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attention away from negatively valenced information (faces), relative to neutral information 
at stimulus duration of 1000 msec, consistent with the idea that older adults may use 
cognitive control to reduce attention to negative stimuli in service of emotion regulation 
goals. This effect was replicated in more recent studies which showed that at stimulus 
durations of 1000 msec, but not shorter, older adults showed a bias to direct attention away 
from negative information (Lee & Knight, 2009; Orgeta, 2011). One problem with these 
studies, however, is that they examined attentional biases to emotional (positive and 
negative) relative to only neutral information. That is they included only pairs of stimuli in 
which one stimulus was negative or positive in valence, and the other neutral; they never 
directly compared attention to negative and positive information. In addition, these studies 
included twice the number of trials with negative stimuli (angry and sad faces) as positive 
stimuli. 
Experiments 5a and 5b of the current thesis extend these previous findings by 
presenting negative-positive stimulus pairs in a dot probe paradigm for 1000 msec. Such a 
design allows a direct comparison, with equal numbers of positive and negative stimuli, of 
whether older adults do indeed use strategic, top-down control to direct attention selectively 
toward positive and away from negative stimuli. Additionally, the current experiments 
compare attentional biases for two types of stimuli: faces (Experiment 5a), and IAPS pictures 
(Experiment 5b) to determine whether effects will generalize across stimulus types. If these 
effects do not generalize to stimuli other than faces, then it is possible that the previously 
reported effects in the literature may not actually reflect attention directed to stimuli of a 
certain emotional valence per se, but perhaps to certain characteristics of facial stimuli (eyes, 
mouths). Moreover, as eye gaze of faces used in dot probe paradigms is typically directed 
straight at the viewer, face stimuli may engage the viewer to a greater extent than scenes, for 
which the viewer takes the role of a passive observer. For instance, eye gaze is known to 
elicit reflexive shifts in attention (for a review, see Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000). It is 
important to demonstrate that positivity effects in orienting attention are not contingent on 
these factors.    
 
 105 
Based on previous work, I expected older adults to show biases away from negative 
relative to neutral information. Moreover, as older adults have been shown to preferentially 
direct attention to positive relative to neutral information (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2003, 
Experiment 1; Allard & Isaacowitz, 2008; Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; 
Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert, 2009; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006b), I 
predicted that the attentional bias away from negative information would be stronger in the 




Thirty healthy community-dwelling older adults (62-88 years of age; 22 female) 
recruited through the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 30 
younger adults (18-23 years of age; 19 female) recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes completed the study. Table 7 displays participant characteristics. Older adults 
received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups inclusion criteria were self-reported: fluency in English, normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, no 
previous head injury, and not currently being treated for depression or anxiety. For older 
adults, an additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 (out of 30) on the Mini-
Mental State Exam, which may indicate cognitive impairment (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1975). Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., 
Verhaeghen, 2003), the older adult group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), t (58) = 4.16,  p  
< .0005, as estimated by the National Adult Reading Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 
1992) than the younger adult group, but age groups did not differ in years of education (p > 
.1). During the course of the study, participants of both age groups completed a battery of 
neuropsychological tasks (Trail Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and 
backward). Scores on the Trail Making Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm 
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that older adult participants were within normal range for cognitive functioning according to 
published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Wechsler, 1997). See Table 7 for mean 
demographic values and scores on neuropsychological tests. Eight older adults were replaced 
due to scoring less than 26 on the MMSE, or having health conditions that could adversely 
impact vision (e.g., macular degeneration). 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Face Stimuli. Seventy-two photos of faces were obtained from the NimStim Set of 
Facial Expressions (http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm) database, a widely used 
database of full-colour photos of faces which have been empirically validated and found 
reliable in terms of ratings of emotionality (Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, Nurse, 
Hare, et al., 2009). There were 24 faces displaying each of three expressions: angry
15
, 
neutral, and happy, used to form 36 unique face pairs. There were 12 pairs for which one face 
had an angry expression and the other a neutral expression (angry-neutral pairs), 12 pairs for 
which one face had a happy expression and the other a neutral expression (happy-neutral 
pairs), and 12 pairs for which one face had an angry expression and the other a happy 
expression (angry-happy pairs). Each pair consisted of the same person expressing two 
different emotions. For each pair type, half of the pairs featured a female, and half a male, 
face. For each gender, half of the faces were White, and half were East Asian or Black. 
For practice purposes, faces of eight other individuals with a neutral expression were 
chosen to form eight neutral-neutral pairs in which both faces were of the same individual. 
Practice trials included only neutral-neutral pairs so as to replicate the methods of Mather & 
Carstensen (2003) as closely as possible. Face photos were resized to be 16.5cm in height, 
with some variation in width (approximately 12cm), when displayed on the computer 
monitor. 
 Dot probe task. Participants were instructed that they would see a fixation cross 
followed by pairs of faces presented on the computer screen, and after the faces disappeared 
a dot would appear in the former location of one of the faces. Participants were asked to 
indicate the location of the dot (left side of screen or right side of screen) by pressing the “B” 
key (labeled L) or the “N” key (labeled R), and to use their dominant hand to make the 
response as quickly and as accurately as possible (participants typically used the index finger 
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 Angry faces were used instead of faces depicting fear, sadness, or disgust, in line with the majority of 




of the dominant hand). Each experimental trial began with the presentation of a black 
fixation cross for 500 msec in the centre of the screen, with a white background. Upon 
fixation cross offset, a pair of faces was displayed for 1000 msec, one on the left side of the 
screen and the other on the right side of the screen. Upon face pair offset, a black dot 0.5cm 
in diameter was displayed in the centre of the former location of one of the faces and 
remained onscreen until the participant responded. Face pairs were presented in a 
randomized order and each unique fair pair was presented four times to counterbalance side 
of screen on which a given face of the pair appeared (L/R) and dot location (L/R), for a total 
of 144 trials. These trials were presented twice to increase number of trials included in each 
mean. See Figure 11 for sample face stimuli and overview of the dot probe task procedure. 
There were 16 practice trials which followed the same procedure as in experimental 
trials. 
 
Figure 11. Experiment 5a, trials from the dot probe paradigm, with face stimuli.
16
 
Procedure. Participants completed the practice trials of the dot probe task followed 
by the experimental trials. Afterward, participants completed a battery of neuropsychological 
tasks which included the NART-R, Trail Making Tests A and B, digit span forward and 
backward, and older adults also completed the MMSE. Additionally, participants completed 
                                                 
16
 Faces taken from the AR face database (Martinez &Benavente, 1998), as NimStim faces cannot be published 
in documents other than scientific journals. 
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the PANAS-X mood scale either after the neuropsychological tasks or before the dot probe 
task. 
Results 
 Dot probe data cleaning. All participants’ overall accuracy was equal to or greater 
than 95%.  Data from two additional older adults were discarded due to low accuracy, and 
long response times relative to median response times of other participants in that age group. 
As in Mather and Carstensen (2003), to remove fast response time outliers, data from 
individual trials were discarded if the response time was 200 msec or less, as this may reflect 
reflexive responding. To remove slow response time outliers, separate cutoff scores were 
calculated for younger (545 msec) and older (799 msec) adult groups to exclude 10% of the 
slowest responses. Only correct responses were analyzed. 
 Performance on dot probe task.  
Bias scores. As in Mather and Carstensen (2003) (as well as other studies, e.g., 
Cooper & Langton, 2006; Fox & Knight, 2005; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 
2006b; Lee & Knight, 2009; Orgeta, 2011), difference scores were used to compute an 
attentional bias score for each face pair type (see Figure 12). These bias scores represent the 
degree to which attention was directed toward a face of a given valence within each face pair 
type (e.g., bias to detect an angry face in angry-happy pairs). To calculate bias scores for 
angry-neutral and happy-neutral face pairs, mean RTs to detect the dot when it replaced a 
neutral face were subtracted from mean RTs to detect the dot when it replaced the emotional 
face. For these bias scores, a positive value indicates greater bias to attend to the emotional 
face of the pair, whereas negative values indicate greater bias to attend to the neutral face of 
the pair. To calculate bias scores for angry-happy face pairs, mean RTs to detect the dot 
when it replaced a happy face were subtracted from mean RTs to detect the dot when it 
replaced an angry face. For these bias scores, a positive value indicates greater bias to attend 
to the happy face of the pair, whereas negative values indicate greater bias to attend to the 





Figure 12. Experiment 5a, mean attentional bias scores (RT difference scores) showing the 
magnitude of bias to attend to angry, neutral, and happy faces in neutral-angry, neutral-
happy, and angry-happy face pairs, by age group. Error bars represent standard error of 
respective means. 
As in Mather and Carstensen (2003) and in the previous studies mentioned above, 
bias scores were analyzed with one-sample t tests to determine whether bias scores for each 
face-pair type in each age group were different than zero (score of zero indicates no bias in 
attention for either face in a pair). For younger adults, bias scores differed from zero for the 
angry-neutral pairs, t (29) = 2.60, p < .05, indicating greater bias to attend to the angry faces, 
and for the angry-happy pairs, t (29) = 2.94, p < .01, indicating greater bias to attend to the 
angry faces, but not for the happy-neutral pairs (p > .1). For older adults, none of the bias 
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scores differed from zero (all ps > .09), although for the bias score for the angry-neutral pairs 
there was a trend for biased attention to the angry face (p = .098).
17
 
T-tests were also conducted to compare age groups in terms of magnitude of bias 
scores. No significant differences were found between age groups for any of these bias scores 
(all ps > .1). 
 Mood measure. Raw scores for basic negative and basic positive affect from the 
PANAS-X were converted to percent of maximum possible score (see Table 7). Both 
younger and older adults reported greater positive, than negative, mood (tyounger (29) = 8.30, p 
< .0005; tolder (28) = 10.66, p < .0005). There was no age group difference in negative mood 
(p > .1), but older adults reported greater positive mood than young, t (57) = 2.39, p < .05. 
Mood data were missing for one older adult participant. 
 Effect of mood on performance in dot probe task. To examine whether mood was 
related to magnitude of bias scores and RTs, partial correlations were conducted, controlling 
for age group. The relation between negative mood and bias scores for angry-happy, angry-
neutral, and happy-neutral face pairs, respectively, were not significant, ps > .1. Greater 
positive mood was significantly related to a smaller bias score for angry-happy face pairs, 
indicating that positive mood was related to greater attention to the angry face of the pair, r = 
-0.31, p < .05. None of the correlations between positive mood, negative mood, and RTs to 
detect the dot when it replaced an angry, neutral, or happy face reached significance. 
 
Experiment 5b 
The purpose of Experiment 5b was to determine whether the effects in attentional 
bias scores reported in Experiment 5a could be replicated with a different type of stimulus, 
namely pictures of emotional and neutral scenes. As mentioned in the introduction, if these 
                                                 
17
 To examine whether performance on the neuropsychological tasks which assess executive function (Trails B 
and Digit Span backward) was related to attentional bias for angry, neutral, and happy faces, scores on these 
tests were correlated with bias scores for each face pair type and age group. These analyses only revealed that 
for younger adults better (faster) performance on Trials B was related to  greater attentional bias for happy 
faces, r = -.51, p < .005. 
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effects do not generalize to stimuli other than faces, then it is possible that the previously 
reported effects in the literature may not actually reflect attention directed to stimuli of a 
certain emotional valence per se, but perhaps to certain characteristics of facial stimuli (eyes, 
mouths). Moreover, as eye gaze of faces used in dot probe paradigms is typically directed 
straight at the viewer, face stimuli may engage the viewer to a greater extent than scenes, for 
which the viewer takes the role of a passive observer. It is important to demonstrate that 
positivity effects in orienting attention are not completely contingent on these factors but 
rather generalize across stimulus types, consistent with the aging-related motivation to 
regulate affective response as postulated by SST.    
Method 
Participants 
Thirty healthy community-dwelling older adults (62-87 years of age; 24 female) 
recruited through the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 30 
younger adults (17-23 years of age; 20 female) recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes completed the study. Table 8 displays participant characteristics. Older adults 
received $10/hour remuneration, and younger adults received course credit for participating. 
For both age groups inclusion criteria were: fluency in English, normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing, no history of neuropsychological impairment, no previous head 
injury, and not currently being treated for depression or anxiety. For older adults, an 
additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 (out of 30) on the Mini-Mental State 
Exam, which may indicate cognitive impairment (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 
1975). Consistent with literature indicating greater vocabulary with aging (e.g., Verhaeghen, 
2003), the older adult group had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), t (58) = 4.90,  p  < .0005, as 
estimated by the National Adult Reading Test – Revised (NART-R, Nelson, 1992) than the 
younger adult group, but age groups did not differ in years of education (p > .1). During the 
course of the study, participants of both age groups completed a battery of 
neuropsychological tasks (Trail Making Tests A and B, and Digit Span forward and 
backward). Scores on the Trail Making Tests and the Digit Span tasks were used to confirm 
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that older adult participants were within normal range for cognitive functioning according to 
published norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Wechsler, 1997). See Table 8 for mean 
demographic values and scores on neuropsychological tests. One older adult was replaced 
due to scoring less than 26 on the MMSE. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Picture Stimuli. Seventy-two pictures were selected from the IAPS database, a 
widely used database of full-colour photos with normative ratings of emotional valence and 
arousal (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). There were 24 each of negative, neutral, and 
positive pictures, used to form 36 unique picture pairs. IAPS normative ratings were used to 
categorize pictures according to valence, and all pictures were selected to be of medium 
arousal. Follow-up t-tests confirmed that negative (Valence M = 2.71, SD = 0.33; Arousal M 
= 5.02, SD = 0.37), neutral (Valence M = 5.20, SD = 0.58; Arousal M = 4.87, SD = 0.58), and 
positive (Valence M = 7.29, SD = 0.38; Arousal M = 4.88, SD = 0.43), pictures differed on 
normative valence (ps < .0005), but not normative arousal (ps > .1). There were 12 pairs for 
which one picture was negative and the other neutral (negative-neutral pairs), 12 pairs for 
which one picture was positive and the other neutral (positive-neutral pairs), and 12 pairs for 
which one picture was negative and the other positive (negative-positive pairs). For each pair 
type, half of the pictures of each valence featured a scene with people, and half contained 
animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects. For practice purposes, eight other pictures with 
a neutral valence were chosen to form eight neutral-neutral pairs. Pictures were resized to be 
17cm in height and 16cm in width, when displayed on the computer monitor. Pictures were 
selected to be of medium arousal level across all valence types. 
 All tasks and procedures in Experiment 5b were identical to those used in Experiment 
5a, except pictures were used as stimuli instead of faces. As such, participants rated study 







Figure 13. Experiment 5b, trials from the dot probe paradigm with picture stimuli. 
Picture Rating Task. To compare normative ratings with participant ratings of 
pictures, participants rated each picture in the experiment on the dimensions of valence, 
arousal, and personal relevance, using a computerized version of the SAM scales (the order 
of the figures in the dominance scale was reversed to form the personal relevant scale, such 
that a value of 1 indicated that the picture was very personally relevant, and a value of 9 
indicated that the picture was not at all personally relevant). After the presentation of a 
fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500 msec, a picture was displayed in the centre 
of the computer screen with a SAM scale below. Participants rated each picture three times, 
(once for each scale) using the keys 1-9 on the keyboard. Pictures advanced automatically 
after they were rated with a key press. A practice version of the picture rating task was 
included in which participants rated the pictures from the dot probe practice trials. For 
analyses regarding participant picture ratings, see Appendix B. 
Results 
 Dot probe data cleaning. All participants’ overall accuracy was equal to or greater 
than 95%.  Data from two additional older adults were discarded due to long response times 
relative to median response times of other participants in that age group. As in Mather and 
Carstensen (2003), to remove fast response time outliers, data from individual trials were 
discarded if the response time was 200 msec or less, as this may reflect reflexive responding. 
To remove slow response time outliers, separate cutoff scores were calculated for younger 
(522 msec) and older (803 msec) adult groups to exclude 10% of the slowest responses. Only 




 Performance on dot probe task.  
Bias scores. None of the bias scores differed significantly from zero for either age 
group, indicating that participants were not biased to either picture of a pair (all ps > .1). See 
Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Experiment 5b, mean attentional bias scores (RT difference scores) showing the 
magnitude of bias to attend to negative, neutral, and positive pictures in neutral-negative, 
neutral-positive, and negative-positive picture pairs, by age group. Error bars represent 
standard errors of respective means. 
 Mood measure. Raw scores for basic negative and basic positive affect from the 
PANAS-X were converted to percent of maximum possible score (see Table 8). Both 
younger and older adults reported greater positive, than negative, mood (tyounger (29) = 9.98, p 
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< .0005; tolder (29) = 13.70, p < .0005). There was no age group difference in negative mood 
(p > .1), but older adults reported greater positive mood than young, t (58) = 4.23, p < .0005. 
 Effect of mood on performance in dot probe task. To examine whether mood was 
related to magnitude of bias scores and RTs, partial correlations were conducted, controlling 
for age group. Greater negative mood was associated with a greater bias to attend to neutral 
pictures in negative-neutral pairs, r (57) = -.28, p < .05, but was not associated with 
magnitude of bias scores for positive-neutral or negative-positive pairs, ps > .1 The relation 
between positive mood and bias score magnitude was not significant for any picture pair 
type, ps > .1. Moreover, none of the correlations between positive mood, negative mood, and 
RTs to detect the dot when it replaced a negative, neutral, or positive picture reached 
significance. 
Discussion: Experiments 5a and 5b 
 Experiments 5a and 5b examined whether older adults are biased to direct attention 
toward positive stimuli, or away from negative stimuli, relative to younger adults, in the 
context of an attention task which allowed sufficient time for participants to use cognitive 
control to direct their attention to preferred stimuli (dot probe task). Results of Experiment 5a 
suggest a negativity bias in younger adults’ attention: Younger adults were biased to direct 
attention toward negative (angry) faces relative to neutral or positive (happy) faces. In 
contrast, older adults showed an attenuation of this negativity bias in attention to faces, which 
may suggest an aging-related reduction in attention to faces expressing negative emotions 
(negativity reduction as opposed to positivity enhancement). In Experiment 5b, none of the 
comparisons reached statistical significance, so it is unclear whether the effects seen with 
faces in Experiment 5a can generalize to other types of stimuli such as pictures. However, the 
pattern of results in Experiment 5a suggests that older adults direct attention away from 
negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli. These findings indicate that older adults may 
use top-down cognitive control processes to reduce attention to negative stimuli. 
 Results of Experiments 5a and 5b suggest that older adults may regulate attention to 
emotional stimuli by directing attention not toward positive stimuli but away from negative 
stimuli. One novel contribution of these experiments is that they examine attention to 
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positive and negative stimuli presented simultaneously, through inclusion of the angry-happy 
face pairs (Experiment 5a) and negative-positive picture pairs (Experiment 5b). If older 
adults are biased to direct attention toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli, 
then the attentional bias scores for these pairings would be expected to reflect this tendency. 
However, bias scores for these stimulus pairs are more consistent with a bias to direct 
attention away from the negative stimulus of the pair (Experiment 5a). 
 The findings of Experiment 5a are in line with results of recent studies which used the 
dot probe paradigm to compare attention to faces in younger and older adults. For example, 
Mather and Carstensen (2003) also presented face stimuli for 1000 msec, allowing enough 
time for cognitive control to be applied in service of emotion regulation goals, found that 
older adults were biased to direct attention away from negative faces, although their younger 
adults did not show attentional biases for emotional faces. As such, Experiment 5a did not 
completely replicate these findings as was expected, as the younger adult group in 
Experiment 5a showed stronger evidence of attentional biases than did older adults. It is 
possible that none of the bias scores reached statistical significance in the older adult group 
because of the greater variance associated with both the bias scores and RTs (see also Lee & 
Knight, 2009).  
 The results of Experiment 5a are also consistent with those of Orgeta (2011), which 
showed evidence that older adults direct attention away from negative faces, although only at 
the longest face presentation duration of 1000 msec and not with shorter presentation times 
(17 msec and 500 msec), consistent with the idea that this aging-related bias to direct 
attention away from negative stimuli is the result of application of cognitive control. 
Moreover, Lee and Knight (2009) used the dot probe task to examine attention to negative, 
positive, and neutral faces, words, and IAPS pictures. The strongest result occurred for the 
face stimuli, with older adults showing avoidance of negative faces at presentation times of 
1500 msec, and vigilance toward negative faces at subliminal presentation times (50 msec for 
older adults). As in Mather and Carstensen (2003), younger adults did not show attentional 
biases for emotional faces relative to neutral faces. These results also support the notion that 
older adults may quickly detect threat information when there is little opportunity to use 
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cognitive control, such as with subliminal and relatively short stimuli presentations, but may 
avoid negative information when the opportunity arises to use cognitive control to regulate 
emotion. 
 The findings of Lee and Knight (2009) additionally inform the null results of 
Experiment 5b, as they also did not find evidence of biases in attention to IAPS pictures in 
either younger or older adults. It is possible that the degree of visual complexity of IAPS 
pictures when compared with faces may contribute to this null effect. For example, within 
some negative scenes, there are areas of the scene that contain no threat/negative 
information, and older adults may direct attention to these areas rather than saccade to the 
neutral or positive picture of the pair to avoid the specific area containing negative 
information. This could allow for faster RTs to detect a dot that replaces the negative pictures 
than if participants directed attention away from the negative picture completely. 
Alternatively, it is possible that effects are stronger with faces because an angry face with 
gaze fixed on the viewer may be perceived as a greater threat than a scene with negative 
content that is not directed toward the viewer, and so older adults may be more motivated to 
avoid looking at the angry face compared with the negative picture. 
It is interesting to note that studies of attention to faces in younger and older adults 
which use eye tracking apparatus to follow participants’ gaze more consistently demonstrate 
that older adults preferentially attend to positive faces (as well as away from negative faces), 
particularly when they are in a bad mood (e.g., Allard & Isaacowitz, 2008; Isaacowitz, 
Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Isaacowitz, 
Toner, & Neupert, 2009; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006b), whereas the studies which have used the dot probe 
paradigm find avoidance of negative stimuli. As stimulus presentation times are much longer 
in eye tracking studies (e.g., 4000 msec) than in dot probe studies, it is conceivable that 
preferential attention to positive stimuli may occur only for these longer stimulus durations, 
when older adults have ample time to implement gaze patterns in accordance with goals to 
regulate emotions. Moreover, Isaacowitz et al. (2006b) suggest that eye tracking may be a 
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more sensitive measure of aging-related positivity effects (and negativity reductions) than the 
dot probe paradigm. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
As with the memory experiments of the current thesis (1-3), one limitation of 
Experiments 5a and 5b is that cognitive control was not directly manipulated/disrupted 
during the dot probe task, and so I can only infer older adults’ use of cognitive control in 
service of emotion regulation goals. As such, a future study could examine performance in 
the dot probe paradigm under conditions of divided attention to directly assess biases in 
attention when the ability to use cognitive control is disrupted in contrast to full attention 
conditions. 
Another possible limitation of the study is that participants were given instructions to 
detect the dot as quickly and accurately as possible. As instructions to focus on accuracy may 
prevent older adults from implementing emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Kennedy, 
Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Experiment 1 of the current thesis), the instructions in the 
current experiments may have attenuated any biases to preferentially direct attention to 
positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli, contributing to the null results of 
Experiment 5b and the absence of significant differences in bias scores for the older adult 
group in Experiment 5a. Nevertheless, the dot probe task is very easy for participants to carry 
out (nearly all participants have accuracy rates exceeding 95%) as all that is required of them 
is to press a key when the dot probe is detected. I would argue that instructions to maintain 
high accuracy and fast RTs would not fully prevent the use of cognitive control to direct their 
attention. This is in contrast to Experiment 1 (FAS test) in which task demands reduce the 
degree to which participants can apply cognitive control, as speed of output is emphasized. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to see if aging-related negativity reductions in attention 
would be stronger when faces of older adults were used as stimuli, as faces of younger adults 
may seem less relevant to older adults, resulting in less motivation to regulate emotions when 
presented with young adult faces. 
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 In summary, Experiments 5a and 5b provided some evidence that older adults direct 
attention away from negative stimuli (negativity reduction) whereas younger adults direct 
attention toward negative stimuli (negativity bias), and suggest that these biases are the result 







5.1 Summary of Major Results 
My thesis sought to identify factors that underlie the inconsistent findings of 
positivity effects in studies of memory and attention. I examined the contribution of a factor 
that has recently been identified in the literature as a possible source of the inconsistent 
findings: inter-study differences in task demands. Specifically, my thesis addressed whether 
positivity effects are more likely to emerge on cognitive tasks that allow for the use of 
cognitive control, especially in a reflective manner, or on those which emphasize reliance on 
processing fluency for the successful completion of the task. In line with the assumption of 
SST that goals to regulate emotional state are more salient in older, relative to younger, 
adults, and may influence the way in which information is cognitively processed (e.g., 
Carstensen, 1995), I hypothesized that positivity effects are more likely to occur on tasks that 
allow cognitive control processes to be used in the service of emotion regulation goals, such 
as in tasks that are reflective in nature, compared with tasks that emphasize speed, accuracy, 
or otherwise de-emphasize awareness of affective state while completing the task. In this 
way, my thesis evaluated the extent to which these two cognitive mechanisms (cognitive 
control and processing fluency) underlie manifestations of positivity effects in tasks of 
memory and attention.  
 To address my hypothesis, I conducted a suite of memory and attention experiments. 
I used five different tasks (three different memory tasks, and two different attention tasks) 
which varied with respect to the degree to which the task allowed for the use of cognitive 
control, were reflective in nature, and emphasized the ability to process information more 
fluently (i.e., faster, or with greater accuracy). I then compared younger and older adults’ 
performance on the tasks to examine under what circumstances positivity effects occurred. 
 Experiments 1 and 2 (Tomaszczyk & Fernandes, in press) compared performance on 
two different types of memory tasks that differed with respect to the degree to which 
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participants must rely on cognitive control/reflective processing versus processing fluency to 
successfully complete the task. Clear positivity effects were found on the task that was 
reflective in nature (autobiographical memory task) but not on the task that relied more 
heavily on fluency (phonemic fluency task). Experiment 3 (Tomaszczyk & Fernandes, under 
revision) examined whether older adults may strategically select positive information to later 
remember (i.e., use cognitive control to regulate encoding of positive material), by asking 
participants to judge the likelihood of remembering positive, negative, and neutral pictures 
for a later memory test. Older, but not younger, adults showed a positivity effect in terms of 
the number of pictures selected as particularly memorable, whereas both age groups showed 
a positivity effect in picture recall. 
In Experiments 4a and 4b, I used an RSVP paradigm to examine age differences in 
the ability of different valence stimuli to capture attention. In this way, the task provides a 
measure of differences in processing fluency across age groups. Little evidence for positivity 
effects was found in these experiments. Experiments 5a and 5b used a dot probe paradigm to 
examine whether older adults preferentially orient attention toward positive, or away from 
negative, pictures and faces relative to neutral pictures and faces. This paradigm allowed 
enough time for participants to use cognitive control to guide their attention to stimuli. Some 
evidence of positivity effects was found, as older adults were shown to be less biased to 
attend to negative (angry) faces compared to younger adults. 
5.2 Theoretical Implications of Results 
Across a suite of memory and attention studies, I found greater support for the 
cognitive control hypothesis of the aging-related positivity effect than the processing fluency 
hypothesis. This result is in line with a top-down account of the emergence of aging-related 
positivity effects in memory and attention tasks. As few studies in the positivity effect 
literature have entertained an alternate explanation to the “top-down” cognitive control 
account, that positivity effects may result from an aging-related enhancement in the “bottom-
up” processing of positive items, the novel contribution of this thesis is that it compares these 
accounts and in so doing identifies the cognitive mechanism that underlies observations of a 
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positivity effect in cognitive processing associated with normal aging. As such, this thesis 
contributes to the determination of boundary conditions under which aging-related 
enhancements in the cognitive processing of emotional information will most likely be 
observed. Results are consistent with the postulates of SST that enhanced affective 
experiences in older age are due to shifts in motivation to regulate emotional state which bias 
the cognitive processing of emotional information such that positive information receives 
preferential processing. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, I do not view the cognitive control and processing 
fluency accounts as mutually exclusive by necessity. Given that Carstensen (e.g., Charles & 
Carstensen, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2005) maintains that goals to regulate emotion are 
“chronically active” in older adults, it is somewhat surprising that fluency does not appear to 
contribute to aging-related positivity effects in memory and attention. If, by the term 
chronically active, Carstensen is implying that older adults’ goals to regulate emotional state 
are implicit, these goals could influence information processing of emotional stimuli in a way 
similar to how implicit attitudes can affect social-cognitive information processing in a 
relatively automatic manner (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Spielman, 
Pratto, & Bargh, 1988). Also, as performance on cognitive tasks is thought to depend upon 
both controlled and automatic processes (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), it seems likely 
that the preferential processing would depend at least in part on relatively automatic 
cognitive processes. The operation of these relatively automatic processes in service of 
emotion regulation goals while completing a cognitive task could result in more fluent 
processing of positive information (positivity effect) or less fluent processing of negative 
information (negativity reduction). 
If older adults have implicit goals to increase positive affect, this raises the question 
of why older adults should require executive control to show positivity effects. One possible 
explanation is that, although older adults may hold a (perhaps implicit) goal to regulate 
emotion, the actual cognitive processes necessary to implement this goal are effortful. 
Indeed, prefrontal cortex activity has been implicated in the act of regulating emotion (for 
reviews see Green & Malhi, 2006, and Ochsner & Gross, 2005). This question touches on the 
 
 127 
apparent paradox of older adults being better able to regulate emotions by the preferential 
cognitive processing of positive material, despite their reduced ability to use executive 
functions for cognitive tasks, relative to younger adults (Scheibe, 2011). Indeed, a prominent, 
and currently favoured, hypothesis regarding the source of aging-related declines in cognitive 
functioning called the “frontal lobe” hypothesis, maintains that due to greater atrophy of the 
frontal lobes compared with other brain structures, aging disproportionately affects those 
cognitive processes governed by the brain’s frontal lobes, namely the higher-level executive 
functions (West, 1996, 2000).  
A few possible explanations to address the paradox have been described by Scheibe 
(2011). First, in keeping with the aging-brain hypothesis (Cacioppo et al., 2011), positivity 
effects/negativity reductions may simply be due to decreased amygdala activity in response 
to negative stimuli. Second, the goal to maintain a positive affective state when completing 
cognitive tasks may strongly motivate older adults to strategically direct a greater proportion 
of their cognitive resources toward emotion regulation. Related to this is the idea that older 
adults’ propensity to direct their cognitive efforts toward emotion regulation is selective and 
compensatory in nature. Third, older adults may be more adept at emotion regulation 
compared with younger adults, and so proportionately fewer cognitive control resources are 
necessary to regulate emotion during cognitive tasks. Some evidence does exist to support 
this idea (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). Given the findings of the current thesis that 
cognitive control appears to underlie aging-related positivity effects, I suspect that 
motivational factors play a greater role in the manifestation of positivity effects in older 
adults than do aging-related changes in amygdala activation. 
Moreover, that processing fluency does not appear to account for positivity effects 
and negativity reductions is at odds with the aging-brain hypothesis of aging-related changes 
in cognitive processing of emotional information (Cacioppo et al., 2011). If positivity 
effects/negativity reductions are due to the amygdala being less responsive to negative 
stimuli in older adults, then I would expect to see relatively reduced processing of negative 
information when compared with positive information in tasks that rely heavily on the ability 
to fluently process information for their successful completion, such as in the FAS test and 
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RSVP paradigm. Furthermore, some studies which have employed the visual search 
paradigm to compare younger and older adults’ ability to detect discrepant angry, happy, and 
neutral faces in a display (e.g., Knight & Mather, 2006) have found that both age groups 
detect angry faces more quickly than happy and neutral faces, which suggests an age-
invariant advantage for threat information in visual attention, which also speaks against the 
aging-brain hypothesis. 
On the other hand, if Carstensen uses the term chronically active to mean that the 
goal to regulate emotional state is explicitly available to older adults on a continuous basis 
and that they use cognitive control to implement other cognitive processes to carry out this 
goal, there still remains the possibility that, in addition to the recruitment of cognitive control 
processes, positive information is easier to cognitively process or negative information 
requires more effortful to process. That the definition of the term chronically active is vague 
in terms of the implicit/explicit distinction limits certain avenues of potential study. For 
instance, if goals to regulate emotion are postulated to operate on an implicit level, then it 
may be fruitful and interesting to explore the degree to which positivity effects emerge on a 
range of tasks assessing the effects of implicit goals on behaviour. Regardless, results of the 
experiments presented in this thesis suggest that processing fluency does not account for 
aging-related positivity effects in memory and attentional paradigms, and that these effects 
are consistent with motivationally-driven employment of cognitive control processes. 
SST is not the only major psychological theory that takes into account the effects of 
time perception on the processing of social and cognitive information. Another theory rooted 
in the tradition of social psychology, called terror-management theory (TMT; Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), attempts to explain the effect of what is deemed mortality 
salience on social-cognitive functioning. TMT maintains that the awareness that one will 
eventually die, as well as the feeling of terror that accompanies this awareness, is a potent 
motivator for individuals to embrace values, views, and relationships (e.g., Cox & Arndt, 
2011) that give them a sense of personal meaning (e.g., Cohen & Solomon, 2011).  
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The findings of my thesis experiments, which are consistent with the idea that older 
adults use cognitive control processes to bias their cognitive processing of information in 
such a way as to presumably increase levels of positive affect (e.g., Isaacowitz, Toner, & 
Neupert, 2009), also suggest the cognitive mechanism by which individuals reduce the 
anxiety associated with the threat of impending death and increase positive feelings. Also, as 
studies of the positivity effect have, by and large, operated on the assumption that older 
adults are more aware of impending death and that this awareness impacts their cognitive 
processing, it would be interesting to directly manipulate mortality salience as in studies of 
TMT and examine the extent to which positivity effects occur in both younger and older 
adults. Priming mortality salience would be a more direct way to test this assumption of the 
SST compared with the less direct ways that have been used in past SST-based studies, in 
which salient endings are primed such as the threat of political takeovers and imagining 
greater time constraints (e.g., Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). For example, younger adults 
have been shown to pay less attention to fear-inducing stimuli (snakes and spiders) when 
primed with mortality (MacDonald & Lipp, 2008), and I suspect that this effect would be 
even stronger in older adults. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
A possible alternative explanation for aging-related positivity effects is that they are 
actually mood congruency effects. As older adults often report more positive, or less 
negative, mood relative to younger adults, the case could be made that older adults have 
better memory for, and pay greater attention to, positive information because they are in a 
more positive mood, and they are preferentially processing information that is congruent with 
their current mood state. However, studies of the positivity effect typically take pains to 
assess participant mood with questionnaires such as the PANAS or PANAS-X, and either 
statistically control for effects of mood or demonstrate through correlational analyses the lack 
of association between mood and the dependent variables of interest (e.g., Charles, Mather, 
& Carstensen, 2003; Tomaszczyk, Fernandes, & MacLeod, 2008). In the experiments of the 
current thesis, participant mood was assessed with a well-known and often used mood scale, 
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the PANAS-X, and the aforementioned statistical tests were used to rule out mood effects to 
account for the pattern of results obtained.  
As mentioned above, I would expect that bottom-up processing of information partly 
contributes to aging-related positivity effects in cognitive tasks, and so I would find it 
prudent to further examine evidence for the processing fluency account. For example, it 
would be interesting to examine age differences in performance on other types of fluency 
tasks, or tasks which rely heavily on the ability to access information quickly, to determine 
the extent to which the results of the fluency task used in the current thesis are generalizable.  
 One interesting avenue for future research is to extend the findings of Experiment 3, 
which gave evidence that older adults are more likely to select positive information as 
memorable, relative to younger adults. If older adults use cognitive control to deliberately 
select positive information to later remember, this may be based on: 1) a motivationally 
based preference for processing positive information, 2) metacognitive beliefs that positive 
information is more memorable, or 3) metacognitive monitoring during encoding, for 
example, the subjective feeling of fluently processing positive items, irrespective of whether 
positive information is actually encoded to a greater extent than negative items (see Kornell 
et al., 2011 for a striking example of a double dissociation between metacognitive monitoring 
judgments and actual memory). To disentangle these explanations, the picture stimuli from 
Experiment 3 could be used in a traditional judgment of learning paradigm, which would 
facilitate comparisons with results of previous research. Younger and older participants could 
view negative, neutral, and positive pictures (or words as well) one at a time and be asked to 
make a judgment of learning after the presentation of each item (estimate the likelihood of 
recalling that item on a later recall test) followed by a recall test for the studied items. This 
would be followed by questions regarding participants’ beliefs about the effect of emotional 
valence and arousal on memory performance. This design would allow for the distinction 
between memory beliefs and memory judgments, and their impact on actual memory 
performance. Furthermore, motivation to regulate emotions could be manipulated through 
instructions to focus on emotional state or accuracy while completing this task, and the effect 
on metamemory judgments as well as actual memory performance could be assessed. 
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 Another potentially fruitful line of inquiry would be to provide an empirical test of 
one of the central assumptions of the SST that older adults are more motivated to maintain 
positive well-being than younger adults, as this has yet to be validated by empirical evidence. 
Previous studies have inferred the role of motivation in aging-related positivity effects, but 
none have directly tested this idea. As such, I could directly test the hypothesis that older 
adults are more motivated to cognitively process positively valenced information than young, 
using a quantifiable measure of motivation. To test this hypothesis, younger and older adults 
could complete a computerized “key press” task that quantifies and provides a behavioural 
measure of the motivational incentive of stimuli (based on Ferrey, Frischen, & Fenske, in 
preparation). Participants would be given instructions to press numerical keys from 1 to 6 to 
view a 2-second presentation of one of six different image types assigned to a given key: 
positive, negative, or neutral (half of each valence category being of high or low 
psychological arousal). Keys would be on a progressive ratio schedule such that each time a 
given key is pressed, twice as many key presses will be required to view the next image from 
the category associated with that key. Thus, independent variables are valence and arousal 
category of the image, and age group; the dependent variable is the number of key presses 
that participants make to view each image type, which quantifies degree of motivation to 
view the images.  
 I predict that older adults would make more key presses to view positive than 
negative or neutral images when compared with younger adults. To provide evidence of the 
validity of my dependent variable, the experiment could be replicated with the addition of an 
eye tracking apparatus, which is an indicator of where attention is directed in a visual scene. 
Thus, gaze patterns could be linked with number of key presses in response to individual 
images and serve as a measure of motivation to attend to images. I predict that older adults 
who show positivity effects in number of key presses would also visually fixate more on 
positive images, relative to young. 
The main limitation of the current thesis is that participants’ ability to use cognitive 
control was not directly manipulated; rather, use of cognitive control is inferred based on the 
extent to which the specific cognitive task allows for cognitive control to be used in service 
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of goals to regulate emotion. As such, future work could examine the effect of disrupting the 
ability of participants to use cognitive control on performance on the tasks presented here to 
further test the cognitive control hypothesis. Nevertheless, a strength of the current thesis is 
that a number of different memory and attention paradigms were used to investigate whether 
cognitive control or processing fluency plays a larger role in regulating the processing of 
emotional information. The use of a number of different tasks to evaluate the cognitive 
control and processing fluency accounts is a strength of this thesis, and allows for 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the generalizability of the findings to different types of 
cognitive tasks. 
5.3.1 The Importance of Understanding Aging-Related Positivity Effects 
The literature reviewed in this thesis strongly suggests that, despite declines in 
cognitive and physical functioning, older adults are able to regulate their affective state to 
maintain high levels of well-being. This finding is echoed in recent statistics from Canadian 
population surveys which show that Canadians of all ages are satisfied with their lives as a 
whole, with 92.1% of Canadians reporting that they are satisfied or very satisfied with life 
(Statistics Canada Canadian Community Health Survey, 2009). Although levels of life 
satisfaction (the cognitive appraisal of how one’s life is going, rather than 
affective/emotional state) decline slightly with age (perhaps due to the development of aging-
related health problems), 88.5% of older adult Canadians still report being satisfied with life 
(Statistics Canada Canadian Community Health Survey, 2009), and also report the lowest 
levels of daily stress of any age group (Statistics Canada Canadian Community Health 
Survey, 2009). Moreover, prevalence of mood disorders, such as depression and bipolar 
disorder, is lower in adults aged 65 years and older than in adults aged 35-64 (Statistics 
Canada Canadian Community Health Survey, 2009). Nevertheless, increases in the 
population of older adults means that in the coming decades there will be greater numbers of 
older adults who are living with mood disorders, and low levels of well-being brought on by 
declining health and other factors. That aging-related health problems may be responsible for 
declines in well-being is consistent with the finding that 51.5% of Canadians who were 
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dissatisfied with life reported that their health was ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ (Statistics Canada 
Canadian Community Health Survey, 2009). As such, it is important to characterize the 
normal emotional experience of older adults, which includes the way in which they 
cognitively process affective information, as a first step in being able to accurately identify 
pathological mood states in this population, and in the development of strategies to prevent 
and manage the disruption of the positive well-being of older adults. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This thesis investigated the contribution of two cognitive mechanisms in the 
manifestation of aging-related positivity effects in memory and attention: cognitive control 
and processing fluency. A suite of memory tasks and attention tasks that differed in terms of 
task demands to employ cognitive control or to rely on processing fluency was used to 
evaluate the extent to which these two cognitive mechanisms could account for aging-related 
positivity effects. Results suggest that top-down cognitive control, rather than bottom-up 
differences in processing fluency, is the mechanism driving this effect. Differences in task 
demands, and the degree to which they allow top-down or bottom-up processing, can account 
for inconsistencies within the current literature in the emergence of a positivity effect in older 
relative to younger adults. The thesis results are consistent with the postulate of SST that 




Experiment 5a (Dot Probe with Faces) RT Analyses 
 Raw RTs. Mean RTs to detect the dot when it replaced a face expressing a given 
emotional valence type (referred to as the “target”), as a function of the valence type of the 
other face of the pair (referred to as the “context”), were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA. 
The within-subjects factor was target face Valence for each respective context face valence 
(angry target with neutral context/angry target with happy context/neutral target with angry 
context/neutral target with happy context/happy target with neutral context/happy target with 
angry context), and the between-subjects factor was Age Group (see Table 9). 
Table 9 Experiment 5a, mean RTs to Detect Dot in the Dot Probe Paradigm when Dot 
Replaces Angry, Neutral, or Happy Target Faces in the Context of Angry, Neutral, and 










Angry in Neutral 402 (34.88) 564 (76.01) 
Angry in Happy 403 (34.89) 566 (76.12) 
Neutral in Angry 409 (36.73) 572 (79.14) 
Neutral in Happy 408 (39.41) 570 (80.05) 
Happy in Angry 410 (36.50) 566 (73.97) 
Happy in Neutral 404 (39.81) 566 (75.88) 
 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported. There was a significant effect of 
Age, F (1, 58) = 111.86, p < .0005, np2 = 0.66; younger adults were faster (M = 406.82, SD = 
35.66) to detect the dot than older adults (M = 568.27, SD = 75.80). There was an effect of 
Valence, F (5, 290) = 2.56, p < .05, np2 = .04, but no Age x Valence interaction (p > .1). To 
examine the main effect of Valence, paired t-tests were used to compare the different face 
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pair types. To control for multiple (16) comparisons, the Bonferroni correction was applied, 
but no comparison reached this adjusted criterion for significance (p < .003). However, two 
comparisons were significant with the p = .05 criterion: RTs were faster to detect the dot 
when it replaced an angry target in a neutral context than when the dot replaced a neutral 
target in a happy context, t (59) = 2.07, p < .05, and RTs were faster to detect the dot when it 
replaced an angry target in a happy context than when it replaced a neutral target in an angry 
context, t (59) = 2.56, p < .05. 
When the analysis was repeated, collapsing across context valence for each target 
valence type (i.e., for angry, neutral, and happy targets), there was a main effect of Face 
Valence, F (2, 116) = 3.91, p < .05, np2 = 0.63, but no Age Group x Face Valence interaction 
(p > .1), and a significant effect of Age Group, F (1, 58) = 111.86, p < .0005, np2 = 0.66. The 
main effect of target Face Valence indicated that the dot was detected more quickly when it 
replaced an angry target (M = 483.81, SD = 100.35) than a neutral target (M = 489.50, SD = 
102.48) faces, t (59) = 2.93, p < .01. There was no significant RT difference between angry 
and happy targets (M = 486.60, SD = 99.20), p > .1, and there was no RT difference between 






Experiment 5b (Dot Probe with Pictures) Participant Picture 
Ratings Analyses 
Participant Ratings of Pictures. Data were missing from 1 older adult participant. To verify 
whether participant ratings of pictures were concordant with normative ratings used to select 
pictures for the dot probe task participant ratings of pictures were analyzed. Three mixed 
ANOVAs were performed, with the between-subjects factor of Age Group, and the within 
subjects factor of Picture Valence, to analyze the participant ratings of valence, arousal, and 
personal relevance, respectively. 
For picture valence, analyses confirmed that participants rated pictures in accordance 
with normative ratings (values are reported with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction). There 
was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 114) = 383.50, p < .0005, np2 = 0.87, but no effect 
of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x Picture Valence interaction (p > .1). The main 
effect of valence indicated that participants rated negative pictures as more negative than 
neutral pictures, t (58) = 18.30, p < .0005,  neutral pictures as less positive than positive 
pictures, t (58) = 15.70, p < .0005, and negative pictures as more negative than positive 
pictures, t (58) = 21.59, p < .0005. 
For picture arousal, there was a main effect of Picture Valence, F (2, 114) = 6.30, p < 
.01, np2 = .10, but no effect of Age Group (p > .1), and no Age Group x Picture Valence 
interaction, (p > .1). The main effect of Valence indicated that participants rated positive 
pictures as more arousing than negative, t (58) = 2.23, p < .05, or neutral, t (58) = 4.30, p < 
.0005, pictures but there was no difference in arousal between negative and neutral (p > .1) 
pictures. 
For personal relevance, there were main effects of Picture Valence, F (2, 114), p < 
.0005, np2 = 0.52, and Age Group, F (1, 57) = 6.55, p < .05, np2 = .10, but no Age Group x 
Picture Valence interaction (p > .1). The main effect of Picture Valence indicated that 
negative pictures were rated as less personally relevant than neutral, t (58) = 2.01, p < .05, 
and positive, t (58) = 8.57, p < .0005, pictures, and that neutral pictures were rated as less 
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personally relevant than positive pictures, t (58) = 9.72, p < .0005. The main effect of Age 
Group indicated that older adults rated the pictures as more personally relevant than younger 




Experiment 5b (Dot Probe with Pictures) RT Analyses 
Raw RTs. RTs to detect the dot when it replaced a picture of a given valence type 
(referred to as the “target”), as a function of the valence type of the other picture of the pair 
(referred to as the “context”), were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA. The within-subjects 
factor was target picture Valence for each respective context picture valence (negative target 
with neutral context/negative target with positive context/neutral target with negative 
context/neutral target with positive context/positive target with neutral context/positive target 
with negative context), and the between-subjects factor was Age Group (see Table 10). 
Table 10 Experiment 5b, Mean RTs to Detect the Dot in the Dot Probe Paradigm when Dot 
Replaces Negative, Neutral, or Positive Target Pictures in the Context of Negative, Neutral, 











Negative in Neutral 394 (35.05) 578 (65.53) 
Negative in Positive 392 (33.08) 576 (65.34) 
Neutral in Negative 395 (35.05) 574 (62.28) 
Neutral in Positive 392 (33.68) 575 (59.84) 
Positive in Negative 395 (35.83) 572 (64.38) 
Positive in Neutral 388 (34.41) 569 (64.54) 
 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported. There was a significant effect of 
Age, F (1, 58) = 201.15, p < .0005, np2 = 0.78; younger adults were faster (M = 392.68, SD = 
33.14) to detect the dot than older adults (M = 574.12, SD = 61.74). There was a trend for an 
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effect of Valence, F (5, 290) = 2.02, p = .09, np2 = .03, but no Age x Valence interaction, p = 
.7. 
When the analysis was repeated collapsed across context pair valence types (i.e., for 
negative, neutral, and positive targets), again there was a trend of an effect of Valence, F (2, 
116) = 2.51, p = .09, np2 = 0.41, but no Age x Valence interaction, p = 0.32, and a significant 
effect of Age, F (1, 58) = 201.15, p < .0005, np2 = 0.78.  
 140 
References 
Ackerman, P. L. (2008). Knowledge and cognitive aging. In F. I. M. Craik & T. A. Salthouse 
(Eds.), Handbook of aging and cognition, 3
rd
 edition (pp. 445-489). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Addis, D. R., Leclerc, C. M., Muscatell, K. A., & Kensinger, E. A. (2010). There are age 
related changes in neural connectivity during the encoding of positive, but not 
negative, information. Cortex, 46, 425–433. 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (1994). Impaired recognition of 
emotion in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the human amygdala. 
Nature, 372, 669-72. 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (1995). Fear and the human 
amygdala. Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 5879-5891. 
Allard, E. S., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2008). Are preferences in emotional processing affected 
by distraction? Examining the age-related positivity effect in visual fixation within a 
dual-task paradigm. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 15, 725-743. 
Almeida, D. M., & Horn, M.C. (2004). Is daily life more stressful during middle adulthood? 
In O. G. Brim, C. D. Ryff, & R.C. Kessler (Eds.), How healthy are we?: A national 
study of well-being at midlife (pp. 425-451), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Anderson, A. K. (2005). Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting 
awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 258-281. 
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and personality. New York: Columbia University Press. 





Axelrod, B. N., & Henry, R. R. (1992). Age-related performance on the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting, Similarities, and Controlled Oral Word Association Tests. Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 6, 16-26. 
Bäckman, L., Ginovart, N., Dixon, R. A., Wahlin, T.-B. R., Wahlin, Å., et al. (2000). Age-
related cognitive deficits mediated by changes in the striatal dopamine system. The 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 635-637. 
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M.  J., & van IJzendoorn, 
M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: 
A meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 1-24. 
Bargh, J. A. Chaiken, S., Govendor, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic 
attitude activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 893-812. 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Vohs, K. D., & Finkenauer, C. (2001). Bad is stronger 
than good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323-370. 
Bechara, A. (2004). The role of emotion in decision-making: Evidence from neurological 
patients with orbitofrontal damage. Brain and Cognition, 55, 30-40. 
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R., Rockland, C., & Damasio, A. R. (1995). 
Double dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowledge relative to the 
amygdala and hippocampus in humans. Science, 269, 1115-1118. 
Berntson, G. G., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). Amygdala 
contribution to selective dimensions of emotion. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience 2,123-129. 
Berntson, G. G., Norman, G. J., Bechara, A., Bruss, J., Tranel, D., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2011). 
The insula and evaluative processes. Psychological Science, 22, 80-86. 
Blake, T. M., Varnhagen, C. K., & Parent, M. B. (2001). Emotionally arousing pictures 
increase blood glucose levels and enhance recall. Neurobiology of Learning and 
Memory, 75, 262-273. 
 
 142 
Blanks, J. C., & Dorey, C. K. (2009). Sensory aging: Vision. In P. R. Hof & C. V. Mobbs 
(Eds.), Handbook of the neuroscience of aging (pp. 199–213), Burlington: 
Elsevier/Academic Press. 
Bolla, K. I., Lindgren, K. N., Bonaccorsy, C., & Bleecker, M. L. (1990). Predictors of verbal 
fluency (FAS) in the healthy elderly. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46, 623–628. 
Borod, J. C., Yecker, S. A., Brickman, A. M., Moreno, C. R., Sliwinski, M., Foldi, N. S., et 
al. (2004). Changes in posed facial expression of emotion across the adult life span. 
Experimental Aging Research, 30, 305–331. 
Bouisson, J., & Swendsen, J. (2003). Routinization and emotional well-being: An experience 
sampling investigation in an elderly French sample. The Journals of Gerontology: 
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 58, 280-282. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1999). Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Stimuli, 
instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical Report C-1, Gainesville, FL. The 
Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Breslin, C. W., & Safer, M. A. (2011). Effects of event valence on long-term memory for two 
baseball championship games. Psychological Science, 22, 1408-1412. 
Brosch, T., Sander, D., Pourtois, G., & Scherer, K. R. (2008). Beyond fear: Rapid spatial 
orienting toward positive emotional stimuli. Psychological Science, 19, 362-370. 
Buchanan, T. W., Etzel, J. A., Adolphs, R., & Tranel, D. (2006). The influence of autonomic 
arousal and semantic relatedness on memory for emotional words. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 61, 26-33. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Bechara, A., Tranel, D., & Hawkley, L. C. (2011). Could an 
aging brain contribute to subjective well-being? The value added by a social 
neuroscience perspective. In A. Tadorov, S. T. Fisk & D. Prentice (Eds.), Social 
neuroscience: Toward understanding the underpinnings of the social mind (pp. 249–
263). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
 143 
Cahill, L., & McGaugh, J. L. (1995). A novel demonstration of enhanced memory associated 
with emotional arousal. Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 410-421. 
Caird, J. K., Edwards, C. J., Creaser, J. I., & Horrey, W. J. (2005). Older driver failures of 
attention at intersections: Using change blindness methods to assess turn decision 
accuracy. Human Factors, 47, 235-249. 
Calder, A., Keane, J., Manley, T., Sprengelmeyer, R., Scott, S., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Young, 
A. (2003). Facial expression recognition across the adult life span. Neuropsychologia, 
41, 195–202. 
Calder, A. J., Lawrence, A. D., & Young, A. W. (2001). Neuropsychology of fear and 
loathing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 352-363. 
Calder, A. J., Young, A. W., Rowland, D., Perrett, D. I., Hodges, J. R., & Etcoff, N. L. 
(1996). Face perception after bilateral amygdala damage: Differentially severe 
impairment of fear. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 13, 699-745. 
Canli, T., Sivers, H., Whitfield, S. L., Gotlib, I. H., & Gabrieli, J. H. (2002). Amygdala 
response to happy faces as a function of extraversion. Science, 296, 2191. 
Carstensen, L. L. (1992). Social and emotional patterns in adulthood: Support for 
socioemotional selectivity theory. Psychology and Aging, 7, 331-338. 
Carstensen, L. L. (1995). Evidence for a life-span theory of socioemotional selectivity. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 151-156. 
Carstensen, L. L. (2006). The influence of a sense of time on human development. Science, 
312, 1913-1915. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Charles, S. T. (1998). Emotion in the second half of life. Current 
Directions ion Psychological Science, 7, 144-149. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). Influence of HIV status and age on cognitive 
representations of others. Health Psychology, 17, 494-503. 
 
 144 
Carstensen, L. L., Fung, H. H., & Charles, S. T. (2003). Socioemotional selectivity theory 
and the regulation of emotion in the second half of life. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 
103-123. 
Carstensen, L. L., Isaacowitz, D. M., & Charles, S. T. (1999). Taking time seriously: A 
theory of socioemotional selectivity. American Psychologist, 54, 165-181. 
Carstensen, L. L., Pasupathi, M., Mayr, U., Nesselroade, J. R. (2000). Emotional experience 
in everyday life across the adult life span. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 644-655. 
Carstensen, L. L., Turan, B., Scheibe, S., Ram, N., Ersner-Hershfield, H., Samanez-Larkin, 
G. R., Brooks, K, P., & Nesselroade, J. R. (2011). Emotional experience improves 
with age: Evidence based on over 10 years of experience sampling. Psychology and 
Aging, 26, 21-33. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Turk-Charles, S. (1994). The salience of emotion across the adult life 
span. Psychology and Aging, 9, 259-264. 
Castel, A. D. (2005). Memory for grocery prices in younger and older adults: The role of 
schematic support. Psychology and Aging, 20, 718-721. 
Castel, A. D., Farb, N. A. S., & Craik, F. I. M. (2007). Memory for general and specific value 
information in younger and older adults: Measuring the limits of strategic control. 
Memory & Cognition, 35, 689-700. 
Castel, A. D., Humphreys, K. L., Lee, S. S., Galvan, A., Balota, D. A., & McCabe, D. P. 
(2011). The development of memory efficiency and value-directed remembering 
across the life span: A cross-sectional study of memory and selectivity. 
Developmental Psychology, 47, 1553-1564. 
Charles, S. T., & Carstensen, L. L. (2008). Unpleasant situations elicit different emotional 
responses in younger and older adults. Psychology and Aging, 23, 495-504. 
Charles, S. T., & Carstensen, L. L. (2009). Social and emotional aging. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 61, 383–409 
 
 145 
Charles, S. T., Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2003). Aging and emotional memory: The 
forgettable nature of negative images for older adults. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 132, 310-324. 
Charles, S. T., Reynolds, C. A., & Gatz, M. (2001). Age-related differences and change in 
positive and negative affect over 23 years. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 80, 136-151. 
Clancy, S. M., & Hoyer, W. J. (1994). Age and skill in visual search. Developmental 
Psychology, 30, 545-552. 
Cohen, F., & Solomon, S. (2011). The politics of mortal terror. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 20, 316-320. 
Comblain, C., D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Phenomenal characteristics 
of autobiographical memories for emotional and neutral events in older and younger 
adults. Experimental Aging Research, 31, 179-189. 
Connor, L. T., Hertzog, C., & Dunlosky, J. (1997). Age-related differences in absolute but 
not relative metamemory accuracy. Psychology and Aging, 12, 50-71. 
Conway, M. A., & Bekerian, D. A. (1987). Organization in autobiographical memory. 
Memory & Cognition, 15, 119–132. 
Cooper, R. M., & Langton, S. R.H. (2006). Attentional bias to angry faces using the dot 
probe task? It depends when you look for it. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 
1321-1329. 
Cox, C. R., & Arndt, J. (2012). How sweet it is to be loved by you: The role of perceived 
regard in the terror management of close relationships. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 102, 616-632. 
Craik, F. I. M. (1986). A functional account of age differences in memory. In F. Klix & H. 
Hagendorf (Eds.), Human memory and cognitive capabilities, mechanisms, and 
performance (pp. 409–422). Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
 146 
Craik, F. I., & McDowd, J. M. (1987). Age differences in recall and recognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 474–479. 
Cumming, E., & Henry, W. H. (1961). Growing old: The process of disengagement. New 
York: Basic Books.  
Daigneault, S., & Braun, C. M. (1993). Working memory and the Self-Ordered Pointing 
Task: Further evidence of early prefrontal decline in normal aging. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 15, 881-895. 
Daigneault, S., Braun, C. M., & Whitaker, H. A. (1992). Early effects of normal aging on 
perseverative and non-perseverative prefrontal measures. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 8, 99-114. 
Dalgleish, T., Golden, A. J., Barrett, L. F., Yeung, C. A., Murphy, V., Tchanturia, K., 
Williams, J. M. G., Perkins, N., Barnard, P. J., Elward, R., & Watkins, E. (2007). 
Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory and depression: The role of 
executive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 23–42. 
Daniels, K. A., Toth, J. P., Hertzog, C. (2009). Aging and recollection on the accuracy of 
judgments of learning. Psychology and Aging, 24, 494-500. 
Davidson, R. J., Scherer, K. R., & Goldsmith, H. H. (2003). Handbook of affective sciences. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Denburg, N. L., Buchanan, T. W., Tranel, D., & Adolphs, R. (2003). Evidence for preserved 
emotional memory in normal older persons. Emotion, 3, 239-253. 
Dennis, N. A., & Cabeza, R. (2008). Neuroimaging of healthy cognitive aging. In F. I. M. 
Craik & T. A. Salthouse (Eds.), Handbook of aging and cognition, 3
rd
 edition (pp. 1-
54.). New York: Psychology Press. 
Diehl, M., Coyle, N., & Labouvie-Vief, G. (1996). Age and sex differences in strategies of 
coping and defense across the life span. Psychology and Aging, 11, 127-139. 
Diener, E., & Emmons, R. A. (1985). The independence of positive and negative affect. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1105-1117. 
 
 147 
Dolcos, F., & McCarthy, G. (2006). Brain systems mediating cognitive interference by 
emotional distraction. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 2072-2079. 
Dollinger, S. M. C., & Hoyer, W. J. (1996). Age and skill differences in the processing 
demands of visual inspection. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10, 225-239. 
Dunlosky, J., Baker, J. M. C., Rawson, K. A., & Hertzog, C. (2006). Does aging influence 
people’s metacomprehension? Effects of processing ease on judgments of text learning. 
Psychology and Aging, 21, 390-400. 
Ekman, P. (1992a). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169-200. 
Ekman, P. (1992b). Are there basic emotions? Psychological Review, 99, 550-553. 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across culture in the face and emotion. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 124-129. 
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ellsworth, P. (1972). Emotion in the human face: Guidelines 
for research and an integration of findings .Oxford, England: Pergamon Press. 
Ekman, P., Levenson, R. W., & Friesen, W. V. (1983), Autonomic nervous system activity 
distinguishes between emotions. Science, 221, 1208-1210. 
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements in facial displays 
of emotions. Science, 164, 86-858. 
Emery, L., & Hess, T. M. (2008). Viewing instructions impact emotional memory differently 
in older and younger adults. Psychology and Aging, 23, 2-12. 
Fox, E. (2008). Emotion science. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fox, L. S., & Knight, B. G. (2005). The effects of anxiety on attentional processes in older 
adults. Aging and Mental Health, 9, 585-593. 
Farkas, M. S., & Hoyer, W. J. (1980). Processing consequences of perceptual grouping in 
selective attention. Journal of Gerontology, 35, 207-216. 
 
 148 
Feinstein, J. S., Adolphs, R., Damasio, A., & Tranel, D. (2011). The human amygdala and 
the induction and experience of fear. Current Biology, 21, 34-38. 
Feldman-Barrett, L. (1998). Discrete emotions or dimensions? The role of valence focus and 
arousal focus. Cognition and Emotion, 12, 579-599. 
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006a). Emotions as natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 1, 28-58. 
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006b). Solving the emotion paradox: categorization and the 
experienced of emotion.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 20-46. 
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006c). Valence as a basic building block of emotional life. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 40, 35-55. 
Fernandes, M., Ross, M., Wiegand, M., & Schryer, E. (2008). Are the memories of older 
adults positively biased? Psychology and Aging, 23, 297–306. 
Folstein, M. F., Folstein, S. F., & McHugh, P. R. (1975). Mini-Mental State: A practical 
method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician. Journal of 
Psychiatric Research, 12, 189–198. 
Fredrickson, B. L., & Carstensen, L. L. (1990). Choosing social partners: How old age and 
anticipated endings make people more selective. Psychology and Aging, 5, 335-347. 
Frijda, N. H. (1994). Varieties of affect: Emotions and episodes, moods, and sentiments. In P. 
Ekman and R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion (pp. 59-67). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Funayama, E. S., Grillon, C., Davis, M., & Phelps, E. A. (2001). A double dissociation in the 
affective modulation of startle in humans: Effects of unilateral temporal lobectomy. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 721-729. 
Fung, H. H., & Carstensen, L. L. (2004). Motivational changes in response to blocked goals 
and foreshortened time: Testing alternatives to socioemotional selectivity theory. 
Psychology and Aging, 19, 68-78. 
 
 149 
Fung, H. H., & Carstensen, L. L. (2006). Goals change when life’s fragility is primed: 
Lessons learned from older adults, the September 11 attacks and SARS. Social 
Cognition, 24, 248-278. 
Fung, H. H., Carstensen, L. L., & Lutz, A. M. (1999). Influence of time on social 
preferences: Implications for life-span development. Psychology and Aging, 14, 
2595-604. 
Gallo, D. A., Korthauer, L. E., McDonough, I., Teshale, S., & Johnson, E. L. (2011). Age 
related positivity effects and autobiographical memory detail: Evidence from a 
past/future source memory task. Memory, 19, 641–52. 
Georgiou-Karistianis, N., Tang, J., Vardy, Y., Sheppard, D., Evans, N., Wilson, M., Gardner, 
B., Farrow, M., & Bradshaw, J. (2007). Progressive age-related changes in the 
attentional blink paradigm. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 14, 213-226. 
Giuliani, N. R., Drabant, E. M., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Anterior cingulate cortex volume and 
emotion regulation: Is bigger better? Biological Psychiatry, 86, 379-382. 
Glisky, E. L., Polster, M. R., & Routhieaux, B. C. (1995).  Double dissociation between item 
and source memory. Neuropsychology, 9, 229-235. 
Glisky, E. L., Rubin, S. R., & Davidson, p. S. R. (2001). Source memory in older adults: An 
encoding or retrieval problem? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 27, 1131-1146. 
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion 
regulation: Reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological Psychiatry, 
63, 577-586. 
Grady, C. L., Hongwanishkul, D., Keightley, M., Lee, W., & Hasher, L. (2007). The effect of 
age on memory for emotional faces. Neuropsychology, 21, 371–380. 
Green, M. J., & Malhi, G. S. (2006). Neural mechanisms of the cognitive control of emotion. 
Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 18, 144–153. 
 
 150 
Griffin, P. W., Mroczek, D. K., & Spiro, A. III. (2006). Variability in affective change 
among aging men: Longitudinal findings from the VA Normative Aging Study. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 40,942-965. 
Gross, J. J. (1998a). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent 
consequences for experience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 224-237. 
Gross, J. J. (1998b). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. Review 
of General Psychology, 2, 271-299. 
Gross, J. J. (2008). Emotion regulation. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, L. F. Barrett 
(Eds.), Handbook of emotions (3rd Ed.) (pp. 497-512). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gross, J. J., Carstensen, L. L., Pasupathi, M., Tsai, J., Skorpen, C. G., & Hsu, A. Y. C. 
(1997). Emotion and aging: Experience, expression, control. Psychology and Aging, 
12, 590-599. 
Grühn, D., Scheibe, S., & Baltes, P. B. (2007). Reduced negativity effect in older adults’ 
memory for emotional pictures: The heterogeneity-homogeneity list paradigm. 
Psychology and Aging, 22, 644–649. 
Grühn, D., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (2005). No aging bias favoring memory for positive 
material: Evidence from a heterogeneity-homogeneity list paradigm using 
emotionally toned words. Psychology and Aging, 20, 579–588. 
Gutchess, A. H., Kensinger, E. A., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Aging, self-referencing, and 
medial prefrontal cortex. Social Neuroscience, 2, 117–133. 
Guy, S., C., & Cahill, L. (1999). The role of overt rehearsal in enhanced conscious memory 
for emotional events. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 114-122. 
Hahn, S., Carlson, C., Singer, S., & Gronlund, S. D. (2006). Aging and visual search: 




Hansen, C. H., & Hansen, R. D. (1988). Finding the face in the crowd: An anger superiority 
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 917-924. 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1988). Working memory, comprehension, and aging: A review 
and a new view. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: 
Advances in research and theory, Vol. 22 (pp.193-225). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Healey, M. K., & Hasher, L. (2009). Limitations to the deficit attenuation hypothesis: Aging 
and decision making. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 17-22. 
Henry, J. D., MacLeod, M. S., Phillips, L. H., & Crawford, J. R. (2004). A meta-analytic 
review of prospective memory and aging. Psychology and Aging, 19, 27-39. 
Hertzog, C., Sinclair, S. M., & Dunlosky, J. (2010). Age differences in the monitoring of 
learning: Cross-sectional evidence of spared resolution across the adult life span. 
Developmental Psychology, 46, 939-948. 
Holland, A. C., Tamir, M., & Kensinger, E. (2010). The effect of regulation goals on 
emotional event-specific knowledge. Memory, 18, 504–521. 
Holtzer, R., Stern, Y., & Rakitin, B. C. (2004). Age-related differences in executive control 
of working memory. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1333-1345. 
Hoyer, W. J., & Ingolfsdottir, D. (2003).  Age, skill, and contextual cuing in target detection. 
Psychology and Aging, 18, 210-218. 
Huang, Y.-M., Baddeley, A., & Young, A. W. (2008). Attentional capture by emotional 
stimuli is modulated by semantic processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 34, 328-339. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Allard, E. S., Murphy, N. A., & Schlangel, M. (2009). The time course of 
age-related preferences toward positive and negative stimuli. Journal of Gerontology: 
Psychological Sciences, 64B, 188–192. 
 
 152 
Isaacowitz, D., Löckenhoff, C. E., Lane, D., Wright, R., Sechrest, Riedel, R., & Costa, P. T. 
(2007). Age differences in recognition of emotion in lexical stimuli and facial 
expressions. Psychology and Aging, 22, 147-159.  
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2008). Looking while unhappy: 
Mood-congruent gaze in young adults, positive gaze in older adults. Psychological 
Science, 19, 848–853. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., & Neupert, S. D. (2009). Use of gaze for real-time mood 
regulation: Effects of age and attentional functioning. Psychology and Aging, 24, 
989–994. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A., Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2006a). Selective 
preference in visual fixation away from negative images in old age? An eye-tracking 
study. Psychology and Aging, 21, 40-48. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A., Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2006b). Is there an age-
related positivity effect in visual attention? A comparison of two methodologies. 
Emotion, 6, 511-516. 
Ihssen, N., & Keil, A. (2009). The costs and benefits of processing emotional stimuli during 
rapid serial visual presentation. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 296-326. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1999). Ironic effects of repetition: Measuring age-related differences in 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
25, 3-22. 
Jansari, A., & Parkin, A. J. (1996). Things that go bump in your life: Explaining the 
reminiscence bump in autobiographical memory. Psychology and Aging, 11, 85–91. 
John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2004). Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: Personality 
processes, individual differences, and life span development. Journal of Personality, 
72, 1301-1334. 
Keil, A., & Ihssen, N. (2004). Identification facilitation for emotionally arousing verbs 
during the attentional blink. Emotion, 4, 23-35. 
 
 153 
Kennedy, Q., Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2004). The role of motivation in the age-
related positivity effect in autobiographical memory. Psychological Science, 15, 208-
214. 
Kensinger, E. A. (2008). Age differences in memory for arousing and nonarousing emotional 
words. Journal of Gerontology, 63B, 13-18. 
Kensinger, E. A., & Corkin, S. (2003). Memory enhancement for emotional words: Are 
emotional words more vividly remembered than neutral words? Memory & 
Cognition, 31, 1169-1180. 
Kensinger, E. A., Garoff-Eaton, R. J., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). How negative emotion 
enhances the visual specificity of a memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 
1872-1887. 
Kensinger, E. A., Growdon, J. H., Brierley, B., Medford, N., & Corkin, S. (2002). Effects of 
normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease on emotional memory. Emotion, 2, 118–134. 
Kensinger, E. A., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Neural processes supporting young and older 
adults’ emotional memories. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 1161–1173 
Kern, R. P., Libkuman, T. M., Otani, H., & Holmes, K. (2005). Emotional stimuli, divided 
attention, and memory. Emotion, 5, 408-417. 
Kim, S., Healey, M. K., Goldstein, D., Hasher, L., & Wiprzycka, U. J. (2008). Age 
differences in choice satisfaction: A positivity effect in decision making. Psychology 
and Aging, 23, 33-38. 
Knight, M., Seymour, T. L., Gaunt, J. L., Baker, C., Nesmith, K., & Mather, M. (2007). 
Aging and goal-directed emotional attention: Distraction reverses emotional biases. 
Emotion, 7, 705–714. 
Kornell, N., Rhodes, M. G., Castel, A. D., & Tauber, S. K. (2011). The ease-of-processing 
heuristic and the stability bias: Dissociating memory, memory beliefs, and memory 
judgments. Psychological Science, 22, 787-794. 
 
 154 
Kray, J., & Lindenberger, U. (2000). Adult age differences in task switching. Psychology and 
Aging, 15, 126-147. 
Kringelbach, M. L. (2005). The human orbitofrontal cortex: Linking reward to hedonic 
experience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 691-702. 
Kulas, J. F., Conger, J. C., & Smolin, J. M. (2003). The effects of emotion on memory: An 
investigation of attentional bias. Anxiety Disorders, 17, 103-113.  
Kunzmann, U., & Grühn, D. (2005). Age differences in emotional reactivity: The sample 
case of sadness. Psychology and Aging, 20, 47-59. 
Kunzmann, U., Little, T., & Smith, J. (2000). Is age-related stability of subjective well-being 
a paradox? Cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence from the Berlin Aging Study. 
Psychology and Aging, 15, 511-526. 
Kunzmann, U., & Richter, D. (2009). Emotional reactivity across the adult life span: The 
cognitive pragmatics make a difference. Psychology and Aging, 24, 879-889. 
Kwon, Y., Scheibe, S., Samanez-Larkin, G., Tsai, J. L., & Carstensen, L. L. (2009). 
Replicating the positivity effect in picture memory in Koreans: Evidence for cross-
cultural generalizability. Psychology and Aging, 24, 748-754. 
Labouvie-Vief, G., Lumley, M. A., Jain, E., & Heinze, H. (2003). Age and gender 
differences in cardiac reactivity and subjective emotion responses to emotional 
autobiographical memories. Emotion, 3, 115-126. 
Lahar, C. J., Isaak, M. I., & McArthur, A. (2001). Age differences in the magnitude of the 
attentional blink. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 8, 149-159. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2001). International affective picture system 
(IAPS): Instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical Report A-5. The Centre 
for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Lang, F. R., & Carstensen, L. L. (2002). Time counts: Future time perspective, goals, and 
social relationships. Psychology and Aging, 17, 125-139. 
 
 155 
Langeslag, S. J. E., & van Strien, J. W. (2009). Aging and emotional memory: The co-
occurrence of neurophysiological and behavioral positivity effects. Emotion, 9, 369-
377. 
Langley, L. K., Rokke, P. D., Stark, A. C., Saville, A. L., Allen, J. L., & Bagne, A. G. 
(2008). The emotional blink: Adult age differences in visual attention to emotional 
information. Psychology and Aging, 23, 873-885. 
Langton, S. R. H., Watt, R. J., & Bruce, V. (2000).  Do the eyes have it? Cues to the direction 
of social attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 50-59.  
Lawton, M. P. (1996). Quality of life and affect in later life. In C. Magai & S. H. McFadden 
(Eds.), Handbook of emotion, adult development and aging (pp. 327–348). San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Lawton, M. P., Kleban, M. H., Rajagopal, D., & Dean, J. (1992). Dimensions of affective 
experience in three age groups. Psychology and Aging, 7, 171-184. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological stress and the coping process. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Leclerc, C. M., & Kensinger, E. A. (2008). Age-related differences in medial prefrontal 
activation in response to emotional images. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 8, 153–164. 
Leclerc, C. M., & Kensinger, E. A. (2010). Age-related valenced-based reversal in 
recruitment of medial prefrontal cortex on a visual search task. Social Neuroscience, 
5, 560–576. 
LeDoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. A. (2004). Emotional networks in the brain. In M. Lewis and J. 
M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 2
nd
 edition (pp. 159-179). New 
York: Guildford Press. 
Lee, L. O., & Knight, B. G. (2009). Attentional bias for threat in older adults: Moderation of 




Leigland, L. A., Schulz, L. E., & Janowsky, J. S. (2004). Age related changes in emotional 
memory. Neurobiology of Aging, 25, 1117-1124. 
Levenson, R. W., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1990). Voluntary facial action generates 
emotion-specific autonomic nervous system activity. Psychophysiology, 27, 363-384. 
Levine, L. J., & Bluck, S. (1997). Experienced and remembered emotional intensity in older 
adults. Psychology and Aging, 12, 514–523. 
Levine, L. J., & Pizarro, D. A. (2004). Emotion and memory: A grumpy overview. Social 
Cognition, 22, 530-554. 
Libkuman, T. M., Stabler, C. L., & Otani, H. (2004). Arousal, valence, and memory for 
detail. Memory, 12, 237-247. 
Löckenhoff, C. E., & Carstensen, L. L. (2007). Aging, emotion, and health-related decision 
strategies: Motivational manipulations can reduce age differences. Psychology and 
Aging, 22, 134-146. 
Maciokas, J. B., & Crognale, M. A. (2003). Cognitive and attentional changes with age: 
Evidence from attentional blink deficits. Experimental Aging Research, 29, 137-153. 
MacDonald, G., & Lipp, O. V. (2008). Mortality salience reduces attentional bias for fear-
relevant animals. Motivation and emotion, 32, 243-250. 
MacKay, D., Shafto, M., Taylor, J. K., Marian, D. E., Abrams, L., & Dyer, J. R. (2004). 
Relations between emotion, memory, and attention: Evidence from taboo Stroop, 
lexical decision, and immediate memory tasks. Memory & Cognition, 32, 474-488. 
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 15-20. 
MacPherson, S. E., Phillips, L. H., & Della Sala, S. (2002). Age, executive function and 
social decision-making: A dorsolateral prefrontal theory of cognitive aging. 
Psychology and Aging, 17, 598–609. 
 
 157 
Madden, D. J., Whiting, W. L., Cabeza, R., Huettel, S. A. (2004). Age-related preservation of 
top-down attentional guidance during visual search. Psychology and Aging, 19, 304-
309. 
Maddox, G. L. (1963). Activity and morale: A longitudinal study of selected elderly subjects. 
Social Forces, 42, 195-204. 
Malatesta, C., Izard, C. E., Culver, C., & Nicolich, M. (1987). Emotion communication skills 
in young, middle-aged and older women. Psychology and Aging, 2, 193–203. 
Malykhin, N. V., Bouchard, T. P., Camicioli, R., Coupland, N. J. (2008). Aging hippocampus 
and amygdala. NeuroReport, 19, 543-547. 
Martens, S., & Wyble, B. (2010). The attentional blink: Past, present, and future of a blind 
spot in perceptual awareness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 947-957. 
Martinez, A. M., & Benavente, R. ``The AR face database," CVC Tech. Report #24, 1998. 
Masson, M. E. J., Carroll, M., & Micco, A. (1995). Attributions of fluency in fame 
judgments by younger and older Adults. Canadian Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 49, 287-312. 
Mather, M., Canli, T., English, T., Whitfield, S., Wais, P., Ochsner, K., Garieli, J. D. E., & 
Carstensen, L. L. (2004). Amygdala responses to emotionally valenced stimuli in 
older and younger adults. Psychological Science, 15, 259-263. 
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2003). Aging and attentional biases for emotional faces. 
Psychological Science, 14, 409-415. 
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Aging and motivated cognition: The positivity effect 
in attention and memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 496–502. 
Mather, M., & Johnson, M. K. (2000). Choice-supportive source monitoring: Do our 
decisions seem better to use as we age? Psychology and Aging, 15, 596-606. 
Mather, M., & Knight, M. (2005). Goal-directed memory: The role of cognitive control in 
older adults’ emotional memory. Psychology and Aging, 20, 554–570. 
 
 158 
Mather, M., & Knight, M. R. (2006). Angry faces get noticed quickly: Threat detection is not 
impaired among older adults. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 61B, 
54-57. 
Mathews, A., & Mackintosh, B. (1998). A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety. 
Cognitive Therapy Research, 22, 539–560. 
McCarley, J. S., Kramer, A. F., Colcombe, A. M., & Scialfa, C. T. (2004). Priming of pop-
out in visual search: A comparison of young and old adults. Aging, Neuropsychology, 
and Cognition, 11, 80-88. 
McCoy, S. L., Tun, P. A., Cox, L. C., Colangelo, M., Stewart, R. A., & Wingfield, A. (2005). 
Hearing loss and perceptual effort: Downstream effects on older adults' memory for 
speech. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental 
Psychology, 58, 22-33. 
McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O., & Jacoby, L. L. (2008). New considerations in aging and 
memory: The glass may be half full. In F. I. M. Craik & T. A. Salthouse (Eds.), The 
handbook of aging and cognition, 3rd edition (pp. 251-310). New York: Psychology 
Press. 
McDowell, C. L., Harrison, D. W., & Demaree, H. A. (1994). Is right hemisphere decline in 
the perception of emotion a function of aging? International Journal of Neuroscience, 
79, 1–11. 
McRae, K., Jacobs, S. E., Ray, R. D., John, O. P., Gross, J. J. (2012). Individual differences 
in reappraisal ability: Links to reappraisal frequency, well-being, and cognitive 
control. Journal of Research in Personality, 46, 2-7. 
Mickley Steinmetz, K. R., Muscatell, K. A., Kensinger, E. A. (2010). The effect of valence 
on young and older adults’ attention in a rapid serial visual presentation task. 
Psychology and Aging, 25, 239-245.  
 
 159 
Mikels, J. A., Larkin, G. R., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., & Carstensen, L .L. (2005). Divergent 
trajectories in the aging mind: Changes in working memory for affective versus visual 
information with age. Psychology and Aging, 20, 542-553. 
Milan, A. (2011). Age and sex structure: Canada, provinces and territories, 2010 (Report 
No. 91-209-X). Retrieved from Statistics Canada website: http:// 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-209-x/2011001/article/11511-eng.htm#a2 
Miller, E. K. (2000). The prefrontal cortex and cognitive control. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 1, 59–65. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1998). A cognitive-motivational analysis of anxiety. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 36, 809–848. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1999). Orienting attention to threatening facial expressions 
presented under conditions of restricted awareness. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 713-
740. 
Monti, L. A., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Reminger, S. L., Rinaldi, J. A., Wilson, R. S., & Fleischman, 
D. A. (1996). Differential effects of aging and Alzheimer's disease on conceptual 
implicit and explicit memory. Neuropsychology, 10, 101-112. 
Moreno, C., Borod, J., Welkowitz, J., & Alpert, M. (1993). The perception of facial emotion 
across the adult life span. Developmental Neuropsychology, 9, 305–314. 
Morris, W. N. (1989). Mood: The frame of mind. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Mossman, K. (2009, April). Brain trainers: A workout for the mind. Scientific American 
Mind. Retrieved from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=brain-
trainers 
Mroczek, D. K., & Almeida, D. M. (2004). The effect of daily stress, personality, and age on 
daily negative affect. Journal of Personality, 72, 355-378. 
 
 160 
Mroczek, D. K., & Kolarz, C. M. (1998). The effect of age on positive and negative affect: A 
developmental perspective on happiness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 75, 1333-1349. 
Murphy, N. A., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2008). Preferences for emotional information in older 
and younger adults: A meta-analysis of memory and attention tasks. Psychology and 
Aging, 23, 263–286. 
Murphy, F. C., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Lawrence, A. D. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of 
emotion: A meta-analysis. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, 3, 
207-233. 
Myers, D. G., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? Psychological Science, 6, 10-19. 
Nashiro, K., Sakaki, M., & Mather, M. (2011). Age differences in brain activity during 
emotion processing: Reflections of age-related decline or increased emotion 
regulation? Gerontology. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1159/000328465 
Nelson, H. E. (1992). The National Adult Reading test (NART-R): Test manual. Windsor, 
UK: NFER. 
Neshat-Doost, H. T., Dalgleish, T., & Golden, A. J. (2008). Reduced specificity of emotional 
autobiographical memories following self-regulation depletion. Emotion, 8, 731–736. 
Nielsen, L., Knutson, B., & Carstensen, L. L. (2008). Affect dynamics, affective forecasting, 
and aging. Emotion, 8, 318-330. 
Nyberg, L., Maitland, S. B., Rönnlund, M., Bäckman, L., Dixon, R. A., Wahlin, Å., et al. 
(2003). Selective adult age differences in an age-invariant multi-factor model of 
declarative memory. Psychology and Aging, 18, 149–160. 
Ochsner, K. N. (2000). Are affective events richly recollected or simply familiar? The 
experience and process of recognizing feelings past. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 129, 242-261. 
 
 161 
Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross, J. J., Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002). Rethinking feelings: An 
fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 14, 1215-1229. 
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 9, 242-249. 
Ogawa, T., & Suzuki, N. (2004). On the saliency of negative stimuli: Evidence from 
attentional blink. Japanese Psychological Research, 46, 20-30. 
Öhman, A. (2000). Fear and anxiety: Clinical, evolutionary, and cognitive perspectives, In 
M. Lewis and J. M. Haviland (Eds.) Handbook of emotions, 2
nd
 ed. (pp. 709-729). 
New York: Guildford Press. 
Öhman, A., Lundqvist, D., & Esteves, F. (2001). The face in the crowd revisited: A threat 
advantage with schematic stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 
381-396. 
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). The secret life of fluency. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 
237-241. 
Orgeta, V. (2011). Avoiding threat in late adulthood: Testing two life span theories of 
emotion. Experimental Aging Research, 37, 449-472. 
Park, D. C., Lautenschlager, G., Hedden, T., Davidson, N. S., Smith, A. D., & Smith, P. K. 
(2002). Models of visuospatial and verbal memory across the adult life span. 
Psychology and Aging, 17, 299-320. 
Pethtel, O., & Chen, Y. (2010). Cross-cultural aging in cognitive and affective components 
of subjective well-being. Psychology and Aging, 25, 725-729. 
Petrican, R., Moscovitch, M., & Schimmack, U. (2008). Cognitive resources, valence, and 




Pfefferbaum, A., Sullivan, E. V., Rosenbloom, M. J., Mathalon, D. H., & Lim, K. O. (1998). 
A controlled study of cortical gray matter and ventricular changes in alcoholic men 
over a 5-year interval. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 905-912. 
Phillips, L. H., Henry, J. D., Hosie, J. A., & Milne, A. B.(2006). Age, anger regulation and 
well-being. Aging and Mental Health, 10, 250-256. 
Phillips, L. H., MacLean, R. D. J., & Allen, R. (2002). Aging and the perception and 
understanding of emotions. Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological 
Sciences and Social Sciences, 57, 526 –530. 
Pichora-Fuller, M. K., & MacDonald, E. (2009). Sensory aging: Hearing. In P. R. Hof & C. 
V. Mobbs (Eds.), Handbook of the neuroscience of aging (pp. 193–198). Burlington: 
Elsevier/Academic Press. 
Piolino, P., Coste, C., Martinello, P., Mace, A., Quinette, P., Guillery-Girard, B., & 
Belleville, S. (2010). Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory and aging: Do 
the executive and feature binding functions of working memory have a role? 
Neuropsychologia, 48, 429–440. 
Pinkham, A. E., Griffin, M., Baron, R., Sasson, N. J., & Gur, R. C. (2010). The face in the 
crowd effect: Anger superiority when using real faces and multiple identities. 
Emotion, 10, 141-146. 
Rahhal, T. A., May, C. P., & Hasher, L. (2002). Truth and character: Sources that older 
adults can remember. Psychological Science, 13, 101-105. 
Raz, N. (2005). The aging brain observed in vivo: Differential changes and their modifiers. 
In R. Cabeza, L. Nyberg, & D. Park (Eds.), Cognitive neuroscience of aging: Linking 
cognitive and cerebral aging (pp.19-57). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, N., Lindenberger, U., Rodrigue, K. M., Kennedy, K. M., Head, D., Williamson, A., 
Dahle, C., Gerstorf, D., & Acker, J. D. (2005). Regional brain changes in aging 




Raz, N., Rodrigue, K. M., Head, D., Kennedy, K. M., & Acker, J. D. (2004). Differential 
aging of the medial temporal lobe: A study of a five-year change. Neurology, 62, 433-
438. 
Reitan, R. M., & Wolfson, D. (1985). The Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test Battery: 
Therapy and clinical interpretation. Tucson, AZ: Neuropsychological Press. 
Rendell, P. G., Phillips, L. H., Henry, J., D., Brumby-Rendell, T., de la Piedad Garcia, X., 
Altgassesn, M., & Kliegel, M. (2011). Prospective memory, emotional valence and 
ageing. Cognition and Emotion, 25, 916-925. 
Resnick, S. M., Pham, D. L., Kraut, M. A., Zonderman, A. B., & Davatzikos, C. (2003). 
Longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging studies of older adults: A shrinking brain. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 3295-3301. 
Rhodes, M. G., & Castel, A. D. (2008). Memory predictions are influenced by perceptual 
information: Evidence for metacognitive illusions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 137, 615-625. 
Richards, J. M., & Gross, J. J. (1999). Composure at any cost? The cognitive consequences 
of emotion suppression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1033-1044. 
Richards, J. M., & Gross, J. J. (2000). Emotion regulation and memory: The cognitive costs 
of keeping one’s cool. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 410-424. 
Riediger, M., Schmiedek, F., Wagner, G. G., & Lindenberger, U. (2009). Seeking pleasure 
and seeking pain: Differences in prohedonic and contra-hedonic motivation from 
adolescence to old age. Psychological Science, 20, 1529-1535. 
Ritchey, M., Bessette-Symons, B., Hayes, S. M., & Cabeza, R. (2011). Emotion processing 
in the aging brain is modulated by semantic elaboration. Neuropsychologia, 49, 640–
650. 
Rocke, C., Li, S.-C., & Smith, J. (2009). Intraindividual variability in positive and negative 
affect over 45 days: Do older adults fluctuate less than young adults? Psychology & 
Aging, 24, 863-878. 
 
 164 
Rolls, E. (2004). The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex. Brain and Cognition, 55, 11-29. 
Rolls, E. T. (2005). Emotions explained. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rönnlund, M., Nyberg, L., Bäckman, L., Nilsson, L.-G. (2005). Stability, growth, and 
decline in adult life span development of declarative memory: Cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data from a population-based study. Psychology and Aging, 20, 3–18. 
Ros, L., & Latorre, J. M. (2010). Gender and age differences in the recall of affective 
autobiographical memories using the autobiographical memory test. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 49, 950–954. 
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 296-320. 
Rubin, D. C., & Schulkind, M. D. (1997). Distribution of important and word-cued 
autobiographical memories in 20-, 35-, and 70-year-old adults. Psychology and 
Aging, 12, 524–535. 
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39, 1161-78. 
Russell, J. A. (1983). Pancultural aspects of the human conceptual organization of emotions. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 1281-1288. 
Russell, J. A., & Feldman Barrett, L. (1999). Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, 
and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 76, 805-819.  
Salthouse, T. A. (1991). Mediation of adult age differences in cognition by reductions in 
working memory and speed of processing. Psychological Science, 2, 179-183. 
Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Influence of processing speed on adult age differences in working 
memory. Acta Psychologica, 79, 155-170. 
Salthouse, T. A. (1994). The nature of the influence of speed on adult age differences in 
cognition. Developmental Psychology, 30, 240-259. 
 
 165 
Salthouse, T. A., (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition. 
Psychological Review, 103, 403-428. 
Salthouse, T. A. (2012). Consequences of age-related cognitive declines. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 63, 201-226. 
Schachter, S. S., & Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinant of 
emotional state. Psychological Review, 69, 379-399. 
Schaie, K. W. (1996a). Intellectual functioning in adulthood. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie 
(Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of aging (4
th
 ed., pp. 266-286). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Schaie, K. W. (1996b). Intellectual development in adulthood: The Seattle Longitudinal 
Study. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Schaie, K. W. (2005). Developmental influences on adult intelligence: The Seattle 
Longitudinal Study. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Scheibe, S. (2011, March). Beyond  motivation: Emotion regulation may become more 
efficient and effective with age. Talk given at the Fredda Blanchard-Fields Memorial 
Conference, Georgia, Atlanta, USA. 
Scheibe, S., & Blanchard-Fields, F. (2009). Effects of regulating emotions on cognitive 
performance: What is costly for young adults is not so costly for older adults. 
Psychology and Aging, 24, 217-223. 
Scheibe, S., & Carstensen, L. L. (2010). Emotional aging: Recent findings and future trends. 
Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 65B, 135–144. 
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process 
approach, In K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (pp. 293–
317). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
 166 
Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal considered as a process of multi-level sequential checking, 
In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: 
Theory, methods, and research (pp. 92-120). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schlagman, S., Kliegel, M., Schulz, J., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2009). Differential effects of age 
on involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memory. Psychology and Aging, 24, 
397–411. 
Schneider, B. A., & Pichora-Fuller, M. K. (2000). Implications of perceptual deterioration for 
cognitive aging research. In F. I. M. Craik & T. A. Salthouse (Eds.), The handbook of 
aging and cognition, 2
nd
 edition (pp. 155–219). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Schnitzspahn, K. M., Horn, S. S., Bayen, U. J., & Kliegel, M. (2011, August 15). Age effects 
in emotional prospective memory: Cue valence differentially affects the prospective 
and retrospective component. Psychology and Aging. Advance online publication. 
doi: 10.1037/a0025021 
Schulz, R. (1982). Emotionality and aging: A theoretical and empirical analysis. Journal of 
Gerontology, 37, 42–51. 
Serra, M. J., Dunlosky, J., & Hertzog, C. (2008). Do older adults show less confidence in 
their monitoring of learning? Experimental Aging Research, 34, 379-391. 
Serrano, J. P., Latorre. J. M., & Gatz, M. (2007). Autobiographical memory in older adults 
with and without depressive symptoms. International Journal of Clinical and Health 
Psychology, 7, 41–57. 
Shamaskin, A. M., Mikels, J. A., & Reed, A. E. (2010). Getting the message across: Age 
differences in the positive and negative framing of health care messages. Psychology 
and Aging, 25, 746-751. 
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. 
Psychological Review, 84, 127-190. 
 
 167 
Shiota, M. N., & Levenson, R. W. (2009). Effects of aging on experimentally instructed 
detached reappraisal, positive reappraisal, and emotional behavior suppression. 
Psychology and Aging, 24, 890-900. 
Smith, C. D., Walton, A., Loveland, A. D., Umberger, G. H., Kryscio, R. J., & Gash, D. M. 
(2005). Memories that last in old age: Motor skill learning and memory preservation. 
Neurobiology of Aging, 26, 883-890. 
Smith, D. P., Hillman, C. H., & Duley, A. (2005). Influences of age on emotional reactivity 
during picture processing. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 60B, 49-
56. 
Smith, S. D., Most, S. B., Newsome, L. A., & Zald, D. A. (2006). An emotion-induced 
attentional blink elicited by aversively conditioned stimuli. Emotion, 6, 523-527. 
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social 
behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. In M. 
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 24 (pp. 93–159). 
Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Spielman, L. A., Pratto, F., & Bargh, J. A. (1988). Automatic affect: Are one’s moods, 
attitudes, evaluations and emotions out of control? American Behavioral Scientist, 31, 
296-311. 
Spreen, O., & Strauss, E. (1998). A compendium of neuropsychological tests. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
St. Jacques, P., Dolcos, F., & Cabeza, R. (2010). Effects of aging on functional connectivity 
of the amygdala during negative evaluation: A network analysis of fMRI data. 
Neurobiology of Aging, 31, 315–327. 
Statistics Canada. (2009). Life satisfaction, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-625-x/2010002/article/11264-eng.htm 




Statistics Canada. (2009). Perceived life stress, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-625-x/2010002/article/11266-eng.htm 
Statistics Canada. (2010). Population projections: Canada, the provinces and territories. 
Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/100526/dq100526b-eng.htm 
Stein, T., Peelen, M. V., Funk, J., & Seidl, K. N. (2010). The fearful-face advantage is 
modulated by task demands: Evidence from the attentional blink. Emotion, 10, 136-
140. 
Strough, J., Mehta, C. M., McFall, J. P., & Schuller, K. L. (2008). Are older adults less 
subject to the sunk-cost fallacy than younger adults? Psychological Science, 19, 650-
652. 
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. (2004a). Emotion recognition deficits in the elderly. 
International Journal of Neuroscience, 114, 403–432. 
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. (2004b). Social understanding: How does it fare with advancing 
years? British Journal of Psychology, 95, 1–18. 
Talmi, D., & Moscovitch, M. (2004). Can semantic relatedness explain the enhancement of 
memory for emotional words? Memory & Cognition, 32, 742-751. 
Thomas, R. C., & Hasher, L. (2006). The influence of emotional valence on age differences 
in early processing and memory. Psychology and Aging, 21, 821-825. 
Tomaszczyk, J. C., & Fernandes, M. A.  (in press).  A positivity effect in autobiographical 
memory, but not phonemic fluency, in older adults.  Aging, Neuropsychology, and 
Cognition, doi:10.1080/13825585.2011.646940 
Tomaszczyk, J. C., Fernandes, M. A., & MacLeod, C. M. (2008). Personal relevance 
modulates the positivity bias in recall of emotional pictures in older adults. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 191-196. 
Tomkins, S. S., & McCarter, R. (1964). What and where are the primary affects: Some 
evidence for a theory. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 18, 119-158. 
 
 169 
Tottenham , N., Tanaka, J. W., Leon, A. C., McCarry, T. , Nurse, M., Hare, T. A., Marcus, 
D. J.,  Westerlund, A. , Casey, B. J., &  Nelson, C. (2009).  The NimStim set of facial 
expressions: Judgments from untrained research participants. Psychiatry Research, 
168, 242-249. 
Trippe, R. H., Hewig, J., Heydel, C., Hecht, H., Miltner, W. H. R. (2007).  Attentional blink 
to emotional and threatening pictures in spider phobics: Electrophysiology and 
behavior. Brain Research, 1148, 149-160. 
Troyer, A. K., Moscovitch, M., & Winocur, G. (1997). Clustering and switching as two 
components of verbal fluency: Evidence from younger and older healthy adults. 
Neuropsychology, 11, 138–146. 
Tsai, J. L., Levenson, R. W., & Carstensen, L. L. (2000). Autonomic, subjective, and 
expressive responses to emotional films in older and younger Chinese Americans and 
European Americans. Psychology and Aging, 15, 684-693. 
Tun, P. A. (1998). Fast noisy speech: Age differences in processing rapid speech with 
background noise. Psychology and Aging, 17, 453-467. 
Uchino, B.N., Birmingham, W., & Berg, C.A. (2010). Are older adults less or more 
physiologically reactive? A meta-analysis of age-related differences in cardiovascular 
reactivity to laboratory tasks. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 65B, 
154–162 
United Nations Population Fund. (2011). State of the world population 2011. Retrieved from 
http://foweb.unfpa.org/SWP2011/reports/EN-SWOP2011-FINAL.pdf 
Urry, H. L., & Gross, J. J. (2010). Emotion regulation in older age. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 19, 352-357. 
Verhaeghen, P. (2003). Aging and vocabulary scores: A meta-analysis. Psychology and 
Aging, 18, 332–339. 
 
 170 
Volkow, N. D., Wang, G. J., Fowler, J. S., Ding, Y. S., Gur, R. C., Logan, J., Moberg, P.J., 
Hitzemann, R., Smith, G., & Pappas, N. (1998). Parallel loss of presynaptic and 
postsynaptic dopamine markers in normal aging. Annals of Neurology, 44, 143-147. 
Wallis, J. D. (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex and its contribution to decision-making. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 30, 31-56. 
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1994). The PANAS-X: Manual for the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule-Expanded form. Unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-70. 
Watson, D., & Tellegen, A. (1985).Toward a consensual structure of mood. Psychological 
Bulletin, 98, 219-235. 
Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Balota, D. A. (2004). Attempting to avoid false 
memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm: Assessing the combined 
influence of practice and warnings in young and old adults. Memory & Cognition, 32, 
135-141. 
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III. San Antonio, TX: The 
Psychological Corporation. 
Weiskrantz, L. (1956). Behavioural changes associated with ablation of the amygdaloid 
complex in monkeys. Journal of Comparative Physiology and Psychology, 49, 381-
391. 
Werheid, K., Gruno, M., Kathmann, N., Fischer, H., Almkvist, O., & Winblad. B. (2010). 
Biased recognition of positive faces in aging and amnestic mild cognitive impairment. 
Psychology and Aging, 25, 1-15. 
West, R. (1996). An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive aging. 
Psychological Bulletin, 120, 272-292. 
 
 171 
West, R. (2000). In defense of the frontal lobe hypothesis of cognitive aging. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 6, 727-729. 
West, R. (2004). The effects of aging on controlled attention and conflict processing in the 
Stroop task. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 103-113. 
Whiting, W. L., Madden, D. J., Pierce, T. W., Allen, P. A. (2005). Searching from the top 
down: Ageing and attentional guidance during singleton detection. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology,58, 72-97. 
Wieser, M. J., Muhlberger, A., Kenntner-Mabiala, R., Pauli, P. (2006). Is emotion processing 
affected by advancing age? An event-related brain potential study. Brain Research, 
1096, 138-147. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (Eds.). (1997). Cognitive 
psychology and the emotional disorders (2nd Ed.). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Wingfield, A., Tun, P. A., & McCoy, S. L. (2005). Hearing loss in older adulthood: What it 
is and how it interacts with cognitive performance. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 14, 144-148. 
Worthy, D. A, Gorlick, M. A., Pacheco, J. L., Schnyer, D. M., & Maddox, W. T. (2011). 
With age comes wisdom: Decision making in younger and older adults. 
Psychological Science, 22, 1375-1380. 
Yang, L., & Hasher, L. (2011). Age differences in the automatic accessibility of emotional 
words from semantic memory. Cognition and Emotion, 25, 3–9. 
Yang, L., & Ornstein, T. J. (2011). The effect of emotion-focused orientation at retrieval on 
emotional memory in young and older adults. Memory, 19, 305–313. 
Yates, A., Ashwin, C., & Fox, E. (2010). Does emotion processing require attention? The 
effects of fear conditioning and perceptual load. Emotion, 10, 822-830. 
Yoon, C., Cole, C. A., & Lee, M. P. (2009). Consumer decision making and aging: Current 
knowledge and future directions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 2-16. 
 
 172 
Zald, D. H. (2003). The human amygdala and the emotional evaluation of sensory stimuli. 
Brain Research Reviews, 41, 88-123. 
Zelinski, E. M., & Burnight, K. P. (1997). Sixteen-year longitudinal and time lag changes in 
memory and cognition in older adults. Psychology and Aging, 12, 503-513. 
Zimmerman, C. A., & Kelley, C. M. (2010). “I’ll remember this!” Effects of emotionality on 
memory predictions versus memory performance. Journal of Memory and Language, 
62, 240-253. 
